International Business Machines Corp. v. Evans

• Decision Date: 13 May 1957
• Docket Number: No. 19657,19657
• Citation: 213 Ga. 333,99 S.E.2d 220
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION v. H. E. EVANS et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 220

99 S.E.2d 220

213 Ga. 333

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION v. H. E. EVANS et al.

No. 19657.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 13, 1957.

Rehearing Denied June 12, 1957.

Syllabus by the Court.

To the extent that Code (Ann.) §§ 15-301, 15-302, 15-303, attempt to waive the State's sovereign right to tax, they are void. The petition, seeking to prevent taxation of private property located upon lands belonging to the United States, alleges no cause of action, and it was not error for the court to dismiss the same on demurrer.

This is an action for an injunction to restrain the collection of State and County ad valorem taxes against the property of the plaintiff for the tax year 1956 and subsequent years, brought against the taxing authorities of Houston County, Georgia, by the International Business Machines Corporation, which has a considerable number of its business machines located on a rental basis at the Robins Air Force Base, a United States government installation, located at Warner Robins, Houston County, Georgia. The petitioner relies upon Code (Ann.) §§ 15-301, 15-302, 15-303, Code, § 1-125(17), Const.U.S. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17; and Title 40 U.S.C.A. § 255, that the United States having accepted exclusive jurisdiction granted by the General Assembly of Georgia of approximately 6,600 acres in Houston County in connection with the Air Base, the Houston County taxing authorities are without authority to tax any private property located exclusively on said government installation. The petition in substance alleges: that the defendants are insisting that said private property is subject to tax, and that such taxation would be illegal, null, void, and unconstitutional in violation of the statutes and constitutional provisions above set forth, and the petitioner has refused to pay any tax on said machines so located; that the defendants have levied such tax, issued a bill for the collection of same which the petitioner refuses to pay, and shortly will issue fi fa and execution and levy on the petitioner's property being used for vital defense purposes by the United States; that the petitioner has no adequate remedy at law; and it prays that defendants be temporarily and permanently restrained and enjoined from attempting to collect such tax, the same being illegal, void and unconstitutional.

General demurrers alleged Code (Ann.) §§ 15-301, 15-302, and 15-303, upon which the petitioner relies, to be unconstitutional to the extent that (a) they grant an exemption from property taxation in violation of the State Constitution, art. 7, § 1, par. 4, Code (Ann.) § 2-5404, which specifies the property within the State which may be exempt from property taxation by the General Assembly, and does not include privately owned property such as here; and (b) that said statutes, together or singly, irrevocably alienate, give, Grant, limit or restrain, or have alienated, given, granted, limited or restrained, in favor of the United States, the power of taxation of Georgia and its subdivision, in violation of Code (Ann.) § 2-5401, Const. art. 7, § 1, par. 1, such that the State of Georgia or its subdivisions are precluded from the exercise of its sovereign right of taxation over the petitioner's privately owned property located in Houston County. The demurrers were sustained as to (b) above. The order of the court held that the Code sections violated Code (Ann.) § 2-5401, Const. art. 7, § 1, par. 1, and that the petitioner failed to show that the proposed taxation of the privately owned property of the petitioner, leased to the Department of Defense, would constitute an unconstitutional or unlawful interference with the operations or activities of the United States. The exception here by the petitioner is to that judgment.

By brief counsel for the defendants in error abandoned their ground of demurrer alleging the Code sections involved to be an exemption from property taxation in violation of Code (Ann.) § 2-5404, Const. art. 7, § 1, par. 4, and asked that the judgment be affirmed on the basis of the attempted waiver of the State's sovereign right of taxation in violation of the Constitution, Code (Ann.) § 2-5401, Const. art. 7, § 1, par. 1, which is the basis of the judgment made by the lower court.

Robert H. Jones and Francis G. Jones, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Wm. L. Norton, Jr., and Ben F. Johnson, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., David Hulbert, Perry, for defendant in error.

DUCKWORTH, Chief Justice.

The Constitution of Georgia declares the supreme law of this State to be the Constitution of the United States, the laws of the United States enacted pursuant thereof, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States. Constitution, art. 12, sec. 1, par. 1 (Code Ann. § 2-8001). No doubt, therefore, can be reasonably entertained as to the unflinching loyalty and respect of Georgia for the Constitution of the United States. But neither Georgia nor the United States can challenge or intentionally fail to conform completely with the imperishable truth expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U.S. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579, as follows: 'In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the governments of the Union, and those of the States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to the other.' That which the State Constitution forbids the legislature to do, the Constitution of the United States cannot require done, and indeed it makes no attempt to require it. All parties whomsoever, including the United States, are charged with knowledge of all constitutional limitations which Georgia has placed upon the powers of her legislature. No valid claim can be based upon an act of the legislature which contravenes the Constitution. Such acts are by the State Constitution declared void, and it is made the duty of the judiciary so to declare them. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 4, par. 2 (Code Ann. § 2-402). The Constitution denies to the legislature the power to surrender the sovereign right of the State to tax. Code (Ann.) § 2-5401, Const. art. 7, § 1, par. 1. Nothing the legislature does, no matter how unambiguously it is expressed, can have validity if it offends Code (Ann.) § 2-5401, Const. art. 7, § 1, par. 1. Nothing in the Constitution of the United States can confer upon the Georgia legislature, an iota of power to legislate for Georgia. We reject in toto all argument of counsel that the Constitution, Code, § 1-125(17), Const.U.S. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17, imposes or was intended to impose any duty whatever upon any State legislature to act. Its sole intent and meaning is to define the jurisdiction that will result if and when a State legislature by a valid law cedes jurisdiction or consents to purchase. Nothing said in Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 5 S.Ct. 1005, 29 L.Ed. 270; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091; or Standard Oil Co. of California v. People of State of California, 291 U.S. 650, 54 S.Ct. 526, 78 L.Ed. 775, constitutes a ruling by that court that a State legislature can enact a law ceding jurisdiction by consenting to a purchase if the State Constitution expressly forbids such action by the legislature. All that is said in those decisions, intimating that the cession or consent must be unqualified has been expressly, plainly, and unmistakably rejected in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155; Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 58 S.Ct. 1009, 82 L.Ed. 1502; and Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 60 S.Ct. 431, 84 L.Ed. 596. Also, the Congress has rejected any such idea by the provisions of 40 U.S.C.A. § 255.

Exclusive legislative power is in essence complete sovereignty. That is, not only is the United States property immune from State taxation, but even private property located thereon, or private persons living thereon would likewise have complete immunity from State taxation. 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 12, p. 62; S. R. A., Inc., v. State of Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 66 S.Ct. 749, 90 L.Ed. 851. Therefore, once it is conceded that Code (Ann.) §§ 15-301, 15-302, and 15-303 are constitutional and valid, it must inevitably follow that exclusive legislative power now vests in the United States and none in the State of Georgia. In that event, the repeated rulings by this court that Georgia and her subdivisions are without jurisdiction to tax property not located within this State (Montag Bros. v. State Revenue Comm. of Ga., 50 Ga.App. 660, 179 S.E. 563, affirmed 182 Ga. 568, 186 S.E. 558; Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 19 S.E.2d 396, 21 S.E.2d 695, 143 A.L.R. 343; National Mortgage Corp. v. Suttles, 194 Ga. 768, 22 S.E.2d 386; Davis v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 198 Ga. 550, 32 S.E.2d 180, 160 A.L.R. 778), become applicable.

In Howard v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 624, 73 S.Ct. 465, 97 L.Ed. 617, it was held that the tax there imposed by the City of Louisville was collectible without offending any Federal law, and a Federal s...