International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Tucker
| Decision Date | 18 December 1951 |
| Citation | 55 So.2d 720 |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL MINERALS & CHEMICAL CORPORATION et al. v. TUCKER. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Wendell C. Heaton, Tallahassee, and Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellants.
Trinkle & Moody, Plant City, for appellee.
Clinton W. Tucker was receiving workman's compensation pursuant to an order of the circuit court holding him temporarily totally disabled. The order was that he should be paid for 350 weeks 'unless it is sooner made to affirmatively appear that the claimant has sufficiently recovered from his injury as to be able to again pursue a gainful occupation.' Tucker petitioned the Industrial Commission to hold a hearing and order an award in a lump sum payment in accordance with Section 440.20(10), F.S.A.
Upon this petition the deputy commissioner held a hearing and found petitioner was then 50% permanently disabled. He, therefore, held petitioner was entitled to a lump sum settlement on that basis. Petitioner appealed to the full commission which affirmed the deputy commissioner. Petitioner appealed to the circuit court and gained a reversal. From that ruling the carrier has appealed.
The circuit court's order is entered upon the premise that petitioner's condition was no better than when the order was entered in the first instance, holding him temporarily totally disabled. The lower court declared that there was no evidence that plaintiff's condition had changed, except for the worse. This theory is not devoid of some logic since petitioner was drawing compensation pursuant to an unappealed judgment of the circuit court holding that petitioner was temporarily totally disabled.
The lower court misapplied the statute to the facts found by the commission. We point out that the original order of the circuit court was not final because it expressly held the disability was temporary, also the award of compensation for 350 weeks was until he was able to pursue a gainful occupation.
Being at liberty to inquire into petitioner's present condition, irrespective of the previous judgment, we look to the evidence to ascertain whether the deputy commissioner and the commission had any basis to found their conclusion that petitioner was able to pursue a gainful occupation.
Dr. Hedrick testified that petitioner had a 50% permanent disability. Dr. Leinbach testified that petitioner was 100% permanently disabled from engaging in his usual work as mechanic, and that he was 50% disabled from any, or all types of, work. Our consideration then narrows to one law, Section 440.02, F.S.A.: "Disability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.'
It is said in defense of the judgment that this section means work of a similar nature which, in this case, would be in the nature of a mechanic. We do not so interpret the statute. If petitioner's earning power is not wholly destroyed, certainly he is not totally incapacitated. See 58 Am.Jur. 778, section 283. This rule is substantiated also by Schneider's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. II, Second Edition, page 1428, section 418:
'In General--Permanent total disability is that condition which is deemed to incapacitate the employee from all work for all time, either actually or by direct statutory provision.
'An employee may be said to be totally incapacitated when he is disqualified from pursuing the usual tasks of a workman in such a way as to enable him to procure and retain employment. * * *' Marker v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 587, 37 P.2d 785, 98 A.L.R. 722; Winters v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 136 Pa.Super. 293, 7 A.2d 112; Micek v. Omaha Steel Works, 136 Neb. 843, 287 N.W. 645.
We, therefore, have a case where the evidence, without conflict, supports the contention that the petitioner was able to engage in a gainful occupation, although different from his usual vocation as a mechanic, and it was error to reverse the findings and award of the commission.
Reversed.
I agree to the majority opinion and judgment in this cause, but I desire to go one step further and touch upon a procedural question discussed in one of the briefs. It appears by the record that the Deputy Commissioner hearing the evidence adduced by the respective parties, after full and careful consideration, reached the conclusion that the claimant Tucker was disabled from a pursuit of a gainful occupation to the extent of 50% of the body as a whole and as a result thereof, under the provisions of Section 440.20(10), F.S.A., was entitled, as a matter of law, to lump sum payment for the then existing disability.
The Florida Industrial Commission is authorized by law to review on appeal the award of the Deputy Commissioner as based upon the testimony which was taken before him. The Industrial Commission heard argument of counsel, reviewed the applicable law, considered all the evidence in the record, and thereafter concluded that the order of the Deputy Commissioner was free from error, accurate and correct, both in law and fact, and under date of September 11, 1950, entered an approperiate order affirming the same in each and every respect.
The authority conferred and duties imposed upon the Florida Industrial Commission by Chapter 440, F.S.A., as amended, are essentially administrative in their nature, even though some portions of the authority so conferred may be regarded as quasi judicial thereby involving official judgment. In the record before us is a conclusion reached on review on the part of this administrative Board of Commission. The Commission's order affirmed the award of its Deputy Commissioner. The procedure of the Industrial Commission was to review the testimony adduced before the Deputy Commissioner and then apply the applicable law to the facts, but prior to the entry of an order of affirmance counsel for the respective parties were given an opportunity to present their views, both on the question of law and fact. The final order of the ...
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...receiving at the time of the injury,' § 440.02(9), Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and the decision of this court in International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Tucker, Fla.1951, 55 So.2d 720, 722. In the International Minerals case, supra, this court held that a finding of total disability was unwarrant......
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Henderson v. Sol Walker & Co., 31318
...in accordance with the facts;' that is, whether the claimant's capacity to earn has been totally destroyed. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Tucker, Fla., 55 So.2d 720. In making this determination, the injured employee's physical condition, age, industrial history, education and ......
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