Loss v. Blankenship
| Decision Date | 22 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-2845,80-2845 |
| Citation | 673 F.2d 942 |
| Parties | 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2953, 93 Lab.Cas. P 13,342 Jane LOSS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Rayford T. BLANKENSHIP, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Daniel M. Katz, Connerton & Bernstein, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Loren J. Comstock, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendant-appellee.
Before CUMMINGS, Chief Circuit Judge, SPRECHER, Circuit Judge, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. *
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a class action complaint which alleged violations of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., and tortious interference with contract under Indiana common law. We hold that dismissal of the federal claim for failure to state a claim under the LMRA was proper. We find, however, that the district court retained diversity jurisdiction over the common law claim and, accordingly, we remand that portion of the case for further proceedings.
The plaintiffs in this case are the employees of Mark Twain Marine Industries, Inc.'s, West Frankfort, Illinois, facility ("Mark Twain") and the employees' union, Local Union No. 87 of the Laborer's International Union of North America, AFL-CIO ("Local 87"). The plaintiff class comprises the entire membership of Local 87, and all within the class are Illinois citizens. The defendant, Blankenship, is an Indiana citizen.
Local 87 has been the collective bargaining representative of Mark Twain's maintenance and production employees since 1969. Mark Twain hired Blankenship in November of 1978, allegedly to help the company induce the decertification of Local 87. 1 At the time Blankenship was hired, a collective bargaining agreement was in force between Local 87 and Mark Twain, but was to expire on February 2, 1979.
The plaintiffs allege that Blankenship fostered anti-union sentiment among the workers at Mark Twain and that his actions resulted in the employees' rejection of a proposed collective bargaining agreement which had been reached on January 31, 1979, between Local 87 and Mark Twain. As a result, Local 87 struck Mark Twain on February 2, 1979. Mark Twain responded by unilaterally implementing its contract proposals and repudiating the collective bargaining agreement it had reached with Local 87. Despite Local 87's unconditional offer to return to work, the strike did not end until May 4, 1979, when Mark Twain reestablished its collective bargaining relationship with Local 87.
Local 87 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board on February 9, 1979, and a final complaint was issued April 10, 1979. This complaint alleged that Mark Twain had violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. After a hearing, the administrative law judge in an opinion issued on June 30, 1980, found that various acts by Mark Twain constituted unfair labor practices. Among these were acts attempting to foster anti-union sentiment, which were taken by Blankenship, who was found to have been an agent of Mark Twain. The administrative law judge issued a final order providing for back pay and benefits, reinstatement of all workers, and injunctive relief against similar future conduct. The administrative law judge's order was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Board, and an action for enforcement is pending.
On July 16, 1980, the individually-named plaintiffs and Local 87 brought this action against Blankenship in federal district court for the Southern District of Indiana on behalf of a class composed of all employees of Mark Twain's West Frankfort, Illinois, plant. The first count of the complaint sought damages and injunctive relief under § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Jurisdiction of this claim was asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1337. 2 The second count alleged common law tortious interference with contract. Jurisdiction was asserted both under diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and pendent jurisdiction.
The district court granted Blankenship's motion to dismiss the complaint on December 1, 1980. The court held that the LMRA count failed to state a claim against Blankenship, because he was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement upon which the complaint was based. Absent the federal claim, the court found no reason to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the tortious interference with contract claim and, accordingly, dismissed the second count of the complaint. The court, however, did not consider diversity as a basis for jurisdiction over the common law claim.
The first count of the plaintiffs' complaint, alleging that Blankenship's actions in creating anti-union sentiment violated § 301(a) of the LMRA, was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Where a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, the general rule is that the complaint will not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs' LMRA complaint falls within this description. The allegations in the complaint establish that Blankenship is not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. Thus, he is not within the class of persons who may be subject to liability under § 301(a).
Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
It is unclear whether the term "between an employer and a labor organization representing employees" refers to who may be party to a suit or to what types of contracts are actionable. In any event, however, courts construing the statute have held that § 301(a) does not provide the basis for an LMRA claim against a nonparty to the underlying collective bargaining agreement. Thus, Blankenship cannot be sued under the LMRA.
This case is governed by this circuit's decision in Baker v. Fleet Maintenance, Inc., 409 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1969). There, truck drivers sued their employer and another company, Sears, alleging wrongful discharge in violation of their collective bargaining agreement with their employer. Although Sears had been involved in the initial hiring of the workers and had promised them various benefits, the court upheld the district court's ruling that Sears could not be made a defendant in the § 301 suit:
It is our opinion that this section 301 suit failed to state a claim against Sears for the reason that it undisputably appears from the pleadings, affidavits, and the contract in issue that Sears was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement which was the basis of the plaintiffs' claim.
Id. at 554 (emphasis added). Thus, the court clearly based its affirmance of summary judgment on Sears' "non participation in the collective bargaining agreement." Id.
Similarly, in this case, Blankenship was not alleged to have been a party to the collective bargaining agreement that formed the basis of the § 301 claim. Rather, he was simply alleged to have been employed by one of the parties to the agreement. Thus, under Baker, the complaint lacked allegations which would bring Blankenship within the scope of § 301(a), and thus failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. See Fabian v. Freight Drivers & Helpers Local 557, 448 F.Supp. 835, 838 (D.Md.1978) (). Accord, Bowers v. Ulpiano Casal, Inc., 393 F.2d 421, 423 (1st Cir. 1968); Carpenter's Local 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth Inc., 511 F.Supp. 509, 511-12 (E.D.La.1981); Martin v. Parkhill Pipeline, Inc., 364 F.Supp. 474, 477 (N.D.Ill.1973).
A remarkably similar complaint was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 631 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1980). There, union members sought to bring suit against an employer and various employees, alleging that they had conspired to mislead the plaintiffs as to company rules and policies, with the ultimate purpose of inducing an illegal work stoppage so as to permit the hiring of replacements for the plaintiffs. The court refused to permit an action against the employees under § 301 of the LMRA because " § 301 suits are confined to defendants who are signatories of the collective bargaining agreement under which they are brought ... (T)he Act was not designed to impose personal liability on employees of corporate organizations." Id. at 1212 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the plaintiffs here seek to hold an employee, Blankenship, liable for conduct inducing a strike. We agree with the reasoning of the Ramsey court and hold that this complaint was not actionable under § 301(a). 3
The scheme of liability under the LMRA further supports our conclusion. Where the plaintiffs allege wrong-doing by an agent of the employer, § 301(b) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b), provides that the employer will be held liable. 4 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Blankenship was an agent of Mark Twain. Thus, under § 301(b) they had a LMRA remedy against the employer. 5 This clear assignment of liability to the employer for the type of wrong alleged in this case argues against an exception to the general rule that non-parties to the collective bargaining agreement cannot be sued under the LMRA.
This availability of a remedy against the employer serves to distinguish this case from the cases cited by the plaintiffs in which the Third and...
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