Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Boeing Co.

• Decision Date: 28 April 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 10–1124–JWL.
• Citation: 814 F.Supp.2d 1150
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS and AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL–CIO and District Lodge 70, Plaintiffs, v. The BOEING COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

814 F.Supp.2d 1150

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS and AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL–CIO and District Lodge 70, Plaintiffs,

v.The BOEING COMPANY, Defendant.

Case No. 10–1124–JWL.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

April 28, 2011.

Anna M. Alvarado, James Roddy Tanner, Anner & Associates, PC, Fort Worth, TX, Thomas E. Hammond, Hammond, Zongker & Farris, L.L.C., Wichita, KS, for Plaintiffs.

Anthony B. Byergo, Nicholas J. Walker, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

This case arises from a dispute between plaintiff District Lodge 70, an affiliate of plaintiff International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (collectively, the “Union”), and the Boeing Company. The Union has filed a complaint under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking to compel Boeing to arbitrate a grievance relating to the layoff of David Russell, a former employee at Boeing's manufacturing facility in Wichita, Kansas. Boeing moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations period. According to Boeing, the court should borrow the six-month statute of limitations period from § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). According to the Union, the court should apply the Kansas five-year limitations period for breach of contract claims. See K.S.A. § 60–511. As will be explained, the court concludes that the six-month NLRA limitations period properly applies in the context of this case. The motion for summary judgment is granted.¹

Despite the lengthy factual statements set forth by both parties, very few facts are essential to the resolution of Boeing's motion.² David Russell, a Boeing employee, was laid off by Boeing in January 2006 and the Union contends (Boeing disputes) that a grievance was filed on behalf of Mr. Russell at that time contending that the layoff of Mr. Russell was in violation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The Union and Boeing engaged in numerous discussions attempting to resolve certain issues relating to Mr. Russell's layoff, including Mr. Russell's claims for reinstatement and back pay. In August 2008, Boeing returned Mr. Russell to work and continued to negotiate with the Union concerning Mr. Russell's claim for back pay. In January 2009, Boeing again laid off Mr. Russell and, shortly thereafter, negotiations concerning Mr. Russell's claim for back pay stemming from his January 2006 layoff fell apart.

In March 2009, the Union filed a written grievance relating to Mr. Russell's January 2009 layoff and a separate grievance concerning, as described by the Union, Boeing's “repudiation” of Mr. Russell's back pay claim stemming from his January 2006 layoff. On April 27, 2009, Boeing notified the Union that it was refusing to arbitrate any grievance relating to Mr. Russell's January 2006 layoff. Nearly one year later, on April 22, 2010, the Union filed this lawsuit seeking to compel arbitration of Mr. Russell's claim for back pay arising from his January 2006 layoff.

The sole question presented by the parties' submissions concerns the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in the context of this action to compel arbitration under § 301 of the LMRA. Boeing asserts that the court should apply the six-month statute of limitations period from § 10(b) of the NLRA. The Union asserts that the court should borrow the Kansas five-year limitations period for breach of contract claims. See K.S.A. § 60–511. If Boeing is correct, then it is undisputed that the Union's lawsuit is barred by the statute of limitations as it was filed more than 6 months after Boeing refused arbitration on April 27, 2009. Indeed, the parties agree both that a cause of action to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement accrues when one party “clearly refuses” to arbitrate the dispute, see Aluminum, Brick & Glassworkers Int'l Union Local 674 v. A.P. Green Refractories, Inc., 895 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir.1990) (collecting cases), and that the accrual date in this particular lawsuit is April 27, 2009.

