Inman v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1953
• Docket Number: No. 16713,16713
• Citation: 74 S.E.2d 423,223 S.C. 98
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: INMAN et al. v. LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA.

Page 423

74 S.E.2d 423

223 S.C. 98

INMAN et al. v. LIFE INS. CO. OF VIRGINIA.

No. 16713.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 5, 1953.

The Order of Judge HENDERSON follows:

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment rendered in this case by Magistrate Henry B. Richardson, in favor of the plaintiff, in the sum of $407.50.

On May 14, 1951, the defendant insurance company issued to the plaintiff a hospitalization policy of insurance, which provided for loss incurred resulting from "sickness (or disease) which first manifests itself at least thirty days after the policy date and does not involve a surgical operation, or which first manifests itself at least ninety days after the policy date and does involve a surgical operation, herein referred to as 'such sickness'." The controversy arises out of the proper construction of this clause of the policy.

On March 6, 1952, which is considerably more than ninety days after the date of the policy, the plaintiff was admitted to the Tuomey Hospital and underwent an operation for duodenal ulcer. The action was brought under the policy for the amount of the plaintiff's hospital and surgeon's bills, amounting to $407.50. The defendant contested the claim on the ground that the sickness or disease, duodenal ulcer, manifested itself within ninety days after the policy date.

There can be no doubt that the duodenal ulcer was chronic and first manifested itself about July 20, 1951, which was less than ninety days after the policy had been written, and I find as a fact that this chronic duodenal ulcer for which the plaintiff underwent surgery in March, 1952, was the same sickness or disease which originated in July, 1951. It extended continuously from July, 1951 to the time of the operation in March, 1952.

From July 20th to July 28th, 1951, Mrs. Inman received hospital treatment not involving a surgical operation, for this same chronic duodenal ulcer. That claim was paid, since the sickness manifested itself more than thirty days after the policy date.

The law is quite well settled that a policy of insurance is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly as against the company, and if by reason of ambiguity in the language employed in such a contract there is doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning, and if it is fairly susceptible of two interpretations, one favorable to the insured and the other favorable to the company, the former will be adopted. Sloan v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company, S.C., 72 S.E.2d 446.

The same principle is announced in Eaves v. Progressive Fire Insurance Company, 217 S.C. 365, 60 S.E.2d 687.

However, in cases where there is no ambiguity, contracts of insurance, like other contracts, must be construed according to the terms which the parties have used, to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Bolen v. Capital Life & Health Insurance Company, 208 S.C. 345, 38 S.E.2d 79. And it is said in Newell & Company v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, 199 S.C. 325, 19 S.E.2d 463, 466, that "If the intention of the parties is clear, the courts have no authority to change the...