Iowa Life Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Black Hawk Cnty.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1921
• Docket Number: 32961.,Nos. 32960,s. 32960
• Citation: 190 Iowa 777,180 N.W. 721
• Parties: IOWA LIFE INS. CO. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS OF BLACK HAWK COUNTY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

190 Iowa 777

180 N.W. 721

IOWA LIFE INS. CO.

v.BOARD OF SUP'RS OF BLACK HAWK COUNTY.

Nos. 32960, 32961.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 15, 1921.

Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; H. B. Boies, Judge.

Suit by plaintiff as a life insurance corporation organized under the laws of the State of Iowa, to recover back taxes erroneously and illegally exacted from it by the defendant county as alleged. There was a demurrer to the petition which was overruled. The defendant standing thereon has appealed. Affirmed.H. M. Havner, Atty. Gen., and E. J. Wenner, County Atty., of Waterloo, for appellant.

Alfred W. Mullan and Courtright & Arbuckle, all of Waterloo, for appellee.

STEVENS, J.

The ground of recovery set forth in plaintiff's petition is the same as that involved in Great Western Accident Insurance Co. v. Martin, 183 Iowa, 1009, 166 N. W. 705. The broad contention of the petition is that the rate of taxation of plaintiff's shares of stock was specified by section 1310 of Code Supp. 1913, whereas the defendant county exacted taxes from it in excess of the five-mill rate provided therein. The one defense interposed by the defendant's demurrer is that section 1310 is unconstitutional, and therefore void, in that it is discriminatory and out of harmony with other sections of the statute, especially Code, § 1305. The special section of the Constitution which it offends, as alleged, is section 6 of article 1, as follows:

“All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”

Other kindred sections of the Constitution specified in the demurrer are sections 2 of article 8 and 30 of article 3. The general purpose of all these sections of the Constitution is to provide for uniformity in the application of the laws to all persons alike and to forbid discriminative laws for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, or road purposes.

While various sections of the statute are more or less involved in the discussion, the grounds of attack specified in the demurrer are confined to an alleged variance between sections 1310 and 1305. Section 1305 is as follows:

“Sec. 1305. Valuation.--All property subject to taxation shall be valued at its actual value, which shall be entered opposite each item, and shall be assessed at twenty-five per cent. of such actual value. Such assessed value shall be entered in a separate column opposite each item, and is to be taken and considered as the taxable value of such property, and the value at which it shall be listed and upon which the levy shall be made. Actual value of property as used in this chapter shall mean its value in the market in the ordinary course of trade.”

So far as material herein, section 1310 is as follows:

“Sec. 1310. Moneys--Credits--Annuities--Bank Notes--Stock.--Moneys, credits and corporation shares or stocks, except as otherwise provided, cash, circulating notes of national banking associations, and United States legal tender notes, and other notes, and certificates of the United States payable on demand, and circulating or intended to circulate as currency, notes, including those secured by mortgage, accounts, contracts for cash or labor, bills of exchange, judgments, choses in action, liens of any kind, securities, debentures, bonds other than those of the United States, annuities, and corporation shares or stocks not otherwise taxed in kind, shall be assessed, and, excepting shares of stock of national, state and savings banks and loan and trust companies, and moneyed capital as hereinafter defined, shall be taxed upon the uniform basis throughout the state of five mills on the dollar of actual valuation, same to be assessed and collected where the owner resides. The millage tax here provided for shall be in lieu of all other taxes upon moneys and credits and shall be levied by the board of supervisors, placed upon the tax list and collected by the county treasurer, and the amount collected in the various taxing districts of the state shall be divided between the various funds upon the same pro rata basis as other taxes collected in such taxing district are apportioned.”

It will be noted that under section 1305 provision is made for an assessment of the taxation value of all property at 25 per cent. of its actual value.

Under section 1310, the property classified therein is to be assessed at its actual valuation, and is to be subjected to a straight levy of 5 mills on the dollar of such actual valuation. Section 1305 fixes no limit upon the rate of levy. The contention of defendant is that section 1310 discriminates in favor of the taxpayer classified thereunder, and that it is unconstitutional for that reason.

I. It is to be noted first that it does not appear upon the face of these sections which of them operates more favorably to the taxpayer. Clearly section 1310 assesses its class at a rate of valuation four times as high as does section 1305. Whether the limitation upon the rate of levy compensates, or more than compensates, for this difference in rate of assessment, can only be ascertained by inquiry into facts outside of the statute. If we conceive of a taxing district wherein the general rate of levy is 20 mills, the operation of the two statutes would be absolutely equal. If the general rate were less than 20 mills, section 1310 would operate more heavily upon its class than section 1305. On the other hand, if the general rate were more than 20 mills, then section 1305 would operate the more heavily. The practical fact doubtless is that the general rate is much in excess of 20 mills for most, if not all, of the taxing districts in the state. In any event, we should assume that the general rate in the defendant county was in excess of 20 mills; otherwise there would have been no excess of taxes collected from the plaintiff over the amount actually due under section 1310.

For the purpose of argument, therefore, let it be assumed that sections 1305 and 1310 operate unequally upon their respective classes, and that section 1305 operates the more heavily of the two. If we must say, therefore, that one of these...