Intermediate School Dist. No. 105 v. Yakima County, 42451
| Decision Date | 14 November 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 42451,42451 |
| Citation | 81 Wn.2d 443,503 P.2d 104 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 105, Respondent, v. YAKIMA COUNTY et al., Appellants. |
Lincoln E. Shropshire, Pros. Atty., Jerry D. Talbott, Yakima, for appellants.
Harry Hazel, Yakima, for respondent.
Yakima County appeals from a writ requiring the county to furnish office space for the operation of an intermediate school district without payment of rental. Defendant county challenges the trial court's construction of RCW 28A.21.120 and the constitutionality of that statute as so construed.
Plaintiff is an intermediate school district created in 1967 under RCW 28A.21. The district embraces Yakima County, Kittitas County and a portion (two school districts) of Klickitat County. Pursuant to authority of RCW 28A.21.120, the district board designated the city of Yakima as the headquarters office of the intermediate school district. A satellite or branch office is located in Kittitas County.
The district paid rent for office space in the Yakima County courthouse from 1967 through 1970. In 1971, the county increased the rental from $2 a square foot to $3 a square foot. The district refused to pay further rentals, whereupon the county withheld sums equal to the claimed rent from funds the county was obligated to pay the district under RCW 28A.21.180. The district sought a writ of mandamus to require the county to furnish the headquarters space without rental and to require the county to pay the withheld funds to the district. The trial court granted the relief.
RCW 28A.21.120 provides:
The intermediate school district board shall designate the headquarters office of the intermediate school district. The board of county commissioners in each county Shall provide the intermediate school district superintendent and employees with suitable quarters and office for the operations of the intermediate school district. Official records of the intermediate school district board and superintendent, including each of the county superintendents abolished by chapter 176, Laws of 1969 ex. sess., shall be kept by the intermediate school district superintendent. Whenever the boundaries of any of the intermediate school districts are reorganized pursuant to (RCW 28A.21.020), the state board of education shall supervise the transferral of such records so that each intermediate school district superintendent shall receive those records relating to school districts within the appropriate intermediate school district.
(Italics ours.)
The first issue is whether the words 'shall provide' mean without payment of rent. Plaintiff contends, the trial court concurring, that the legislature intended the county to make space available rent free. The county contends these words evidence a legislative intent to require the county to make space available at a reasonable rental.
Words in a statute are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning. State ex rel. Beam v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 77 Wash.2d 951, 468 P.2d 998 (1970).
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1963) defines 'provide' as follows: 'to supply what is needed for sustenance or support.' Such a definition implies that the facilities are to be made available rent free. In Backman v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 415, 375 P.2d 756, 758 (1962), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the word 'provide' in the phrase: '(A)ll counties * * * with a population greater than 250,000 according to the last official census shall call and provide for * * * a special election * * * . . .' The court held that 'provide' meant the county should pay the cost of the special election.
The primary consideration, as with any question of statutory construction, is to determine the intent of the legislature. 3 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5813 (3d ed. 1943), at page 95; State ex rel. Blume v. Yelle, 52 Wash.2d 158, 324 P.2d 247 (1958). As a general proposition, courts will apply the construction which best carries into effect the purpose of the statute under consideration.
The legislative history of the statute supports the meaning we attribute to the statute. Prior to the creation of intermediate school districts, counties were required to provide county superintendents of schools with a suitable office at the county seat.
The county commissioners shall provide the county superintendent with a suitable office at the county seat. Whenever a joint county board of education as herein provided is organized, it shall be the duty of such board to designate the headquarters office of the county superintendent, and the board of county commissioners in the county of such designation shall provide the county superintendent with a suitable office at the county seat of such county, and official records of the county superintendent of each consolidation of county superintendents' offices shall be transferred to and thereafter kept by the county superintendent of the consolidated offices.
Laws of 1955, ch. 157, § 15. It is undisputed that counties were not charging rent to county school superintendents under that statute. In 1965, the legislature created intermediate school districts. Laws of 1965, ch. 139. That legislation contained no provision concerning funished of office quarters. The county charged the district rent for 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970. In 1969, the legislature enacted a comprehensive rewrite of the intermediate school district act and by Laws of 1969, ch. 176, § 12 (effective July 1, 1970), included a provision that 'The board of county commissioners in each county shall provide the intermediate school district superintendent with suitable quarters and office.' The 1971 act (RCW 28A.21.120) merely added language not pertinent to the issue at bench.
Because of the ordinary meaning of the words and the legislative history of the statute, we hold that the language 'shall provide' as used in this...
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