Iowa Motor Vehicle Ass'n v. Board of Railroad Commissioners
| Decision Date | 28 September 1928 |
| Docket Number | 39218 |
| Parties | IOWA MOTOR VEHICLE ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS, Appellees; L. C. PANTAGES et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED JANUARY 23, 1929.
Appeal from Polk District Court.--W. G. BONNER, Judge.
Action in equity, commenced by the Iowa Motor Vehicle Association and other motor carriers similarly situated (appellants), to restrain the board of railroad commissioners of Iowa from collecting or attempting to collect the license fee or tax assessed against the appellants under the provisions of Chapter 4, Laws of the Forty-first General Assembly. The primary challenge is against the legislative classification of motor vehicles for purposes of taxation, on the ground that the classification so provided is arbitrary unreasonable, and discriminatory, and therefore invalid under the provisions of the United States Constitution and of the Constitution of Iowa. The cause was tried below on its merits. The trial court found and determined that the classification was reasonable, and that the statute in question was constitutional, the finding resulting in the dissolution of the injunction theretofore entered, and judgment for costs against the appellants herein. Hence this appeal.
Affirmed.
Bradshaw, Schenk & Fowler and Senneff, Bliss & Witwer, for plaintiffs, appellants.
John Fletcher, Attorney-general, Maxwell A. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney-general, Dwight N. Lewis, Commerce Counsel, and Stephen Robinson, for appellees.
A. D. Pugh, for interveners, appellants.
DE GRAFF, J.
I.
Two co-related questions are involved on this appeal: (1) Is Chapter 252-A2 (Section 5105-a40 et seq.), Code of 1927, in conflict with Article III, Section 30, of the Constitution of Iowa, in that it is a special law for the assessment and collection of taxes for road purposes? (2) Is Chapter 252-A2, Code of 1927, violative of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it denies to the complainants the equal protection of the law?
In the approach to the discussion of the questions heretofore indicated, it may be well to note first the provisions of the challenged statutes. Section 5105-a40 defines certain terms, and, inter alia, contains the following:
It is provided in Section 5105-a41:
Section 5105-a42 provides:
"The ton-miles of freight travel shall be computed as follows: The maximum capacity of each motor vehicle, including trailers, shall be added to the weight of the vehicle; this sum shall be multiplied by the number of miles the vehicle is operated, and the amount thus obtained divided by two thousand. "
Section 5105-a43 provides:
"The ton-miles of passenger travel shall be computed as follows: The maximum seating capacity of each passenger-carrying motor vehicle, including trailers, shall be estimated at one hundred fifty pounds per passenger seat; to this sum shall be added the weight of the vehicle, the total shall then be multiplied by the number of miles operated, and the amount thus obtained divided by two thousand."
In subsequent sections it is provided that motor carriers shall keep daily records, upon forms prescribed by the commission, and make monthly reports on or before the 10th of the month following.
Section 5105-a48 prescribes that:
"On or before the last day of each month, the commission shall notify all motor carriers of the amount of the tax due from them for the preceding month, which shall be computed by multiplying the total number of ton-miles operated, by the appropriate rate of taxation as herein prescribed, and shall be paid to the commission on or before the 15th day of the following month."
It is further provided that, if the payment is not made upon the said date, a penalty shall be added, and that taxes and penalty shall be a first lien upon all the property of the motor carrier, and, in the event that the "payment is not made on or before 60 days from the date the tax is payable, the property of the carrier, or so much thereof as may be necessary, may be sold to satisfy the said taxes and penalty, interest, and costs of sale." It is made the duty of the board of railroad commissioners to collect all taxes and penalties provided in this chapter, and to remit to the treasurer of the state of Iowa all moneys so collected.
Section 5105-a54 defines the distribution of the proceeds as follows:
It is the further duty of the commission to certify the amount due each county to the auditor of state, who shall draw warrants upon the treasurer of state, to be transmitted to the respective county treasurers. Such funds shall be used by each county board of supervisors for the maintenance and repairs of highways over which motor carriers operate.
In connection with the foregoing provisions as contained in Chapter 252-A2, Code of 1927, there must be taken into consideration Chapter 252-A1, with the caption "Regulation of Motor Vehicle Carriers." The legislature (forty-first general assembly) enacted these two chapters on the same date, as a part of the same system and comprehensive plan, and with the same class of carriers in contemplation.
Chapter 252-A1, Code of 1927, defines the special and general powers of the railroad commission of this state. The chapter also makes it unlawful for any motor carrier "to operate or furnish public service within this state without first having obtained from the commission a certificate declaring that public convenience and necessity require such operation." Section 5105-a6.
It is the general rule, as to the construction of statutes adopted at the same session of the legislature when they relate to the same subject-matter, that they shall be construed together. The rule that statutes in pari materia shall be construed together applies with peculiar force to statutes passed at the same session of the legislature. It is presumed that such acts are imbued with the same spirit, and actuated with the same policy, and they are to be construed together, as if parts of the same act. 36 Cyc. 1151.
The two chapters in question constitute a plan promulgated by the state legislature at the same time, for the purpose of taxing and regulating motor carriers using the highways of this state, and only those motor carriers which qualify under the provisions of Chapter 5, Laws of the Forty-first General Assembly (Chapter 252-A1, Code of 1927), are required to pay the license fee or tax imposed under the provisions of Chapter 252-A2.
It may be observed that the act in question recognizes and expressly declares the creation and levy of a tax for the maintenance and upkeep of the public highways. See State v. Manhattan Oil Co., 199 Iowa 1213. The legislative intent is primarily the creation of a privilege tax for road use under the classification as defined and limited by the statute. The authorities generally affirm that the power to tax, in a strict and proper sense, for the purpose of creating revenue, is not included within the police power of the state. City of Terre Haute v. Kersey, 159 Ind. 300 (64 N.E. 469). See, also, City of Ottumwa v. Zekind, 95 Iowa 622, 64 N.W. 646; City of Burlington v. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 102; Star Transportation Co. v. City of Mason City, 195 Iowa 930; 17 Ruling Case Law 532; 26 Ruling Case Law 17, 192 N.W. 873; 37 Cyc. 711. True, part of the fund so levied and collected is devoted to the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the chapter and the regulation of motor carriers.
Sufficient to state that the statute under consideration is a conservation law, which provides for the assessment and collection of a fund for road purposes. It is based upon the physical employment of the highway, and contemplates the "wear and tear" of the highway and the repair and maintenance thereof. It may be conceded that there must be some other reason for the instant classification than the use of the vehicle, unless the use itself affords substantial grounds for a distinction. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 509 (109 S.W. 293, 16 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1035). We do not feel, however that the questions of constitutional law involved herein can be...
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