Ingle v. State

• Decision Date: 08 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 22S00-9611-DP-724.,22S00-9611-DP-724.
• Citation: 746 N.E.2d 927
• Parties: John INGLE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

746 N.E.2d 927

John INGLE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 22S00-9611-DP-724.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 8, 2001.

Michael J. McDaniel, McDaniel & Betteau, New Albany, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Andrew L. Hedges, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee. SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant John Ingle shot his estranged wife to death in a restaurant where she worked, then fired on a police officer as he attempted to escape. He was convicted of murdering and attempting to kidnap his wife and attempting to murder the police officer. We affirm the murder and attempted murder convictions.

Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder. Indiana law permits a death sentence only if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more "aggravating circumstances" specified by the legislature exist. Here, the State charged that Defendant killed his wife while attempting to take her hostage and while "lying in wait." We find that the State proved neither and so a death sentence is not permitted under Indiana law.

Background

The evidence at trial showed that Defendant John Ingle was upset that his wife, Debbie Ingle, had left him. On the evening of July 26, 1996, Defendant went to Debbie's place of employment, Tommy Lancaster's Bar, and threw a brick through the windshield of her car. On the morning of the 27th, Defendant watched from a concealed position as the police arrived to take a report from Debbie. After the police left, Defendant went and purchased clothes to use as a disguise. Defendant then returned to Tommy Lancaster's. When he walked in, Debbie immediately recognized him and she shouted for someone to call the police. As Debbie ran behind a counter, Defendant shot her. Five bullets struck Debbie, killing her.

Defendant then left the bar, concealing his gun. As he fled toward the Ohio River, he was soon confronted by Officer Russell Witt. He refused to comply when Officer Witt ordered him to lie down. When Officer Witt sprayed Defendant with mace to force him to comply, Defendant fired the remaining shots in his gun. One of the bullets struck the patrol car and four struck Officer Witt; three hit his protective vest and one went up his right arm into his chest, seriously injuring him.

A jury found Defendant guilty of Murder,¹ Attempted Murder,² a Class A felony, and Attempted Kidnapping, a Class A felony.³ Alleging two aggravating circumstances, Murder committed by lying in wait⁴ and Murder while Attempting Kidnapping,⁵ the State sought a sentence of death. The jury recommended death and the court sentenced Defendant to death. Additional sentences of 50 years for attempted kidnapping and 50 years for the attempted murder were imposed.

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant contends that his killing of Debbie Ingle constituted voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. He states, "events over the several weeks prior to the homicide merely support a factual basis which would cause an ordinary person to lose control...." Appellant's Br. at 44-45. When Defendant entered the bar and approached Debbie, she identified him and shouted for someone to call the police. Defendant contends that this incited his passions "to the extent it prevented deliberation." Id. at 44.

A person commits voluntary manslaughter when the person "knowingly or intentionally kills another human being while acting under sudden heat." Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a) (1993). Sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder. Id. § 35-42-1-3(b). Sudden heat occurs where provocation engenders rage, resentment, or terror sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, preventing deliberation and premeditation, excluding malice, and rendering a person incapable of cool reflection. See Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466, 474 (Ind.1998),

reh'g denied; Powers v. State, 696 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ind.1998).

Defendant states that he "placed the issue of sudden heat in the evidence," and "the prosecution bears the ultimate burden of negating any defense which is sufficiently raised by the defendant." Appellant's Br. at 43 (quoting Wolfe v. State, 426 N.E.2d 647, 652 (Ind.1981)).

We agree with that proposition but find that the State's evidence rebutted Defendant's sudden heat defense. As discussed under Background, supra, Defendant vandalized Debbie's car, waited for the police to leave, attempted to disguise himself, walked into the bar, and then opened fire when Debbie tried to run behind the counter. This evidence is sufficient for a jury to conclude that Defendant was not provoked and that his actions were deliberate. Defendant may well have been enraged that Debbie shouted for someone to call the police, but this is not "sufficient provocation" to establish sudden heat. It is predictable that one would call out for the police or for some kind of help when assaulted by a person with a gun. The prosecution sufficiently rebutted the Defendant's claim of sudden heat.

