Inhabitants of Winslow v. Inhabitants of Troy

• Decision Date: 22 December 1902
• Citation: 53 A. 1008,97 Me. 130
• Parties: INHABITANTS OF WINSLOW v. INHABITANTS OF TROY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

53 A. 1008

97 Me. 130

INHABITANTS OF WINSLOW

v. INHABITANTS OF TROY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 22, 1902.

(Official.)

Exceptions from superior court, Kennebec county.

Action by the inhabitants of Winslow against the inhabitants of Troy for pauper supplies. Verdict for defendant. Motion for new trial and exceptions by plaintiff. Overruled.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and STROUT, SAVAGE, POWERS, PEABODY, and SPEAR, JJ.

C. F. Johnson, for plaintiff.

R. F. Dunton, J. R. Dunton, and W. C. Philbrook, for defendant.

SAVAGE, J. Action to recover for pauper supplies furnished to one Berneta Pomeroy, who is alleged to have a pauper settlement in the defendant town. The verdict was for the defendant. The case comes up on the plaintiff's exceptions and motion for a new trial. Several questions are presented, but it will be necessary to consider only one. For, if the pauper's settlement was not in the defendant town, it is unimportant here where it was. Assuming that the pauper's derivative settlement was in the defendant town, the defendant contends that that setdement was lost by her residence for five years in an unorganized place in this state, and, if not so, then by her marriage to one Lorenzo V. Pomeroy, who had a pauper settlement in the town of Starks. Eddington v. Brewer, 41 Me. 462. We consider only the questions relating to the marriage. The solemnization of the marriage is not disputed. But it was open to the plaintiff to show that the marriage was originally void, or that it had been annulled by judicial decree. The plaintiff claims that the marriage was subsequently annulled by a decree of the supreme judicial court of this state. If it was legally annulled, it is claimed, and properly, that the pauper's legal settlement must be regarded as not affected by the marriage. Reading v. Ludlow, 43 Vt. 628. So, if the marriage was void. On the other hand, if the marriage was not annulled, and if there is no proof of its invalidity, it must be held that the pauper took and still retains the settlement of her husband, and hence is not chargeable to the defendant town. And in such case all the other disputed questions become immaterial, whatever may have been the grounds upon which the jury based their verdict. The single question, therefore, is whether, upon the evidence in the case, the marriage was valid, and is still subsisting. If this be answered in the affirmative, the verdict must be sustained.

The record shows that a petition for annulment was presented to the court by Henry S. Doyen, claiming to be the guardian of the husband, who had been decreed to be a person of unsound mind. The petitioner described himself as guardian, and, after setting out alleged causes for annulment, prayed the court to annul the marriage. He signed the petition, "Henry S. Doyen, Guardian of Lorenzo V. Pomeroy." Upon this petition, notice was ordered and served upon Lorenzo V. Pomeroy; but, so far as appears, no notice was ordered or served upon Berneta Pomeroy, the wife.

It is clear that the petition gave the court no jurisdiction in the premises. It was the petition of the guardian, not that of the husband. Rev. St. c. 60, § 18, provides that, "when the validity of a marriage is doubted, either party may file a libel as for a divorce; and the court shall decree it annulled or affirmed according to the proof." It is unnecessary to decide whether the petition of one of the parties, by a guardian, would give the court jurisdiction, for that question is not presented. The statute says that "either party may file a libel as for a divorce." Here neither party to the marriage filed libel or petition. The decree was made upon the libel or petition of the guardian only. Upon this ground, therefore, it appears that the court had no jurisdiction to annul the marriage, and that the decree was void.

Furthermore, if the decree was made without notice to the wife, the result would be the same. It is elemental knowledge that the court has jurisdiction of parties to proceedings in court only after appearance or notice,—such notice as is prescribed by law. Notice to parties against whom process is brought lies at the very foundation of the administration of justice. Without notice to her, the court had no jurisdiction to make a decree affecting the rights or changing the status of the wife.

The want of jurisdiction is apparent upon the face of the record. The decree of nullity was absolutely void. It is well settled that a judgment thus void for want of jurisdiction may be attacked collaterally. In truth, it needs not to be attacked, for it cannot stand alone. Railroad Co. v. Weeks, 52 Me. 456. It follows that the settlement of the pauper was not affected by the attempted annulment of the marriage.

This conclusion is decisive of this case, unless it appears from the evidence that the husband was in fact of unsound mind and! Incapable of contracting marriage at the time of the marriage. If he was, the marriage was absolutely void, ab inito. Such is I the common law, and such, also, is the statute provision in this state as to marriages solemnized in this state. Unity v. Belgrade, 76 Me. 419; Bish. Mar. & Div. § 187; Rev. St. c. 59, § 2; Id. c. 60, § 1. Such a marriage may be impeached collaterally. Judgment of nullity is not required. Unity v. Belgrade, supra; Bish. Mar. & Div. § 187. The marriage in question was solemnized in Massachusetts, but, in the absence of proof of any statutory provisions upon the subject, it is to be presumed that the common law of Massachusetts is the same as in this state. Tllexan v. Wilson, 43 Me. 186; McKenzie v. W'ardwell. 61 Me. 136.

It was therefore open to proof in this case that the marriage was void by reason of the husband's unsoundness of mind. When a marriage is proved, it is presumed that the parties to it were...