Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of Peoria

• Decision Date: 21 January 2022
• Docket Number: Docket No. 127040
• Citation: 2022 IL 127040,193 N.E.3d 1208,456 Ill.Dec. 800
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 50, Appellee, v. The CITY OF PEORIA, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2022 IL 127040

193 N.E.3d 1208

456 Ill.Dec. 800

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 50, Appellee,

v.The CITY OF PEORIA, Appellant.

Docket No. 127040

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed January 21, 2022.

Esther J. Seitz, of Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, of Springfield, for appellant.

Jerry J. Marzullo and Joseph E. Weishampel, of Asher Gittler & D'Alba, Ltd., of Chicago, and Thomas W. Duda and Scott P. Moran, of Law Offices of Thomas W. Duda, of Palatine, for appellee.

Robert J. Smith Jr. and Paul Denham, of Clark Baird Smith LLP, of Rosemont, for amicus curiae Public Employer Labor Relations Association.

Keith A. Karlson and Mark S. McQueary, of Metropolitan Alliance of Police, of Bolingbrook, and David Amerson, of Police Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois, of Springfield, amici curiae.

Margaret Angelucci, Amanda Clark, and Matt Pierce, of Asher, Gittler & D'Alba, Ltd., of Chicago, for amici curiae Associated Firefighters of Illinois et al.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following the passage of an ordinance amending the Peoria City Code's provision on line-of-duty disabilities, the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 50 (Union), filed suit in the circuit court of Peoria County seeking a declaratory judgment challenging several definitions contained in the ordinance. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Union and denied the City of Peoria's motion. The appellate court affirmed. 2021 IL App (3d) 190758, ¶ 14, 449 Ill.Dec. 871, 180 N.E.3d 796. We allowed the City's petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 1997, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) ( 820 ILCS 320/1 et seq. (West 2018)). See Pub. Act 90-535, § 1 (eff. Nov. 14, 1997). In section 5, the General Assembly states that it "determines and declares that the provisions of this Act fulfill an important State interest." 820 ILCS 320/5 (West 2018). That interest, as detailed in section 10, requires that an employer

"who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who *** suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer's health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee's spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee." Id. § 10(a).

¶ 4 However, because the Act does not provide a definition for "catastrophic injury," this court was ultimately tasked with discerning the legislature's intent as to that term's meaning in 2003. In Krohe v. City of Bloomington , 204 Ill. 2d 392, 400, 273 Ill.Dec. 779, 789 N.E.2d 1211 (2003), this court held that "catastrophic injury" is "synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4-110 of the [Illinois Pension] Code" ( 40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2000) ). That holding has never been disturbed.

¶ 5 Nonetheless, on June 12, 2018, the City passed an ordinance—amending section 2-350 of the Peoria City Code—which, relevant here, defined terms used in section 10 of the Act. Specifically, the ordinance defined the terms "catastrophic injury" and "injury" but also added and defined the term "gainful work." See Peoria Ordinance No. 17584 (approved June 12, 2018); Peoria City Code § 2-350 (amended June 12, 2018). On July 23, 2018, the Union filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, alleging that the City had defined the terms in a way that violates the Act. In its answer, the City denied that it had exceeded its home rule authority in passing the ordinance; that the ordinance violated or contradicted the Act, the Illinois Constitution, or any other statute; and that the ordinance was invalid or otherwise ineffective. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2018).

¶ 6 Pertinent here, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Union, finding:

"3. That the meanings of the terms ‘catastrophic injury’ and ‘injury’ as used in 820 ILCS 320/10(a) and (b) are not ambiguous when considering the full text of those sections along with Judicial opinions construing and defining those terms.

4. That the City of Peoria does not have the home [r]ule authority to redefine the terms ‘catastrophic injury’ and ‘injury’ as it has in Peoria, IL Code of Ordinances Sec. 2-350."

