Bateson v. Weddle

• Decision Date: 14 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18720.,18720.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Edward BATESON et al. v. Gary WEDDLE.

306 Conn. 1

48 A.3d 652

Edward BATESON et al.

v.Gary WEDDLE.

No. 18720.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 27, 2012.

Decided Aug. 14, 2012.

David A. Slossberg, with whom, on the brief, was Russell A. Green, for the appellant (intervening defendant conservation commission of the town of Fairfield).

Charles W. Fleischmann, for the appellant (defendant).

George R. Bisacca, with whom, on the brief, was Edward F. Kunin, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.^*

McLACHLAN, J.

In this appeal, we review the procedural and substantive requirements for maintaining a quo warranto action pursuant to General Statutes § 52–491,¹ which challenges an alleged unlawful usurpation of “the exercise of any office, franchise or jurisdiction....” The defendant, Gary Weddle, and the intervening defendant, the conservation commission of the town of Fairfield (commission),² appeal ³ from the trial court's decision granting the writ of quo warranto filed by the plaintiffs, certain concerned taxpayers of the town of Fairfield,⁴ and ordering Weddle's removal from the office of wetlands compliance officer. The defendants advance the following arguments: (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' claim because the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing; (2) the trial court improperly determined that Weddle's appointment violated the Fairfield charter (town charter) by usurping the office of the Fairfield conservation director; and (3) the trial court improperly concluded, in the alternative, that Weddle's appointment was invalid because the commission lacked the authority to appoint multiple individuals to the office in question. We disagree with the defendants, and, accordingly, affirm the decision of the trial court.

The record discloses the following facts and procedural history, either as found by the trial court or undisputed by the parties. This quo warranto action concerns the construction of a thirty-five acre train station and commuter parking project known as the Fairfield metro center project. Pursuant to General Statutes § 22a–42⁵ and the town charter, the commission is authorized to act as an inland wetlands agency. In carrying out its duty to protect and define the inland wetlands and watercourses, the commission is also authorized to “adopt, amend and promulgate such regulations as are necessary.” Fairfield Charter § 10.3.C (2). Accordingly, the commission adopted the Fairfield inland wetlands and watercourses regulations (regulations) on October 3, 1974.

In the course of developing the metro center project, the developer was required to comply with these regulations. In November, 2007, the developers expressed their concern to the town first selectman that certain members of the commission, particularly conservation director Thomas Steinke, were acting unreasonably in their oversight of the developers' compliance with the regulations. In response, on March 27, 2008, the commission, acting as the inland wetlands agency, appointed Weddle to the office of wetlands compliance officer for the metro center project. Additionally, in its appointment of Weddle, the commission specified that Weddle should report directly to it rather than being subject to the supervision of the conservation director, thereby eliminating the conservation director's involvement with the metro center project.

On April 28, 2009, the plaintiffs brought the present action in quo warranto, pursuant to § 52–491, claiming that the appointment of Weddle as the wetlands compliance officer violated the town charter because Weddle's position was not subject to the general supervision of the conservation director, as required by § 10.3.D ⁶ of the town charter.⁷ The matterproceeded to a trial to the court on March 24, 2010, and March 25, 2010. Upon the conclusion of trial, the court first concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the quo warranto action. In particular, the court determined that the plaintiffs' allegation that Weddle's appointment was improper constituted a proper subject for a quo warranto action. In turn, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue the present action on the ground that the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, had demonstrated sufficient interest to establish standing in a quo warranto action.

With respect to the merits of the plaintiffs' claim that Weddle's appointment was unlawful, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs on two bases. Preliminarily, because the title challenged in a quo warranto proceeding must be a public office, the court found that the position held by Weddle was indeed a public office. The court thereupon reviewed the town charter provisionsthat authorized the appointment of a wetlands compliance officer and concluded that the commission did not have the authority to appoint Weddle to that position with the condition that he not be subject to the general supervision of the conservation director. Additionally, the court determined that the appointment of Weddle to this office was “illegal, null and void” because the town charter and regulations provided for one wetlands compliance officer only, and the position had been already filled. Accordingly, the trial court granted the writ of quo warranto and ordered Weddle to be removed from the wetlands compliance officer position. This appeal followed.

The defendants claim that the trial court improperly concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the present action. Specifically, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs' status as taxpayers was insufficient to establish standing; instead, they argue that the plaintiffs were required to present evidence of individual harm, which they did not do.⁸ Additionally, even if the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants argue that the court improperly determined that the commission violated the town charter in appointing Weddle to the wetlands compliance officer position. Accordingly, the defendants urge this court to reverse the judgment of the trial court. We disagree.

I

We begin with the defendants' claim that the plaintiffs lacked standing to commence the present quo warranto proceeding because it presents a question as to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Canty v. Otto, 304 Conn. 546, 557, 41 A.3d 280 (2012) (“[w]here a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause” [internal quotationmarks omitted] ). “Once the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised ... [t]he court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Paul Travelers Cos. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 816, 12 A.3d 852 (2011). Additionally, “[w]e have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Canty v. Otto, supra, at 557, 41 A.3d 280.

“Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Orange, 256 Conn. 557, 567–68, 775 A.2d 284 (2001). In actions in quo warranto, this court has held that a plaintiff's status as a taxpayer constitutes a justiciable interest sufficient to establish standing. State ex rel. Waterbury v. Martin, 46 Conn. 479, 482 (1878). We have explained, “[a]s [a taxpayer, a plaintiff] is interested in having the duties annexed to the several public offices recognized by the city charter performed by persons legally elected thereto, and is entitled upon this proceeding to a determination as to the right of the respondent [public official] to exercise the office which he has assumed, although no other person now claims it.” Id.; see also Meyer v. Collins, 49 Conn.App. 831, 834 n. 6, 717 A.2d 771 (1998) (stating taxpayer of town in which charter authorizes office has standing to proceed in quo warranto action); Carleton v. Civil Service Commission, 10 Conn.App. 209, 216, 522 A.2d 825 (1987) (“[a] taxpayer qualifies for standing [in a quo warranto proceeding] because as such he is interested in having the duties annexed to the several public offices recognizedby the city charter performed by persons legally elected or appointed thereto whether or not another person claims the office”).

Since this court decided State ex rel. Waterbury v. Martin, supra, 46 Conn. at 479, we have relied implicitly on the rule established therein that a plaintiff's status as a taxpayer is sufficient to establish standing to pursue a quo warranto action. See, e.g., Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253, 254–55, 438 A.2d 88 (1980) (quo warranto action filed, in part, by plaintiffs as councilmen, residents and taxpayers); State ex rel. Barnard v. Ambrogio, 162 Conn. 491, 493, 294 A.2d 529 (1972) (quo warranto action brought by plaintiff as finance director and taxpayer); State ex rel. Sloane v. Reidy, 152 Conn. 419, 420, 209 A.2d 674 (1965) (quo warranto action brought by plaintiffs as residents and taxpayers); Civil Service Commission v. Pekrul, 41 Conn.Supp. 302, 303, 308, 571 A.2d 715 (concluding that plaintiff as city resident and taxpayer had standing to bring quo warranto action), aff'd, 221 Conn. 12, 14, 601 A.2d 538 (1992) (affirming trial court decision “in all of its procedural and substantive ramifications” [emphasis added] ). Even though standing was not an issue expressly before us in these cases, in reaching the substantive issue on appeal, this court necessarily presumed that the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, had alleged sufficient...