International Union, UMWA v. Covenant Coal Corp.
| Decision Date | 27 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 90-0086-A. |
| Citation | 759 F. Supp. 1204 |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. COVENANT COAL CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
James J. Vergara, Jr., Vergara & Associates, Hopewell, Va., Robert Stropp, Jr., Judith A. Scott, Gen. Counsel, UMWA, Daniel B. Haviland, Yablonski, Booth & Edelman, Washington, D.C., James M. Haviland, McIntyre, Haviland & Jordan, Charleston, W.Va., for plaintiff.
Robert M. Galumbeck, Deannis Simmons, Dudley, Galumbeck & Simmons, Tazewell, Va., Gardner T. Courson, Atlanta, Ga., C. Matthew Keen, Raleigh, N.C., for defendants.
This is an action by plaintiff, United Mine Workers of America (hereinafter "UMWA"), against defendants, Covenant Coal Corporation and its officers and directors, alleging that in violation of federal and state law, defendants tortiously interfered with contract rights established under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (hereinafter "NBCWA"). UMWA alleges that defendants "intentionally and maliciously caused" various employers that were signatories to the 1984 NBCWA "to abrogate and repudiate their obligations" under that agreement and "to recommence operations under different corporate names." Defendants are officers and directors of the signatory employers and Covenant Coal Corporation, a company that these officers and directors allegedly formed to help carry out their plan. The newly formed operating companies have not been named as defendants. None of the defendants are parties to the NBCWA. Jurisdiction over the federal tortious interference claim is asserted pursuant to § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1337. Pendent jurisdiction is asserted over the state law claim. The court holds that the authority of federal courts to develop federal common law under § 301 of the LMRA is proscribed by the express language of § 301, which extends jurisdiction only to "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization...." As only a party to a contract can violate that contract, federal courts possess no authority to develop federal common law under § 301 for tortious interference by a non-signatory. The court also finds that UMWA's pendent claim is preempted. UMWA's § 301 claim and its pendent claim will, therefore, be dismissed.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957), the United States Supreme Court held that in suits under § 301(a) federal courts must apply federal common law, which they "must fashion from a policy of our national labor laws." Id. at 456, 77 S.Ct. at 918. There is a split in the circuits as to the scope of the power to fashion a body of common law. Some circuits have limited § 301 suits to contract enforcement actions. Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL-CIO v. Jacobs Constructors, Inc., 804 F.2d 879 (5th Cir.1986); see Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 948 n. 6 (7th Cir.1982). In contrast, other circuits have expansively construed the scope of power to develop federal common law under § 301. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. v. Newspaper Guild of Wilkes-Barre, Local 120, 647 F.2d 372 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143, 102 S.Ct. 1003, 71 L.Ed.2d 295 (1982); Painting & Decorating Contractors Ass'n v. Painters & Decorators Joint Comm., 707 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927, 104 S.Ct. 1709, 80 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984); Local 472, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Georgia Power Co., 684 F.2d 721 (11th Cir.1982). Even within this district, it has been held that federal courts have the authority to develop federal common law under § 301 for tortious interference with contractual relations. See International Union, UMWA, v. Eastover Mining Co., 623 F.Supp. 1141 (W.D.Va.1985).1 This court reaches a contrary conclusion and holds that its power to develop federal common law under § 301(a) is limited to contract enforcement.
The prospect of an individual not being held accountable for inequitable conduct lies at the heart of the development of the federal common law of tortious interference under § 301. In Eastover Mining, United States District Judge Glen M. Williams persuasively argues that inequities may arise if non-signatories are not subject to suit under § 301, because state claims for tortious interference are likely preempted.2 But finding neither the express language nor the legislative history of § 301 indicative of congressional intention to create a reservoir of jurisdiction enabling federal courts to remedy inequitable conduct by persons who are not parties to a labor contract, this court respectfully declines to follow Eastover Mining.
The congressional intent of § 301 was first examined by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 452-56, 77 S.Ct. at 915-918. In Textile Workers, a union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with an employer. The agreement provided that there would be no strikes or work stoppages and also provided procedures for handling grievances, which permitted either party to request arbitration. The employer refused to arbitrate several grievances concerning work loads and work assignments, and the union brought suit in district court to compel arbitration. Concluding that it had jurisdiction, the district court ordered the employer to arbitrate in accordance with the grievance arbitration provisions of the agreement. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Although the court of appeals concluded that the district court had jurisdiction, it nevertheless held that the district court "had no authority founded either in federal or state law to grant the relief." Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 449, 77 S.Ct. at 914. The Supreme Court found to the contrary and reversed.
The Supreme Court began its inquiry by quoting the express language of § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, which provides:
The court noted two conflicting views concerning the effect of § 301(a). According to the first view, § 301(a) "merely gave federal district courts jurisdiction in controversies that involved labor organizations in industries affecting commerce, without regard to diversity of citizenship or the amount in controversy." Textile Workers, 353 U.S. at 450, 77 S.Ct. at 914. Under this view, § 301(a) was not a source of substantive law. According to the second view, "§ 301(a) is more than jurisdictional. ..." Id. at 450-51, 77 S.Ct. at 914-15 (footnote omitted). Under the second view, § 301(a) authorizes "federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements...." Id. at 451, 77 S.Ct. at 915. The Supreme Court agreed with the second view.
Before the enactment of § 301, a crazy-quilt of state and federal decisions governed the enforcement of labor contracts against labor unions. Suits by and against unions frequently resulted in the determination that the labor union was not an entity subject to suit. Section 301 was enacted against this historical backdrop. In reviewing the legislative history of § 301, the Supreme Court noted that "both the Senate Report and the House Report indicate a primary concern that unions as well as employees should be bound to collective bargaining contracts," and a "broader concern — a concern with a procedure for making such agreements enforceable in the courts by either party." Id. at 453, 77 S.Ct. at 916. According to the Court, § 301 "expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can best be obtained only in that way." Id. at 455, 77 S.Ct. at 917.
After discerning the primary purpose of § 301(a), the Court turned its attention to the question of applicable substantive law and concluded that federal courts should develop federal common law from the policies of our national labor laws. The Court stated:
We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws. Citation omitted. The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. Citation omitted. Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state law. Citation omitted. But state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the...
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...the ISP because she must prove breach of contract to establish a claim of tortious interference. Int'l Union UMWA v. Covenant Coal Corp., 759 F.Supp. 1204, 1208 (W.D.Va.1991) ("In Virginia, breach of contract is an essential element of a claim for tortious interference."). In a claim for to......
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