Insinga v. LaBella

• Decision Date: 20 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 72322,72322
• Citation: 14 Fla. L. Weekly 214,543 So.2d 209
• Parties: 14 Fla. L. Weekly 214 John INSINGA, etc., Appellant, v. Michelle LaBELLA, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 209

543 So.2d 209

14 Fla. L. Weekly 214

John INSINGA, etc., Appellant, v.Michelle LaBELLA, et al., Appellees.

No. 72322.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 20, 1989.

Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow & Olin, P.A., and Freidin & Hirsh, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

Henry Burnett of Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot, P.A., Miami, for appellees.

William A. Bell, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for The Florida Hosp. Ass'n.

OVERTON, Justice.

This case is before us to answer the following question certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to rule 9.150,Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure:

Whether Florida law recognizes the corporate negligence doctrine and whether it would apply under the facts of this case.

Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249(11th Cir.1988).We have jurisdiction.Art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.

The facts as set forth in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion are as follows.

On January 19, 1981, an individual named Morton Canton admitted Mildred Insinga, who was 68 years old at the time, to Biscayne, a hospital in North Miami, Florida.At that time, Canton was masquerading as a medical doctor under the name of "Dr. Michelle LaBella."Mrs. Insinga died on February 6, 1981 while a patient in the hospital.It was subsequently discovered that Canton was not a medical doctor, but rather, a fugitive from justice in Canada where he was under indictment for the manufacture and sale of illegal drugs.Canton had fraudulently obtained a medical license from the State of Florida and staff privileges at Biscayne using the name of Dr. LaBella, a deceased Italian physician.

Insinga filed a wrongful death action against several defendants in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida.The amended complaint contained charges against (1) Dr. LaBella, a/k/a Canton, for negligence in failing to diagnose and properly treat Mrs. Insinga; (2) the Board of Medical Examiners of the State of Florida("Board"), for negligence in licensing Canton/LaBella; (3) the Department of Professional Regulation of the State of Florida("Department"), for negligence in issuing a license to Canton/LaBella; and (4) Humana, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Kentucky, for negligence in granting Canton/LaBella medical staff privileges.Because of the presence of two Florida defendants, there was not the requisite diversity of citizenship present to support removal of the case to federal court.

Canton was extradited to Canada and never served with process.The remaining defendants filed motions for summary judgment.During the pendency of these motions, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the Department.The Board's motion for summary judgment was granted on sovereign immunity grounds, but the state trial court denied Humana's motion.The state trial court entered a final judgment for the Board on June 3, 1986.

On the Monday following the expiration of 30 days from the date it received notice of the judgment in favor of the Board, Humana, as the sole remaining defendant, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida....

The jury trial against Humana began on August 25, 1986.In his opening statement, plaintiff's counsel stated that he intended to prove that Canton/LaBella negligently diagnosed and treated Mrs. Insinga and that, had she been properly treated, she would have had a 90% chance of survival.Counsel also said that he intended to prove that (1) Canton/LaBella was not a doctor, but a wanted criminal who had assumed the identity of a dead Italian physician; (2)he had fraudulently obtained a license from the State of Florida and staff privileges at Biscayne; (3) the hospital was negligent in failing to follow its own procedures to verify LaBella's application and because it breached the prevailing standard of care in granting him staff privileges; and (4) such lack of care was the cause of Mrs. Insinga's death.Although it is undisputed that Mrs. Insinga employed "Dr. LaBella" to treat her ailments several months before being admitted to Biscayne, the plaintiff claims that he and his wife relied on LaBella's representation that he had staff privileges at Biscayne in selecting him as her physician.

Prior to the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the district court, sua sponte, directed a verdict in favor of Humana.A written order followed on September 3, 1986, in which the district court concluded that, under Florida law, Humana did not owe Mrs. Insinga any duty of care and that, therefore, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action against Humana.The district court was persuaded that the case was governed by Reed v. Good Samaritan Hospital Ass'n, 453 So.2d 229, 230(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) in which the court held that, "a hospital is not vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor such as a physician in private practice to whom it has merely granted staff privileges."See also, Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So.2d 40(Fla.1953).The court distinguished the instant case from Beam v. University Hospital Building, Inc., 486 So.2d 672(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986), in which the court referred to the corporate negligence doctrine in dictum, on the basis that, unlike the plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in Beam did not have the opportunity to select his own physician.The district court further noted that, heretofore, the corporate negligence doctrine has not been explicitly adopted in Florida and declined to apply the doctrine to this case....

Id. at 250-51(footnote omitted; emphasis added).

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Insinga argued that Florida law recognizes the corporate negligence doctrine, which places direct liability on a hospital for failing to properly investigate a medically incompetent applicant for staff privileges.The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the law, as established by the Florida district courts of appeal and applied by the United States district judge, reaffirmed the independent contractor theory requiring a finding of no liability.After concluding that jurisdiction had been properly assumed by the United States District Court, the Eleventh Circuit stated: "[W]e believe that the substantive issue of state law raised by Insinga in this appeal involves a question of Florida law determinative of the cause but which is unanswered by controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida and is appropriate for resolution by the highest court of that state."Id. at 255.

We find it appropriate to rephrase the certified question as follows:

Whether prior to October 1, 1985(the effective date of section 768.60, Florida Statutes(1985)), hospitals owed a duty to their patients to select and retain competent physicians who, although they are independent practitioners, would be providing in-house patient care through their hospital staff privileges.

For the reasons expressed, we answer the question in the affirmative.

Insinga, as he did in the federal courts, urges that hospitals owe a duty of care to their patients to ensure that only competent physicians are granted staff privileges; that the duty existed at the time this incident arose in 1981; and that a breach of duty occurred when the hospital admitted Dr. LaBella, a/k/a Canton, to staff privileges without properly verifying his credentials, contrary to the prevailing national and state standards and the hospital's own bylaws.Insinga argues that, had such a check been made, the hospital would have known or reasonably should have known that LaBella was an imposter and incompetent to provide medical services in its facility.Insinga relies principally on Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946, 86 S.Ct. 1204, 16 L.Ed.2d 209(1966), andPedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash.2d 226, 677 P.2d 166(1984), which adopted the so-called "corporate negligence doctrine" for hospitals.Insinga also asserts that the legislature's subsequent enactment of section 768.60, Florida Statutes(1985), governing the liability of health care facilities, was merely a statutory codification of the corporate negligence doctrine and is a strong indicator of the duty of care required by public policy prior to enactment.The statute provides in pertinent part:

(1) All health care facilities, including hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers, as defined in chapter 395, have a duty to assure comprehensive risk management and the competence of their medical staff and personnel through careful selection and review, and are liable for a failure to exercise due care in fulfilling these duties.

....

Each such facility shall be liable for a failure to exercise due care in fulfilling one or more of these duties when such failure is a proximate cause of injury to a patient.

Humana responds by arguing that no duty exists where a patient has independently retained the services of a private physician who has hospital staff privileges except where the hospital has provided the physician to the patient following admission.The hospital strenuously asserts that the case law, as established by the district courts of appeal of this state, support its position, citing Beam v. University Hospital Building, Inc., 486 So.2d 672(Fla. 1st DCA1986);Reed v. Good Samaritan Hospital Association, 453 So.2d 229(Fla. 4th DCA1984);andSnead v. Le Jeune Road Hospital, Inc., 196 So.2d 179(Fla. 3d DCA1967).Also supporting this view in an amicus curiae brief is the Florida Hospital Association which contends that extending the duty to hospitals for the benefit of patients who initially created a doctor-patient relationship through the physician's private office practice would result in the joining of a hospital as a proper party to every suit brought against a private physician who...