II

Defendant contends that he was entitled to have the jury instructed that it could convict him of attempted voluntary manslaughter, rather than attempted murder of Officer Witt, asserting that the officer's actions "engendered the rage, terror and anger which factually justify a finding of sudden heat." Appellant's Br. at 47.

When Defendant was intercepted by New Albany police officer Russell Witt during his flight toward the Ohio River after killing Debbie, he refused to comply when Officer Witt twice ordered him to lie on the ground. Officer Witt maced Defendant, who responded by shooting Officer Witt.

Defendant was not entitled to an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction on these facts. We addressed the same argument in Spranger v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1117 (Ind.1995), reh'g denied:

Because citizens have a duty to submit to a lawful arrest by a law enforcement officer, such an arrest will not be recognized as legally adequate to provoke the passions of an ordinary person to sudden heat so as to justify a conviction for the lesser offense of manslaughter.

Id. at 1122.

Defendant acknowledges that the officer's actions were "quite lawful and performed during an arrest." Appellant's Br. at 48. As such, they cannot be the basis for a sudden heat defense. The trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter.

III

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his requests for disqualification of the prosecuting attorney and for the appointment of a special prosecutor.

The basis of Defendant's claim stems from the relationship between Defendant's younger brother, Gordon Ingle, and the prosecuting attorney, Stanley Faith. Gordon, a lawyer, worked under Faith as a deputy prosecuting attorney between January 1, 1987, and July, 1989, and as a volunteer deputy until January, 1991. Gordon and Faith remained friends after Gordon stopped working at the prosecutor's office.

Gordon, Faith, and a mutual friend, James Hancock, had lunch together on the day before the killings, and Defendant was discussed in the conversation. The trial court probed the nature and substance of the conversation at a hearing on Defendant's motion to require the State to disclose all possible bases for the disqualification of the prosecuting attorney. Gordon testified that he could only "recall saying something to the effect that there was [going to] be a homicide/suicide in Floyd County." Hancock testified during the same hearing that the tenor of the conversation was that Defendant was out of control and that he "was going to do something." Hancock further testified that he did not recall any specific comments that Faith made during the conversation, but that Faith "indicated ... that he was aware that there was a protective order in effect and basically that from a ... law enforcement standpoint, that was probably all that could be done at that point."

Faith's presence at the conversation was never disclosed to the jury. Nevertheless, Defendant argues that the court should have granted his motion to disqualify Faith and appoint a special prosecutor; that Faith failed to disclose the extent of his personal knowledge of the conversation, resulting in prejudice to the Defendant; and that Defendant was incorrectly barred from calling Faith as a witness, frustrating Defendant's right to present a defense. We find, for reasons discussed below, that the trial court did not err in shielding Faith from testifying, and that there was no resulting prejudice to Defendant.

A

Defendant sought to call Faith as a witness to testify regarding his recollection of the conversation between Faith and Gordon in which Gordon discussed Defendant's state of mind. Defendant argues that Faith's recollection of the conversation would relate to the issue of Defendant's state of mind and would have therefore contributed to his defense.

Ordinarily, counsel is not subject to being called as a witness. See Chatman v. State, 263 Ind. 531, 545, 334 N.E.2d 673, 682 (1975)

. We stated in Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind.)

cert. denied, 504 U.S. 962, 112 S.Ct. 2320, 119 L.Ed.2d 238 (1992):

As a general rule, a prosecuting attorney cannot be called as a defense witness unless the testimony sought is required by compelling and legitimate need. The trial court in its discretion may deny the request if the prosecutor does not have information vital to the case. Where the evidence is easily available from other sources and absent "extraordinary circumstances" or "compelling reasons," an attorney who participates in a case should not be called as a witness.

Id. at 1206 (quotations in original) (citations omitted).

We see no basis for concluding that Faith had any information that was not easily available from other sources and, therefore, that the court properly shielded him from...