Udell v. Haas

• Decision Date: 28 February 1968
• Citation: 235 N.E.2d 897,21 N.Y.2d 463,288 N.Y.S.2d 888
• Parties: , 235 N.E.2d 897 Daniel A. UDELL, Appellant, v. Richard HAAS, as Mayor of the Village of Lake Success et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 888

288 N.Y.S.2d 888

21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897

Daniel A. UDELL, Appellant, v. Richard HAAS, as Mayor of the Village of Lake Success et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 28, 1968.

Gerald Dickler, New York City, for appellant.

John M. Lewis and Michael K. Stanton, New York City, for respondents.

KEATING, Judge.

The issue on this appeal is whether a 1960 amendment to the Building Zone Ordinance (altering the Zoning Map) of the Village of Lake Success, which reclassified appellant's property from Business 'A' and 'B' to Residence 'C', is valid. Appellant claims that the rezoning was discriminatory, confiscatory and Ultra vires.

The background of the dispute it this: The Village of Lake Success is a small, suburban community in the extreme westerly portion of Nassau County. It has a rather irregular shape, but generally is bounded on the south by the Northern State Parkway and on the north and east by the Town of North Hempstead. To the west lies its giant neighbor, the City of New York.

The village is approximately two square miles in size. Running through it in a generally north-south direction is the main artery of the village, Lakeville Road. That street intersects with Northern Boulevard, a major east-west thoroughfare in this section of Long Island.

The village's northern boundary appears to be completely arbitrary. For the most part, it is to the south of Northern Boulevard. However, along Lakeville Road, the village reaches out in a northerly direction to touch Northern Boulevard. The area is not large and is neck-like in shape, consisting of several hundred feet on either side of Lakeville Road extending from Northern Boulevard some 750 feet to University Road on the west side of Lakeville Road and some 600 feet to Cumberland Avenue on the east. Cumberland Avenue and University Road form what may be described as the base of the neck.

Prior to the 1960 rezoning in question, almost the entire neck was zoned for business. For a distance of some 400 feet south of Northern Boulevard, the area was zoned Business 'A' which permitted retailing and similar uses as well as laboratories and office and public buildings. The rest of the neck was zoned Business 'B' where essentially the only nonresidential use allowed was neighborhood retaining.

Two parcels of land were initially the subject of this litigation. They are located in this neck and constitute a substantial portion of it. However, as a result of this litigation, only one parcel is now in question. It consists of approximately two and one-half acres, covering all of the area formerly zoned Business 'A' on the East side of Lakeville Road, except for a 100 by 100-foot plot in the northwest corner of the parcel at the intersection of Northern Boulevard and Lakeville Road which is occupied by a gasoline station. Twenty-four feet of the southern end of the parcel entend into the former Business 'B' zone. Appellant also owns land, adjacent to and east of this property in the Town of North Hempstead.

When appellant assembled this east parcel in 1951, the only use being made of this property was in the northerly portion facing Northern Boulevard. It was then being operated as a restaurant.

Also in 1951, plaintiff acquired two and one-half acres of vacant lots on the West side of Lakeville Road. This property covered almost the entire block from Lakeville Road to University Place, one block to the west of Lakeville Road, and from Northern Boulevard for a distance of approximately 500 feet to the south towards University Road, except for a few lots facing University Place to the west. Like the northwest corner of the east parcel, the northeast corner of this property is also occupied by a gas station, not owned by appellant.

The zoning amendment, ordinance No. 60, placed the entire neck, except for a 100-foot-wide strip adjacent to Northern Boulevard, in a Residence 'C' category. Thus, the northeast and the northwest corners of the east and west parcels, respectively, that is the land fronting on Northern Boulevard, are not directly involved in this proceeding since the rezoning did not affect those portions of appellant's property. Permitted uses in the new classification include public and religious buildings and residences with minimum plot size set at 13,000 square feet and minimum frontage of 100 feet on Lakeville Road.