“Section 301 of the LMRA makes collective bargaining agreements enforceable in federal court, but provides no statute of limitations for claims brought under it.” Edwards v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 46 F.3d 1047, 1050 (10th Cir.1995) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988)). Because the statute is silent on the issue, courts generally assume that Congress “intended the most closely analogous state statute of limitations to apply.” Id. (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley–Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 147, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987) (Rules of Decision Act usually requires application of statute of limitations and “[g]iven our longstanding practice of borrowing state law, and the congressional awareness of this practice, we can generally assume that Congress intends by its silence that we borrow state law”)). Consistent with this general rule, the Supreme Court, in UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), applied the pertinent state statute of limitations for breach of contract to a § 301 action for damages brought by a union alleging that the employer had breached the collective bargaining agreement with respect to vacation pay allegedly due employees. In Hoosier Cardinal, there “was no requirement to arbitrate and the union sued directly on the bargaining agreement.” Garcia v. Eidal Int'l Corp., 808 F.2d 717, 720 (10th Cir.1986). In declining to adopt a uniform federal statute of limitations for § 301 actions, the Court “emphasized that national uniformity is relatively unimportant when an issue does not implicate ‘those consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote—the formation of the collective bargaining agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it.’ ” Id. (quoting Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 702, 86 S.Ct. 1107).

In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), the Supreme Court was faced with a § 301 action that differed significantly from Hoosier Cardinal. Unlike the straightforward § 301 action for breach of the collective bargaining agreement in Hoosier Cardinal, DelCostello involved a “hybrid” suit by an employee against both the employer and the union, alleging “that the employer had breach a provision of the collective-bargaining agreement, and that the union had breached its duty of fair-representation by mishandling the ensuing grievance-and-arbitration proceedings.” Id. at 154, 103 S.Ct. 2281. The Court applied the six-month statute of limitations prescribed by § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). In doing so, the Court distinguished Hoosier Cardinal in several respects.

The Court first noted that Hoosier Cardinal did not involve any agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, and that the suit in Hoosier Cardinal was brought by the union itself rather than by an individual employee. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 162, 103 S.Ct. 2281. Second, the suit in Hoosier Cardinal did not involve any of the consensual processes that federal labor law is designed to protect. Id. at 163, 103 S.Ct. 2281. By contrast, in DelCostello, the plaintiff challenged the outcome of the grievance procedure. Therefore, the contractually created method for private settlement of disputes was directly challenged. Id. at 165, 103 S.Ct. 2281. Finally, unlike the “straightforward” section 301 suit in Hoosier Cardinal, which was closely analogous to a common law breach of contract action, the “hybrid” section 301 suit in DelCostello had no close analogy in state causes of action. Id.

International Union of Elevator Constructors v. Home Elevator Co., 798 F.2d 222, 226 (7th Cir.1986). According to the Court, the six-month limitation period in § 10(b) of the NLRA, as applied to a “hybrid” § 301 action, appropriately balanced the “national interest in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unfair settlement under the collective bargaining system.” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. 2281.

In light of the “federal policy” concerns described by the Court in both Hoosier Cardinal and DelCostello, Boeing contends that this case—specifically, an action to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement—warrants applications of the 6–month limitations period set forth in § 10(b) of the NLRA. The weight of Circuit authority clearly favors Boeing's argument.

Indeed, when deciding the appropriate statute of limitations to apply in an action to compel arbitration under § 301, the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals are nearly unanimous in adopting the § 10(b) six-month period. The most recent Circuit to have analyzed the issue is the District of Columbia Circuit. See Communications Workers of Am. v. AT & T Co., 10 F.3d 887 (D.C.Cir.1993). In resolving the issue back in 1993, the D.C. Circuit first noted that seven Circuits by that time had adopted the six-month limitations period in the context of actions to compel arbitration under § 301. See id. at 889 & n. 1 (citing Communications Workers of Am. v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir.1988); Associated Brick Mason Contractors of Greater New York v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1987); Federation of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 736 F.2d 896 (3d Cir.1984); Aluminum, Brick and Glassworkers Int'l Union Local 674 v. A.P. Green Refractories, Inc., 895 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.1990); McCreedy v. Local Union No. 971, 809 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir.1987); United Food & Commercial Workers Local 100A v. John Hofmeister and Son, Inc., 950 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir.1991); General Teamsters Union Local No. 174 v. Trick & Murray,...