Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Dept. Store 1023 v. Iowa Civil Rights Com'n

• Decision Date: 28 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 2-68272,2-68272
• Citation: 337 N.W.2d 896
• Parties: 48 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1559 IOWA BEER AND LIQUOR CONTROL DEPARTMENT STORE 1023, and Iowa State Executive Council, Petitioners-Appellees, v. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant, and Leona Brown, Intervenor.
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

Page 896

337 N.W.2d 896

48 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1559

IOWA BEER AND LIQUOR CONTROL DEPARTMENT STORE 1023, and Iowa State Executive Council, Petitioners-Appellees, v. IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant, and Leona Brown, Intervenor.

No. 2-68272.

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

June 28, 1983.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Scott H. Nichols, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent-appellant.

Alan N. Waples of Wittkamp & Waples, Burlington, for intervenor.

Patricia A. Shoff and Steven L. Nelson of Davis, Hockenberg, Wine, Brown & Koehn, Des Moines, for petitioners-appellees.

Heard by OXBERGER, C.J., and DONIELSON, SNELL, and SCHLEGEL, JJ.

SNELL, Judge.

Claimant, Leona Brown, was hired as a liquor store clerk and worked for approximately eight months notwithstanding the fact that a physical disability (heart condition) prevented her from lifting more than ten pounds. Claimant performed such tasks as operation of the cash register, bookkeeping, dusting, checking in of orders, and light lifting. The written policies of the petitioner-employer, Iowa Beer and Liquor Control Department, require all liquor store clerks to be able to perform every task enumerated in the job description, of which some involve lifting moderately heavy objects. On forms filed with the employer claimant stated that she had no physical disability, but she testified at trial that she did not conceal her condition from the various store managers for whom she worked. She was fired after her condition was discovered by higher levels of management. She then filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission alleging that her termination resulted from disability discrimination. The Commission found in claimant's favor, ordered claimant reinstated in her job, and awarded backpay of $18,076.20. On judicial review, the district court reversed, determining that the ability to lift more than ten pounds was a bona fide occupational qualification and that the employer had not failed to reasonably accommodate claimant's handicap.

Respondent Iowa Civil Rights Commission appeals from the district court decision which vacated the Commission's order and dismissed the complaint. We reverse and remand.

Section 601A.17(1) of the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 and Chapter 17A of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act provide for judicial review of final agency action. See Iowa Code section 17A.19 (1983). The district court, when exercising the power of judicial review conferred by section 17A.19, functions in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law as specified in section 17A.19(8). Iowa Public Service Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 263 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1978). "Thus, when this court reviews a decision of a district court rendered pursuant to section 17A.19, the sole question is whether the court correctly applied the law. In order to make that determination, this court applies the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether this court's conclusions are the same as those of the district court." Jackson County Public Hospital v. Public Employment Relations Board, 280 N.W.2d 426, 429-30 (Iowa 1979).

Section 17A.19(8) provides:

The court may affirm the agency action or remand to the agency for further proceedings. The court shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate relief from the agency action, equitable or legal and including declaratory relief, if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the agency action is:

a. In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

b. In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

c. In violation of an agency rule;

d. Made upon unlawful procedure;

e. Affected by other error of law;

f. In a contested case, unsupported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole; or

g. Unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

If our application of these standards leads us to the same conclusion as that reached by the district court, affirmance is in order. If not, reversal may be required. 280 N.W.2d at 429-30.

Iowa Code section 601A.6(1)(a) makes it an unfair or discriminatory employment practice for any person to refuse to hire or to discharge any applicant or employee because of a disability, "unless based upon the nature of the occupation." This exception has been construed as "akin to the 'bona fide occupational qualification' exception present in the federal fair employment legislation." Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Parr, 227 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 1975). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides, in pertinent part, that it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to employ an individual "on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupations qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that business or enterprise ..." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (West 1981) (Civil Rights Act of 1964).

Our first task on this appeal, then, is to review the record as a whole to determine whether the Commission's conclusion that the claimant's discharge was not "based upon the nature of the occupation" was supported by substantial record evidence. See Iowa Code §§ 17A.19(8)(f); 601A.6(1)(a); Woodbury County v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 335 N.W.2d 161 at 164 (Iowa S.Ct.1983). The hearing officer, in its proposed decision which was later adopted by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission as its own findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order on November 10, 1980, made the following findings of fact: That claimant discussed her heart condition with the store manager at the time of her application and was told that there would be no restrictions on her work duties; that she also discussed her condition with the next acting manager and thereupon was not assigned to any jobs involving heavy lifting; that during the time claimant worked at the Burlington store only one full time employee could do any lifting, while the other three could not; that claimant's work was rated "satisfactory" in July of 1977 by the assistant manager; that the new manager, Betty Ward, did not notice for one to two weeks that claimant was not doing lifting, at which time she contacted the store operations manager for the department; and that testimony by the witnesses was fairly consistent that the store could operate more efficiently with liquor store clerks who could perform all the job functions in the job description, but that it could still operate efficiently with claimant working there without doing any lifting. We have reviewed the record and find that while conflicting evidence was presented with respect to some of these findings, each nevertheless was supported by substantial evidence. On the basis of these findings we conclude that it cannot be said that the ability to lift moderately heavy objects, albeit listed as a requisite on the job description statement, was a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the business. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(e) (West 1981). Petitioners have failed to show that the discharge was "based upon the nature of the occupation," See Iowa Code § 601A.6(1)(a), rather than on the employer's mere preference or convenience.

In Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 318 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1982), the Iowa Supreme Court was presented with the similar issue whether the discharge of a Dahl's cafeteria worker because of a convulsive epileptic seizure constituted an unfair employment practice in violation of Iowa Code section 601A.6. The employee had, after fourteen months of satisfactory performance of her employment duties, suffered a grand mal seizure during working hours, whereupon she was discharged three days later. Id. at 164. In interpreting and applying section 601A.6, the court referred to the definition of "disability" in section 601A.2(11), "the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap, but is unrelated to such person's ability to engage in a particular occupation." The court noted that a restrictive interpretation of the definition would be ineffective to accomplish the purpose of the statute:

A literal interpretation of [the definition] would allow an employer to discharge an employee whenever the employee's disability in any way related to his or her ability to perform the job. [Claimant's] epilepsy obviously bears some relationship to her ability to perform any job, since a convulsive seizure such as the one that led to her firing would render her unconscious, and thus unable to discharge her duties, for a brief period of time. We do not believe such a restrictive interpretation of [the definition] is justifiable, however.

Id. at 167. Finding that the district court erred in its determination that claimant was discharged because of the potential for harm to herself and because she had failed to disclose her epileptic condition on her application, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the hearing officer's determination that she was terminated because she suffered a seizure on the job, a reason which was not "based upon the nature of the occupation" within the meaning of section 601A.6(1)(a). Id. at 167-68. We deem the reasoning of the Foods court to be apropos to the situation before us, and conclude that the district court erred in finding that the Commission's determination--that the lifting requirement was not a bona fide occupational qualification--was not supported by substantial evidence. In fairness, we note that the district court's decision was made prior to and thus without benefit of the guidance provided us by the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Foods.

We believe that this determination is inextricably linked to the...