Inhabitants of Unity v. Inhabitants of Belgrade

• Decision Date: 15 October 1884
• Citation: 76 Me. 419
• Parties: INHABITANTS OF UNITY v. INHABITANTS OF BELGRADE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

76 Me. 419

INHABITANTS OF UNITY v. INHABITANTS OF BELGRADE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

October 15, 1884

ON EXCEPTIONS.

Assumpsit to recover for pauper supplies furnished to Julia A. Jackson and her three children.

At the trial the plaintiffs introduced evidence of a marriage between Julia A. Jackson and one Gustavus A. Farnham whose settlement was admitted to be in the defendant town whereupon the defendants were permitted to introduce evidence, against the plaintiffs' objections, tending to prove that at the time of the marriage Farnham was insane. And the presiding justice instructed the jury that if they found that Farnham was insane at the time the marriage ceremony was performed, the marriage would be void, and the plaintiffs could not, for that reason, maintain this action.

To this ruling and instruction, the verdict being for the defendants the plaintiffs alleged exceptions.

William H. Fogler, for the plaintiffs.

It is not competent to question the validity of a marriage on account of the insanity of one of the parties in the trial of a collateral issue, such question can be determined only in a process instituted for the purpose of testing such validity. See definition of marriage in Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480.

The relation is publici juris. A decent regard for the rights of others, for the peace of mind of the parties to the marriage for the good name of children begotten by parents under the sanction of proper and lawful marriage ceremonies, demand that this question should not be made a foot-ball by contesting litigants, but that a marriage, duly solemnized according to the laws of the state, should be held sacred until the subject has been judicially investigated and the fact established by the proper tribunal, and in the way provided by the statute, for the government of all parties for all time.

The expediency, at least, of the method of procedure for which the plaintiffs contend is declared by the elementary writers. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 464, note 2; 2 Kent 77.

Although the marriage of a lunatic is absolutely void without any decree of nullity in Massachusetts, yet, the question whether lunacy existed to an extent to annul the marriage, can not be raised collaterally. The fact must be decided in such a way as to be fixed for all purposes and for all parties.

The same provision is made by the statute of New York.

In this state the question has not been judicially decided. In Atkinson v. Medford, 46 Me. 510, the question was not raised, or discussed, or decided.

It is an open question. The court is called upon first to determine what is right; what is salutary; what is for the good order of society, and the peace of mind of all persons who enter into the bonds of matrimony.

If it is best for the public, best for the parties concerned, that the validity of a marriage shall be questioned and brought into controversy, incidentally, to be decided in one way in one cause, and the contrary in another suit; that the social status of parents should be thrown into doubt, and the legitimacy of children brought into discredit, at the will of litigants, and left in doubt and discredit, even after the decision of the cause in which the question is raised, then, of course, the ruling of the judge at nisi prius must be sustained.

Baker, Baker and Cornish, for the defendants, cited: 1 Bish. Mar. and Div. § § 105 (49), and cases cited, 124, 125, 136; Ferlat v. Gojon, 1 Hop. Ch. 478; S. C. 14 Am. Dec. 554; Gathings v. Williams, 5 Ired. 487; S. C. 44 Am. Dec. 49, and note, p. 54; Elliott v. Gurr, 2 Phillim. 19; 1 Black. Com. p. [524], [526], [527]; Jenkins v. Jenkins Heirs, 2 Dana, (Ky.) 103; S. C. 26 Am. Dec. 437; Foster v. Means, 1 Speer's Eq. 569; S. C. 42 Am. Dec. 332; Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343; Crump v. Morgan, 3 Ired. Eq. 91; S. C. 40 Am. Dec. 447; Powell v. Powell, 18 Kan. 371; S. C. 26 Am. Rep. 774; note to Gathings v. Williams, 44 Am. Dec. 55, and cases; R. S., c. 59, § 2; R. S., c. 60, § 1; note to Jackson v. King, 15 Am. Dec. 368; see Wiser v. Lockwood, 42 Vt. 720; Middleboro' v. Rochester, 12 Mass. 363; Mountholly v. Andover, 11 Vt. 226; S. C. 34 Am. Dec. 685; Goshen v. Richmond, 4 Allen 460; Atkinson v. Medford, 46 Me. 510.

VIRGIN J.

As no person can contract a valid marriage when incapable of giving an intelligent consent thereto, the marriage of an insane person, though formally solemnized, is a nullity. Middleboro' v. Rochester, 12 Mass. 363; Atkinson v. Medford, 46 Me. 510; 1 Bish. Mar. & Div. (5th ed.) § § 105 and 125; Sch. Dom. Rel. 25, 29. Moreover the statute expressly provides, not only that, " no insane person is capable of contracting marriage," (R. S., c. 59, § 2) but also that such a marriage, " if solemnized in this state, is absolutely void." R. S., c. 60, § 1. And as the law, in the absence of any statutory requirement, does not require so useless a ceremony as that of annulling, by a special proceeding, a marriage which has no existence, but is absolutely void ab initio, its invalidity may be shown in any proceeding, in any court whenever the question arises collaterally. Sch. Dom. Rel. 24; 1 Bish. Mar. & Div. supra; Gathings v. Williams, 5 Ired 487; S. C. 44 Am. Dec. 49, and note, p. 54.

Such has been the invariable practice in this court ever since the separation. Thus in an action for the recovery of pauper supplies, the plaintiffs were permitted to impeach the validity of an alleged marriage of the female pauper, by showing that the marriage was solemnized by a minister at his own house, neither of the parties residing in that town as required by st. 1786, c 3; Ligonia v. Buxton, 2 Me. 102. So, in a similar action, proof was allowed that a former husband of a married woman was still living when she married another man. Pittston v. Wiscasset, 4 Me. 293; Harrison v. Lincoln, 48 Me. 205; Howland v. Burlington, 53 Me. 55; Augusta v. Kingfield, 36 Me. 235. So, in the trial of a writ of entry, the defendant was...