Interstate Commerce Commission v. Western New York & P. R. Co.
| Citation | 82 F. 192 |
| Decision Date | 03 July 1897 |
| Docket Number | 24. |
| Parties | INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION v. WESTERN NEW YORK & P.R. Co. et al. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania |
Lee & Chapman, W. J. Heywang, and S. S. Mehard, for complainants.
T. B Jennings, for New York, L.E. & W.R. Co. and Receivers.
Frank Rumsey, for Western New York & P.R. Co. and Receivers.
David Wilcox, for Delaware & H. Canal Co.
F. J Gowen, for Lehigh Valley R. Co.
Geo. B Gordon, for Pennsylvania Co.
Before ACHESON, Circuit Judge, and BUFFINGTON, District Judge.
At the hearing of the demurrers to the petition, and the motion to dismiss the petition, the arguments of counsel took a wide range, embracing some questions which we think are not properly determinable at this stage of the case. In disposing of the demurrers and the pending motion we will confine our discussion to three points only:
1. The sixteenth section of the interstate commerce act provides that in cases of the violation of, or disobedience to, the order or requirement of the commission, application ny petition for relief may be made to the circuit court of the United States sitting 'in the judicial district in which the common carrier complained of has its principal office or in which the violation or disobedience of such order or requirement shall happen. ' By the primary order of the commission here sought to be enforced, made on November 14, 1892, the railroad companies complained of were required to cease and desist from certain specified acts found by the commission to constitute unjust and unlawful discrimination between shippers of petroleum oil transported over their respective roads or lines of railway from the oil regions of Western Pennsylvania to New York and New York Harbor points, and to Boston and Boston points. The petition of the interstate commerce commission, after reciting the said order, and setting forth that each of the defendants is a common carrier engaged in the transportation of property by railroad, alone or together with some one or more of the other defendants, from Titusville and Oil City, in the state of Pennsylvania, to New York City, and other points, known as 'New York Harbor Points,' and to Boston, in the state of Massachusetts, charges that all of the defendants 'have willfully continued to fail and neglect, and they still refuse, to obey and conform to said requirements as set forth in said order, ' and that 'by so failing, neglecting, and refusing said defendants have violated, and do continue to violate, provisions of said act to regulate commerce, at, to wit, Titusville and Oil City, in the state of Pennsylvania. ' Upon the face of the petition, therefore, our rightful jurisdiction of all the defendants appears, for each of them is therein charged with the violation or disobedience within this judicial district of the order or requirement of the commission. But if we look beyond the terms of the petition itself, and examine the attached exhibits, our jurisdiction seems to be equally clear. The substance of the complaint against the defendants is that they are engaged in the transportation of petroleum oil by railroad under common arrangements for continuous carriage thereof from Titusville and Oil City, and other points in the Western district of Pennsylvania, to points at the seaboard in other states, and that by joint agreement and combined action among the defendants the alleged unlawful discriminations complained of are committed. If the allegations are true, it may well be said that the violation or disobedience within this judicial district of the order of the commission by any one of the defendants is the violation or disobedience of all the defendants who are parties to, and acting under, the common arrangement. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 74 F. 42; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U.S. 197, 16 Sup.Ct. 666.
2. The petition sets forth that the railroad formerly owned by the Western New York & Pennsylvania Railroad Company, one of the defendants in the proceeding before the commission, now is and since about March 31, 1895, has been, owned, controlled, and operated by the Western New York & Pennsylvania Railway Company, and that the railroad formerly owned by the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company, one of the defendants in the proceeding before the commission, now is, and since about November 20, 1895, has been owned, controlled, and operated by the Erie Railroad Company. Both of these new companies-- the Western New York & Pennsylvania Railway Company and the Erie Railroad Company-- are joined as parties defendant in this suit, and the petition distinctly avers that these two companies have willfully failed and neglected and refuse to obey and conform to the requirements of the order of the commission made on November 14, 1892. Each of these two new companies sets up as ground of demurrer to the petition that it was not a party to the proceeding before the interstate commerce commission, and that no order or requirement against or of it has been made by the commission. The order, however, here sought to be enforced, was made against the old railroad companies, to which the Western New York & Pennsylvania Railway Company and the Erie Railroad Company, respectively, have since become successors. The question then is, are these succeeding companies to be regarded as strangers to that order? We cannot think so. It would indeed be lamentable if a lawful order against unjust discrimination by a railroad company, made by the interstate commerce commission after a protracted investigation, could be nullified by the subsequent reorganization of the company, or transfer of its railroad and franchises to another corporation. It is a settled principle that the purchaser of property in litigation, pendente lite, is bound by the judgment or decree in the suit. 1 story, Eq. Jur. Sec. 405. And the rule is said to be founded upon great public...
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