The circuit court denied the City's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the definitions of "catastrophic injury" and "injury" contained in the ordinance were held to be "invalid, null, and void." By extension, the ordinance's definition of "gainful work" was stricken as surplusage.

¶ 7 On appeal, the appellate court observed that the City, as a home rule unit, could properly "adopt procedures for determining claims under the Act." 2021 IL App (3d) 190758, ¶ 11, 449 Ill.Dec. 871, 180 N.E.3d 796 (citing Pedersen v. Village of Hoffman Estates , 2014 IL App (1st) 123402, 380 Ill.Dec. 541, 8 N.E.3d 1083 ). The court clarified that, pursuant to its home rule authority and section 20 of the Act, the City "could define an administrative procedure for determining benefits under the Act, but it could not redefine the Act's substantive terms to the extent that the City would provide benefits inconsistent with the Act." Id. The court thereafter held:

"After the Illinois Supreme Court has construed a state statute, ‘that construction becomes, in effect, a part of the statute and any change in interpretation can be effected by the General Assembly if it desires so to do.’ Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan , 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 19 [396 Ill.Dec. 111, 39 N.E.3d 937] (quoting Mitchell v. Mahin , 51 Ill. 2d 452, 456 (1972) ). Pursuant to Krohe , ‘a pension board's award of a line-of-duty disability pension establishes [as a matter of law] that the public safety employee suffered a catastrophic injury as required by section 10(a) of [the Act].’ Id. ¶ 25. The Act was never amended in response to Krohe . Thus, if a firefighter is injured and awarded line-of-duty disability, he has a catastrophic injury pursuant to section 10(a) of the Act. We conclude that the City's definitions of ‘catastrophic injury,’ ‘injury,’ and ‘gainful work’ were inconsistent with the substantive requirements of the Act, and the ordinance was not a valid exercise of home rule authority." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 12.

¶ 8 We allowed the City's petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). We also allowed the following parties to file amicus curiae briefs: the Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association, the Associated Firefighters of Illinois and Illinois AFL-CIO, and the Metropolitan Alliance of Police and the Police Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 This appeal emanates from the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Union and denial of the City's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment motions are governed by section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2018) ).

"[S]ummary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Pielet v. Pielet , 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 29, 365 Ill.Dec. 497, 978 N.E.2d 1000.

¶ 11 "When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they mutually agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that only a question of law is involved." Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund , 2016 IL 119618, ¶ 26, 401 Ill.Dec. 454, 50 N.E.3d 596 (citing Gurba v. Community High School District No. 155 , 2015 IL 118332, ¶ 10, 396 Ill.Dec. 348, 40 N.E.3d 1 ). "Where a case is decided through summary judgment, our review is de novo. " Pielet , 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 30, 365 Ill.Dec. 497, 978 N.E.2d 1000 (citing Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. , 237 Ill. 2d 391, 399-400, 341 Ill.Dec. 429, 930 N.E.2d 943 (2010) ). De novo review is also appropriate, as we must construe both the Act and the ordinance. See Western Illinois University v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board , 2021 IL 126082, ¶ 32, 451 Ill.Dec. 662, 184 N.E.3d 249 ("An issue of statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to de novo review."); City of East St. Louis v. Union Electric Co. , 37 Ill. 2d 537, 542, 229 N.E.2d 522 (1967) (noting that "the same rules which govern the construction of statutes are to be applied in construing municipal ordinances").

¶ 12 "The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, and the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning."

Dew-Becker v. Wu , 2020 IL 124472, ¶ 12, 449 Ill.Dec. 183, 178 N.E.3d 1034. "No part of a statute should be rendered meaningless or superfluous." Rushton v. Department of Corrections , 2019 IL 124552, ¶ 14, 442 Ill.Dec. 749, 160 N.E.3d 929.

¶ 13 Section 6(a) of article VII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that "a home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6 (a). Subsection (i) provides that "[h]ome rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive." Id. § 6 (i).

¶ 14 Here, the City argues that...