Inv. Assocs. v. Summit Assocs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 18910.,18910.
• Citation: 74 A.3d 1192,309 Conn. 840
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES v. SUMMIT ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.

309 Conn. 840

74 A.3d 1192

INVESTMENT ASSOCIATES

v.SUMMIT ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.

No. 18910.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 18, 2013.

Decided Aug. 27, 2013.

Proloy K. Das, with whom was Bernard F. Gaffney, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant Joseph D. Lancia).

Pasquale Young, New Haven, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD and ESPINOSA, Js.

McDONALD, J.

In 2009, our legislature created a mechanism whereby a judgment creditor can “revive” an unsatisfied judgment for money damages at any time before the period for enforcement expires; Public Acts 2009, No. 09–215, § 1(c) (P.A. 09–215); see General Statutes § 52–598(c); ¹ the purpose of which was to aid in the execution of such judgments in foreign jurisdictions. The present case requires us to consider the nature of proceedings under § 52–598(c) regarding questions of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant with respect to a judgment rendered before the effective date of § 52–598(c).

Upon our grant of certification, the defendant Joseph D. Lancia ² appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's 2010 judgment reviving a 1994 judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Investment Associates, pursuant to § 52–598(c). Investment Associates v. Summit Associates, Inc., 132 Conn.App. 192, 31 A.3d 820 (2011) The defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly determined that: (1) his challenge to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the plaintiff was neither a legal entity nor an entity in existence was barred as an improper collateral attack on the original judgment; and (2) § 52–598(c) applies retroactively and provides a proper basis for the trial court's jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes of adjudicating the motion to revive. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following facts are undisputed. In 1991, the plaintiff commenced an action to recover on a promissory note executed by Summit Associates, Inc. (Summit), and guaranteed by Ned B. Wilson and the defendant. The complaint identified the plaintiff as having been at all relevant times a joint venture, equally owned by R.S.S. McKosky and Alton W. Seavey, Jr., and having its usual place of business in North Branford. The complaint further identified the plaintiff as the holder and owner of the note and as the assignee of a related security agreement. In 1992, while the action was pending, the defendant moved from Connecticut to South Carolina. The defendant continued to be represented by counsel at proceedings on the action, at which he asserted various defenses to the merits but no jurisdictional challenges. In 1994, the trial court, Hon. Frank S. Meadow, judge trial referee, rendered judgment in the plaintiff's favor in the amount of $272,530.03 plus costs. Under Connecticut law, the plaintiff had twenty years from the date judgment entered to obtain an execution on the judgment. See General Statutes § 52–598(a). Under South Carolina law, the plaintiff had ten years from that date to obtain an execution in that state's courts. See S.C.Code Ann. § 15–3–600 (2005); Abba Equipment, Inc. v. Thomason, 335 S.C. 477, 481, 517 S.E.2d 235 (App.1999). The plaintiff did not seek an execution of the Connecticut judgment in South Carolina before that state's limitations period expired.³

In 2007, the plaintiff commenced a separate action in Connecticut solely against the defendant to enforce the judgment. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the trial court, A. Robinson, J., granted. Investment Associates v. Lancia, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV–07–4028746–S, 2008 WL 2168983 (May 5, 2008) (45 Conn. L. Rptr. 437). The court recognized that Connecticut would have a valid interest in enforcing the judgment. Id., at 440. Nonetheless, it concluded that the defendant's sole contact with Connecticut since leaving the state in 1992—the 1994 judgment—was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of either the long arm statute; General Statutes § 52–59b; or due process to allow the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him.⁴Investment Associates v. Lancia, supra, at 439–40.

