Inst. Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare

• Decision Date: 17 July 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 72-2272.
• Citation: 459 F. Supp. 30
• Parties: INSTITUTIONALIZED JUVENILES in Pennsylvania institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded et al. v. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

459 F. Supp. 30

INSTITUTIONALIZED JUVENILES in Pennsylvania institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded et al.

v.

SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.

Civ. A. No. 72-2272.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

May 25, 1978.

Dissenting Opinion June 14, 1978.

On Motion to Stay Judgment July 17, 1978.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Ferleger, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Norman J. Watkins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, Pa., for defendants.

Before GIBBONS, Circuit Judge, and HUYETT and BRODERICK, District Judges.

OPINION AND ORDER

HUYETT, District Judge.

I. Introduction

In 1975, this Court, convened as a three-judge federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281¹ held that certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (1966 Act) providing for voluntary commitment and admission to mental health facilities were unconstitutional.² Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039 (E.D.Pa.1975), vacated and remanded 431 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 1709, 52 L.Ed.2d 184 (1977). We concluded that these provisions failed to provide juveniles committed to mental health facilities with specific procedural rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution which could not be waived by parents, guardians, or persons standing in loco parentis.

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded this case for further consideration in view of the passage by the Pennsylvania Legislature of the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 (1976 Act). 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503 (Supp.1977-78). The passage of the 1976 Act mooted the claims of the named plaintiffs³ and, in addition, created distinctions, at least with respect to the governing statutory enactments, between mentally retarded and mentally ill juveniles. It was the Supreme Court's opinion that, in view of these new statutory distinctions, the class action originally approved no longer met the requirements of Fed.R. Civ.P. 23(a). The Supreme Court therefore remanded "for reconsideration of the class definition, exclusion of those whose claims are moot, and substitution of class representatives with live claims." 431 U.S. at 135, 97 S.Ct. at 1718.

II. Statutory Scheme

We first consider the contours of the statutory scheme governing voluntary admissions and commitments of juveniles. A description of the statutory scheme is important in order to structure properly the subclasses to be maintained pursuant to Rule 23. Furthermore, a full understanding of the statutes is necessary to our determination of whether they satisfy the requirements of procedural due process.

A. The Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 (1976 Act)

The 1976 Act repeals the provisions of the 1966 Act except as they relate to mentally retarded persons. Article II of the 1976 Act articulates the procedures for voluntary inpatient treatment of mentally ill persons. "Inpatient treatment" includes all treatment that mandates full or part-time residence in a mental health facility.⁴ Section 201 provides that "a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to a child less than 14 years of age" may apply for voluntary examination and treatment, and by so doing shall be deemed to act on behalf of the child.⁵ Once a juvenile is accepted for voluntary examination and treatment, the 1976 Act requires that "an individualized treatment plan be formulated by a treatment team" within seventy-two hours.⁶ The treatment plan must state whether inpatient treatment is necessary and, if so, the reasons for that conclusion.

Section 206 of the 1976 Act sets forth the procedures for withdrawal from voluntary inpatient treatment.⁷ Where the person committed is under the age of fourteen, his parent, legal guardian or person standing in loco parentis may obtain his release. In addition, "any responsible party" who believes that it would be in the best interests of the juvenile to be withdrawn from inpatient treatment may petition the Juvenile Division of the court of common pleas of the county in which the juvenile resides and request withdrawal or modification of treatment. Then the court must appoint counsel for the child and schedule a hearing within ten days to determine "what inpatient treatment, if any, is in the minor's best interest." 50 P.S. § 7206(b).

B. Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (1966 Act)

The 1966 Act was the focus of the original Bartley decision in which this Court declared sections 402 and 403 of that Act to be unconstitutional.⁸ Following the passage of the 1976 Act, only mentally retarded juveniles remain within the ambit of the 1966 Act. Sections 402 and 403 provide, in brief, that mentally retarded juveniles age eighteen or younger may be admitted or committed⁹ to a mental health facility upon the application of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis, and may withdraw only with the consent of the admitting party or his successor.

