Iranian Muslim Organization v. City of San Antonio
| Citation | 604 S.W.2d 379 |
| Decision Date | 23 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 16468,16468 |
| Parties | IRANIAN MUSLIM ORGANIZATION and Ali Seyed Fanai Khayat, Appellants, v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
This is an appeal from the denial of the appellants' application for a temporary mandatory injunction.
On December 2, 1979, approximately four weeks after the seizure of the American hostages in Tehran, Iran, Rezi Pahlavi, the former Shah of Iran, was flown from New York to Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. The next day the appellants filed two applications for parade permits for separate demonstrations to be held on December 7, 1979. One parade was to be held adjacent to Lackland Air Force Base at 11:00 a. m. The other demonstration was to occur in downtown San Antonio at 2:00 p. m.
The appellants desired to peacefully demonstrate against the Shah in the hope of convincing the American people that our government's support of the Shah is wrong. On December 4, 1979, the day after the appellants filed their applications, an application for a parade permit was made on behalf of the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan sought to hold a demonstration at the same time and place as the appellants. That evening the City Manager announced at a news conference that the appellants' applications had been denied because the City had decided not to issue permits to any persons desiring to speak to the Iranian issue. The City Manager testified that the decision to deny the applications had been made only after consulting with numerous persons, including representatives of various law enforcement agencies, a staff person with the National Security Council, a diplomat with experience in Iranian affairs, and an employee of the Department of Justice. Although several reasons were given for the denial of the applications, the decision not to issue the permits was based entirely on a concern for the safety of the hostages. In other words, the City felt that there was a very real possibility that a demonstration would result in physical injury to the appellants, which in turn could have an adverse effect on the American hostages in Iran. The Acting Chief of Police of the City of San Antonio testified that had there been no hostages in Iran, the permits would have been issued.
On December 10, appellant, Ali, and four of his friends began a hunger strike on the steps of City Hall. The demonstration lasted until December 12 when the five Iranians were arrested and taken to jail. At the time of the arrest a mob of approximately 300 persons had gathered at City Hall at the urging of two radio personalities. The mob had been taunting the demonstrators and were threatening to use force to remove them from the steps of City Hall. The Acting Chief of Police testified that the demonstrators were arrested because it was the only means of protecting them from the unruly mob.
On December 11, the San Antonio City Council heard the appellants' appeal of the City Manager's decision. At the conclusion of the hearing a motion was passed which states in pertinent part, "I move the Council uphold the Manager's decision and that permits be denied for public parades and or demonstrations to the Iranian Muslim Student Association and others who encompass the cause either pro or con in the Iranian question."
Subsequently, the appellants filed this suit to permanently enjoin the City from interfering with their rights of free speech and assembly. The appellants also sought a temporary injunction ordering the appellees to grant a parade permit for a demonstration to be held within three days of the issuance of the preliminary order. From an order denying the appellants' application for a temporary injunction, an appeal has been perfected.
When reviewing a trial court's order granting or denying a temporary injunction, the only question before the appellate court is whether the action of the trial judge in granting or denying the temporary injunction constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. In making its determination, the court may not assume that the evidence developed at the preliminary hearing will be the same as that adduced at a full trial on the merits. See Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex.1978). Moreover, the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction is proper only if a mandatory order is necessary to prevent irreparable injury or extreme hardship. See Gunnels v. North Woodland Hills Community Association, 563 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1978, no writ); City Council of Fort Worth v. Fort Worth Associated Master Plumbers & Heating Contractors, Inc., 8 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1928, writ ref'd). The appellants allege that the Shah's stay in San Antonio is a temporary one, and that the purpose of having a demonstration is to protest the presence of the Shah in this country and, specifically, in San Antonio, Texas. Thus, it is contended that immediate relief is necessary to avoid the irreparable injury that would occur if the appellants were not allowed to demonstrate while the Shah was in San Antonio. At the time of the hearing on the application for a temporary injunction, however, the Shah had departed the United States and was residing in Panama. Since no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested or filed, the trial court's judgment must be upheld on any legal theory supported by the record. See Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex.1978). We conclude that there is some basis upon which the trial court could have properly held that a mandatory order was not necessary to prevent irreparable injury. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the appellants were not entitled to a temporary mandatory injunction pending the final hearing.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
I cannot agree that doctrines concerning the broad discretion vested in a trial judge in temporary injunction proceedings and the limited scope of appellate review in such cases furnish a foundation strong enough to support the heavy weight of the attempt by the City of San Antonio to impose prior restraints on public discussion of questions raised on connection with our past and future relations with, and policy toward, Iran.
Although questions concerning the rights of public protestors have often faced the courts of this country, it is difficult to identify concrete standards which furnish reliable guidance in cases involving prior restraints on the right to demonstrate. But, as Mr. Chief Justice Burger pointed out in 1976, at that time every member of the Supreme Court of the United States had accepted, tacitly or expressly, the principle that prior restraints on expression are presumptively unconstitutional. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2802, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). Since the presumption against the validity of prior restraints is a " 'heavy presumption,' " Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181, 89 S.Ct. 347, 351, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968), the City of San Antonio in this case "carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of (the prior) restraint." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Even if we accord to the trial court the broadest constitutionally permissible discretion in this case, it cannot reasonably be concluded that the City has discharged its "heavy burden."
Several persons spoke at the City Council meeting which resulted in the adoption of the resolution confirming the decision of the City Manager to ban all parades or demonstrations which had as their purposes the airing of views concerning the "Iranian question."
Several persons predicted the outbreak of violence if appellants were allowed to parade or demonstrate. Others argued that appellants, being foreigners, had no constitutional rights. The City Manager told the Council that his decision had been made only after discussion with "appropriate City departments and other sources," and that his prime concern was the effect that action taken in San Antonio might have on the well-being of the hostages in Iran. He then said he denied the permit because (1) the holding of the parade would divert so much police manpower that the City would be unable to furnish normal police protection throughout the municipality; (2) the "request contained a high potential for violence, disorderly conduct and disturbance"; (3) a parade "would disrupt the safe and orderly flow of traffic in and around the area of the parade and/or demonstration"; (4) "there was a high degree of probability that the parade could not progress without unreasonable delay"; and (5) the permit "was not, in fact, requested fifteen days in advance, as required by the ordinance."
One of the speakers pointed out that there had been "a number of acts done in the United States by various people and by the United States government which are substantially more likely to provoke reprisals amongst the ones I would say are the freezing of all Iranian assets in the United States; the announcement of an economic a potential economic embargo against Iran; and indeed, the death of several Iranian students throughout the country in the last week and a half." Nevertheless, he said, there had been no reprisals against the hostages, "nor have we had any intimation from whatsoever anyone," other than city officials, "that such reprisals might indeed happen."
The City's answer to appellants' petition alleged only the "unacceptable...
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Iranian Muslim Organization v. City of San Antonio
...Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio. The trial court denied a temporary mandatory injunction and the court of civil appeals affirmed. 604 S.W.2d 379. We reverse the judgments On December 3, 1979, about a month after the American hostages were seized in Iran, Ali Seyed Fanai Khayat and ot......