In June, 2009, the legislature enacted P.A. 09–215, codified as § 52–598, and made effective October 1, 2009. Pursuant to the newly enacted subsection (c) of § 52–598, the plaintiff filed a motion on October 6, 2009, to revive the 1994 judgment, alleging that the judgment remained unsatisfied and that the period for executing the judgment had not yet expired. In response, the defendant moved to dismiss the motion, claiming that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him in light of: (1) his South Carolina residency and lack of contact with Connecticut since 1992; (2) the trial court's ruling dismissing the plaintiff's 2007 action for lack of personal jurisdiction as res judicata; (3) the absence of any basis in § 52–598(c) or postjudgment procedure statutes conferring personal jurisdiction; and (4) his lack of minimum contacts with the state to render the exercise of such jurisdiction consonant with due process. The court issued a decision in 2010 concurrently denying the motion to dismiss and granting the motion to revive. The defendant thereafter moved to reargue the motion to revive, claiming that he had not been given an opportunity to assert substantive challenges to the merits of the motion because he could not have advanced such claims without conceding personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied that request, and the defendant appealed from the revived judgment to the Appellate Court.

In that appeal, the defendant renewed claims previously made to the trial court, and, for the first time, challenged the plaintiff's standing to invoke the court's jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiff, as a joint venture, was neither a legal entity nor in existence at the time it commenced the action. Investment Associates v. Summit Associates, Inc., supra, at 195–96, 31 A.3d 820. Following oral argument, the Appellate Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the defendant should be precluded from challenging the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Id., at 197, 31 A.3d 820. After considering supplemental briefs on that question, the Appellate Court concluded that the defendant was precluded from raising these claims. Id., at 197, 201–202, 31 A.3d 820. The court reasoned that a motion to revive is not the beginning of a new action, in which the defendant undoubtedly would be able to challenge the court's jurisdiction even for the first time on appeal, but, rather, a continuation of the original action. Id., at 199–200, 31 A.3d 820. Accordingly, the court concluded that the timeliness of the defendant's challenge must be viewed in light of the original judgment. Id., at 200, 31 A.3d 820. Considering the fact that the defendant had failed to avail himself of the opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction in the original proceedings, the Appellate Court concluded that the interest in finality of judgments outweighed the concerns that the defendant had raised regarding the validity of the judgment. Id., at 201–202, 31 A.3d 820. The court further concluded that, because the practical effect of the defendant's challenge to the motion to revive was an attack on the 1994 judgment, the defendant could not challenge the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over either the original judgment or the motion to revive. Id.

In addition, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's challenge to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him and his claim that the trial court's decision on the motion to revive had been made without affording him an opportunity to challenge that motion on the merits. Id., at 202–208, 31 A.3d 820. With respect to the former, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction over the defendant when granting the motion to revive because: § 52–598(c) is a procedural statute that may be applied retroactively; a motion filed pursuant to that subsection is not a new action that would require the trial court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant independent of the jurisdiction present at judgment; and the legislature had conferred continuing jurisdiction on the court over parties to post-judgment procedures, which included § 52–598(c). Id., at 203–205, 31 A.3d 820. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the revived judgment. Id., at 208, 31 A.3d 820.

Thereafter, this court granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) “Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's 2009 motion to revive?”; (2) “Did the Appellate Court properly determine that ... § 52–598(c) is procedural in nature, and, therefore, may be applied retroactively?”; and (3) “Did the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes of adjudicating the plaintiff's 2009 motion to revive?” ⁵Investment Associates v. Summit Associates, Inc., 303 Conn. 921, 922, 34 A.3d 396 (2012). Each of these issues raises questions of law over which this court exercises plenary review. Bateson v. Weddle, 306 Conn. 1, 7, 48 A.3d 652 (2012) (standing); Walsh v. Jodoin, 283 Conn. 187, 195, 925 A.2d 1086 (2007) (retroactivity of statute and statutory construction); New London County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nantes, 303 Conn. 737, 745, 36 A.3d 224 (2012) (personal jurisdiction). Upon such review, we answer the certified questions in the affirmative.

I

We begin with a brief explanation of the nature and effect of § 52–598(c), which is central to our resolution of the issues in this appeal. Under the law existing at the time the original judgment was rendered in the present case and as...