C. 1973 Regulations

The 1973 Regulations,¹⁰ promulgated by the Secretary of Public Welfare under the provisions of the 1966 Act, augment the procedural rights given to mentally retarded juveniles by the 1966 Act.¹¹ Portions of the regulations apply to all juveniles aged eighteen and younger, such as the requirement that juveniles admitted to a mental health institution be referred by a mental health professional, pediatrician, general physician, or psychologist; that this referral include a psychiatric, medical or psychological evaluation stating specifically the reasons why the juvenile requires institutional care;¹² and that the Director of the Institution conduct an independent examination of the juvenile prior to admission.

Additional rights are available to mentally retarded juveniles thirteen years of age or older. These juveniles receive written notification explaining their rights and furnishing them with the number of counsel whom they may call for representation. If a juvenile age thirteen or older objects to remaining at the institution, a commitment hearing must be held pursuant to the procedures provided for involuntary commitment.¹³ We note here, as we did in the original Bartley opinion, that the regulations designate no time by which a post-commitment hearing must be held. 402 F.Supp. at n. 5.

In sum, there are two completely distinct statutory schemes which are under attack in this lawsuit; one relating to the mentally retarded (1966 Act as modified by the 1973 Regulations) and one relating to the mentally ill (1976 Act). Furthermore, with respect to mentally retarded juveniles, older juveniles are given some rights not accorded the younger juveniles.

III. Named Plaintiffs

There are twelve named plaintiffs in this lawsuit. Nine are mentally ill juveniles, age thirteen or younger, who were committed to mental health institutions pursuant to the 1976 Act.¹⁴ The remaining named plaintiffs are mentally retarded juveniles, age fourteen or older, institutionalized under the 1966 Act and the 1973 Regulations.¹⁵

Plaintiff Kevin S., age twelve, was admitted to Haverford State Hospital (Haverford) on July 18, 1977, pursuant to section 201 of the 1976 Act. Kevin's medical records reveal that his mother, who is separated from his father, has a history of serious mental illness, including incidents of hospitalization. Consequently, much of Kevin's youth has been spent in foster homes.

Prior to his commitment to Haverford, Kevin came to the attention of school authorities because of his inappropriate behavior, such as "making weird noises, refusing to do work, and talking back to teachers." A consulting school psychiatrist diagnosed Kevin as a "disturbed child" and recommended placement in Haverford. Kevin's psychological evaluation, performed after his admission to Haverford, describes him as a "very needy, very angry boy" who was "not currently seen as psychotic, although there is a tendency toward projection and a lack of controls where anxious." His Admission Note, also prepared after his admission, gives as the "reason for admission:" "Difficulties adjusting to school and family (mother). Exhibited bizarre behavior in school that has included making inappropriate sounds and laughing inappropriately." Kevin's psychological history concludes, "It is felt that much of Kevin's problems come from living with a schizophrenic mother and having a very unstable and abused early life."

Richard S., age thirteen, was committed to Haverford by the county child care agency on June 6, 1976 pursuant to section 201 of the 1976 Act. Richard has spent almost all of his life in foster homes and residential homes for difficult children, with the exception of a two-year period between the ages of two and four. His Admission Note for Haverford states, as a reason for admission: "Inability to adjust to an open setting. History of self harm and running away."

Plaintiff James Paul M., age eight, was admitted to Haverford on October 17, 1977, under section 201 of the 1976 Act. His mother had died approximately one year before his admission to Haverford. The stated "reason for admission" to Haverford was "uncontrollable behavior" and "learning disability."

Plaintiff Raymond C., age thirteen, was admitted to Haverford on September 28, 1977, pursuant to section 201 of the 1976 Act. Raymond was admitted initially for purposes of "evaluation." The reason given for his admission was "History of uncooperative disruptive and aggressive behavior including run sic away from school. Problems in community with stealing and destroying property. Has a learning and hearing problem."

William B., age nine, was committed to Haverford by his father pursuant to section 201 of the 1976 Act on September 21, 1977. For about two years prior to his commitment, William had been living with his natural father, stepmother, and two stepbrothers. The stated reason for his hospitalization was William's "uncontrollable behavior;...