Integon Indem. Corp. v. Canal Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 44073,44073
• Citation: 256 Ga. 692,353 S.E.2d 186
• Parties: INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION v. CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 186

353 S.E.2d 186

256 Ga. 692

INTEGON INDEMNITY CORPORATION v. CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 44073.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Feb. 24, 1987.

William A. Pannell, C. Michael Evert, Jr., Fortson & White, Atlanta, for Integon Indem. Corp.

Fain, Major & Wiley, Charles A. Wiley, Jr., Thomas R. Brennan, amicus curiae.

Harry W. Bassler, Scroggins, Brizendine & Bassler, Atlanta, for Canal Ins. Co.

Smith, Grambrell & Russell, John A. Blackman, Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr., amicus curiae.

GREGORY, Justice.

The trial court granted summary judgment to Integon Indemnity Corporation (Integon) in a declaratory judgment action involving coverage of one of the company's insureds. The Court of Appeals reversed. Canal Ins. Co. v. Integon Indemn. Corp., 180 Ga.App. 670, 350 S.E.2d 250 (1986). We reverse the Court of Appeals.

On March 12, 1982, Stag, Inc., a used car dealer, gave Cynthia Robinson permission to drive a Dodge Omni off its sales lot. The Omni collided with a vehicle driven by Nellie Williamson. Williamson and her passengers were injured and filed law suits against Robinson.

Stag's Omni was insured by Canal Insurance Company (Canal). Robinson owned a Ford, which was insured by Integon. Robinson's policy with Integon limited coverage to vehicles owned by Robinson or temporary substitutes used while Robinson's vehicle was being repaired. At the time of Robinson's collision, her husband was using their Ford.

In February 1984, Integon filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of no coverage under its policy in the pending suits. Canal counterclaimed asking that Integon be declared the primary insurance carrier pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-3(e). The trial court granted Integon's motion for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeals reversed, and we granted certiorari to determine whether the limited coverage provided by the policy issued to Robinson by Integon meets minimum coverages required by the Georgia Code.

Both Integon and Canal agree that if Integon's policy provides coverage for Robinson's involvement in the accident in question, then Integon is the primary liability carrier pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-3(e). But Integon argues that its policy does not cover Robinson as an operator of a vehicle neither owned by Robinson nor a temporary substitute.

Canal argues that the provisions in Integon's policy limiting coverage to vehicles owned by her or temporary substitutes is void as a matter of public policy. Canal contends that such provisions thwart the policy behind compulsory liability insurance laws that accident victims will have access to insurance funds to satisfy their judgments. Canal cites for support Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 329 S.E.2d 136 (1985), in which this court struck down a provision in an automobile insurance policy excluding coverage of the insured "while attempting to avoid apprehension or arrest."

We have held that the advent of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance in Georgia established a public policy of providing that innocent persons who are injured should have an adequate recourse for the recovery of their damages. See Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, supra at 338, 329 S.E.2d 136; Anderson v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 556, 307 S.E.2d 499 (1983).

The real dispute in the instant case involves the legislature's method for implementing this public policy. Canal argues that to assure all accident victims have access to adequate resources to satisfy their judgments, coverages in automobile liability insurance policies should as a matter of law apply to the insureds no matter who owns the vehicle being driven by the insured. Integon, on the other hand, argues the state's compulsory insurance laws require only that the owner of each vehicle insure the vehicle to the statutory minimum coverages for insured motor vehicles listed in the policy. Any coverage of the insured while driving a vehicle owned by another is a matter of negotiation between the insurer and the insured, Integon contends.

Expressions of the legislature through statutes are conclusive on the question of public policy; and courts cannot declare agreements or acts authorized by statute to be contrary to public policy. Greenwood Cemetery v. Travelers, etc., Co., 238 Ga. 313, 316-17, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977). We thus begin our analysis by looking at the language in...