Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155

• Decision Date: 24 September 2015
• Docket Number: 118369.,Nos. 118332,s. 118332
• Citation: 40 N.E.3d 1
• Parties: Jeff GURBA et al., Appellees, v. COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 155 et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

40 N.E.3d 1

Jeff GURBA et al., Appellees

v.COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 155 et al., Appellants.

Nos. 118332

118369.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 24, 2015.

Dean W. Krone, Robert E. Swain, Steven M. Richart and Kerry P. Burnet, of Hodges, Loizzi, Eisenhammer, Rodick & Kohn LLP, Arlington Heights, for appellant Board of Education of Community High School District No. 155.

Michael G. Nerheim, Special State's Attorney, Waukegan (Carla N. Wyckoff and Lisle A. Stalter, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant Leslie Schermerhorn.

Thomas R. Burney, Thomas C. Zanck and James L. Wright, of Zanck, Coen, Wright & Saladin, P.C., Crystal Lake, and Jerome S. Schain, Michael R. Burney and Patrick T. Brankin, of Schain, Banks, Kenny & Schwartz, Ltd., Chicago, for appellee Jeff Gurba et al.

Victor P. Filippini, Jr., and Betsy L. Gates, Evanston, for appellee City of Crystal Lake.

Ares G. Dalianis, Brian P. Crowley and Scott R. Metcalf, of Franczek Radelet P.C., Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Association of School Boards et al.

Laurie Reynolds, of University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, amicus curiae.

Roger Huebner, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The question presented in this consolidated appeal is whether municipal zoning ordinances govern a school district's construction of football stadium bleachers on school property. The appellate court below affirmed the judgment of the circuit court holding that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local governmental zoning and storm water restrictions. 2014 IL App (2d) 140098, 385 Ill.Dec. 149, 18 N.E.3d 149. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Crystal Lake South High School (Crystal Lake South) is located in the city of Crystal Lake, Illinois (City), a municipal corporation with home rule authority situated in McHenry County. The area surrounding the school is zoned “R–2 residential single family,” and the school constitutes a legal, nonconforming use. The Crystal Lake South campus is owned by Community High School District No. 155 (District) and operated by the Board of Education of Community High School District No. 155 (Board).

¶ 4 In 2013, the Board decided to replace the bleachers at the Crystal Lake South football stadium after a failed structural inspection. The Board's plan involved switching the locations of the home and visiting bleachers so that the new home bleachers would now be adjacent to residential property next to the school. The new home bleachers would be larger, higher, and closer to the property line than the existing bleachers abutting the residences. The Board applied for a permit for the project from Leslie Schermerhorn, the McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools. Schermerhorn approved the plans and issued a building permit pursuant to section 3–14.20 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/3–14.20 (West 2012) ). The District began work on the project without notifying the city of Crystal Lake or seeking a building permit, zoning approval, or storm water management approval from the City.

¶ 5 Upon learning of the project, the City informed the Board that it was required to comply with the provisions of the Crystal Lake Unified Development Ordinance, which regulates zoning and land use, as well as the City's storm water management ordinance. The City ordered the Board to stop construction on the project until it had obtained a special-use permit, a storm water permit, and zoning variances. The Board disregarded the order and proceeded with construction of the new bleachers. The Board took the position that a school district's construction on property used for school purposes is not subject to the zoning authority of the local municipality.

¶ 6 At the same time, three plaintiffs who own residential properties adjacent to the school filed suit against the Board and the District, seeking to privately enforce the City's zoning restrictions pursuant to section 11–13–15 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11–13–15 (West 2012) ). Plaintiffs alleged that the new, larger, bleachers did not comply with local zoning regulations and negatively affected the value of their properties.¹ The Board subsequently filed a third-party complaint for declaratory judgment against the city of Crystal Lake and Schermerhorn asking the circuit court to decide whether the City has authority over the District to enforce its zoning and storm water ordinances.

¶ 7 The parties to the third-party complaint filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court of McHenry County awarded summary judgment in favor of the City. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order. 2014 IL App (2d) 140098, 385 Ill.Dec. 149, 18 N.E.3d 149.² The Board and Schermerhorn filed petitions for leave to appeal in this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (Ill.S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. July 1, 2013)). We allowed the petitions and consolidated the two appeals.

¶ 8 We allowed the Illinois Association of School Boards, the Illinois Association of School Administrators, and the Illinois Association of School Business Officials to file a brief as amici curiae in support of appellants, and we allowed the Illinois Municipal League and Professor Laurie Reynolds to file separate amicus curiae briefs in support of the City. Ill. S.Ct. R. 345(a) (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Under section 2–1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2012). When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they mutually concede that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that only a question of law is involved. Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28, 365 Ill.Dec. 497, 978 N.E.2d 1000. Our review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Schultz v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 237 Ill.2d 391, 399–400, 341 Ill.Dec. 429, 930 N.E.2d 943 (2010). The issues in this case involve statutory analysis and interpretation, presenting questions of law which are subject to de novo review. People v. Elliott, 2014 IL 115308, ¶ 11, 378 Ill.Dec. 424, 4 N.E.3d 23. In construing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. The best indicator of that intent is the statutory language itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id.

¶ 11 At issue is whether a school district is subject to local zoning and land use regulations in the course of exercising its statutory powers to construct new facilities on school property. Zoning is primarily a legislative function, and it is within the province of local governmental bodies to determine the use of land and to establish zoning classifications. La Grange State Bank v. County of Cook, 75 Ill.2d 301, 307, 26 Ill.Dec. 673, 388 N.E.2d 388 (1979). In the absence of express statutory exclusions, municipalities are empowered by the Illinois Municipal Code to regulate all land uses within their territory. See 65 ILCS 5/11–13–1 et seq. (West 2012); Village of Chatham, Illinois v. County of Sangamon, Illinois, 216 Ill.2d 402, 430–31, 297 Ill.Dec. 249, 837 N.E.2d 29 (2005) ; People of the Village of Cahokia v. Wright, 57 Ill.2d 166, 168, 311 N.E.2d 153 (1974).

¶ 12 The General Assembly has chosen to exempt certain entities from municipal zoning regulations under the Municipal Code. For instance, section 11–13–1(12) of the Municipal Code prohibits a home rule or non-home rule municipality from banning the display of outdoor political campaign signs on residential property. 65 ILCS 5/11–13–1(12) (West 2012). Another section of the Municipal Code restricts municipalities' zoning powers with respect to antennas or antenna support structures that are used for amateur radio communications. 65 ILCS 5/11–13–1.5 (West 2012). However, there is no statutory provision restricting the authority of a municipality to regulate zoning or storm water management on school property. Thus, under the plain terms of the Municipal Code, school property is subject to municipal zoning laws.

¶ 13 Moreover, as a home rule municipality, the City has broad powers to perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs, including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the public. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6 (a); Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill.2d 281, 287, 260 Ill.Dec. 835, 762 N.E.2d 494 (2001). Included within the realm of home rule powers are municipal development regulations such as zoning ordinances, which “undoubtedly pertain to local affairs.” Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill.2d at 290, 260 Ill.Dec. 835, 762 N.E.2d 494. See also LeCompte v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 2011 IL App (1st) 100423, ¶ 19, 354 Ill.Dec. 869, 958 N.E.2d 1065. The General Assembly may choose to restrict a home rule unit's powers by “provid[ing] specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6 (h). If there is no express preemption by the General Assembly, a home rule unit may “exercise and perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6 (i). See Schillerstrom Homes, 198 Ill.2d at 287, 260 Ill.Dec. 835, 762 N.E.2d 494. The General Assembly has not enacted any statute expressly preempting or limiting a home...