The trial court held the rezoning with respect to the so-called West parcel unconstitutional as being confiscatory, but sustained the ordinance insofar as it affected the East parcel (Udell v. McFadyen, 40 Misc.2d 265, 243 N.Y.S.2d 156). The decision with respect to the west parcel rested on three grounds. First, there was the size and shape of the plot; second, the topography of the land, which sloped down some 15 feet from Lakeville Road to University Place; and third, the existing neighboring uses. After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the trial court concluded that 'residential zoning precludes use for any purpose to which it is reasonably adaptable' (40 Misc.2d 265, 271, 243 N.Y.S.2d 156, 162). It also held the rezoning to be discriminatory, of which more will be said later.

With respect to the east parcel, however, a contrary conclusion was reached as to the validity of the ordinance. In essence, the court held that since the appellant also owned contiguous lots fronting on Summer Avenue in the Town of North Hempstead, residential use was practical for the east parcel since the residences could face Summer Avenue. In addition, it found residential zoning would not be inconsistent with the character of the neighborhood and that a nursery school located on the south side of the east parcel was not incompatible with residential use. The problem raised by the commerce of Northern Boulevard could be remedied by appropriate fencing.

Both sides appealed this decision. During the pendency of the appeal, the village passed a second amendatory ordinance rezoning the West parcel into a new Business 'C' category, which permitted 'such scientific and/or research laboratory use, offices for executive, administrative, banking or professional purposes, libraries, schools, telephone exchanges and municipal building uses, as may be approved by the Village * * * upon recommendation of the Planning Board'. Following this second change, the village withdrew its appeal.

On the landowner's appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed. Justice Hopkins, dissenting, stated in a brief opinion that he could see no justification for treating the two properties differently and that the 'same considerations that prompted the declaration of the invalidity of the ordinance exist on the one side of Lakeville Road as on the other' (27 A.D.2d 750, 751, 279 N.Y.S.2d 701).

We hold that ordinance No. 60 is invalid with respect to the East parcel as well as the West parcel. We have concluded that the rezoning was discriminatory and that it was not done 'in accordance with (the) comprehensive plan' of the Village of Lake Success (Village Law, § 177). In our view, sound zoning principles were not followed in this case, and the root cause of this failure was a misunderstanding of the nature of zoning, and, even more importantly, of its relationship to the statutory requirement that it be 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan.'

Zoning is not just an expansion of the common law of nuisance. It seeks to achieve much more than the removal of obnoxious gases and unsightly uses. Underlying the entire concept of zoning is the assumption that zoning can be a vital tool for maintaining a civilized form of existence only if we employ the insights and the learning of the philosopher, the city planner, the economist, the sociologist, the public health expert and all the other professions concerned with urban problems.

This fundamental conception of zoning has been present from its inception. The almost universal statutory requirement that zoning conform to a 'well-considered plan' or 'comprehensive plan' is a reflection of that view. (See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1926).) The thought behind the requirement is that consideration must be given to the needs of the community as a whole. In exercising their zoning powers, the local authorities must act for the benefit of the community as a whole following a calm and deliberate consideration of the alternatives, and not because of the whims of either an articulate minority or even majority of the community. (De Sena v. Gulde, 24 A.D.2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dept., 1965).) Thus, the mandate of the Village Law (§ 177) is not a mere technicality which serves only as an obstacle course for public officials to overcome in carrying out their duties. Rather, the comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll.

Moreover, the 'comprehensive plan' protects the landowner from arbitrary restrictions on the use of his property which can result from the pressures which outaged voters can bring to bear on public officials. 'With the heavy presumption of constitutional validity that attaches to legislation purportedly under the police power, and the difficulty in judicially applying a 'reasonableness' standard, there is danger that zoning, considered as a self-contained activity rather than as a means to a broader end, may tyrannize individual property owners. Exercise of the legislative power to zone should be governed by rules and standards as clearly defined as possible, so that it cannot operate in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion, and will actually be directed to the health, safety, welfare and morals of the community. The more clarity and specificity required in the articulation of the premises upon which a particular zoning regulation is based, the more...