Irizarry v. Yehia
| Decision Date | 08 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-cv-02881-NYW |
| Parties | ABADE IRIZARRY, Plaintiff, v. A. YEHIA, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Court of Colorado |
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (the "Motion to Dismiss" or "Motion") [#14, filed December 9, 2020]. The undersigned considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the Order of Reference for all purposes [#17] and concludes that oral argument will not materially assist in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, upon review of the Motion and the related briefing, applicable case law, and the entire docket, and being fully advised in the premises, I GRANT the Motion to Dismiss.
The court draws the following facts from the Complaint [#1] and presumes they are true for purposes of the instant Motion. Plaintiff Abade Irizarry ("Mr. Irizarry" or "Plaintiff") is a YouTube journalist and blogger who regularly publishes stories about police brutality and police conduct or misconduct. [#1 at ¶¶ 10, 24]. On May 26, 2019,1 Mr. Irizarry was on the scene of atraffic stop of a third-party being conducted by the Lakewood Police Department in Lakewood, Colorado. [Id. at ¶ 12]. Mr. Irizarry was accompanied by three other "journalists/bloggers"—Eric Brandt ("Mr. Brandt"), Elijah Westbrook, and Michael Sexton. [Id. at ¶¶ 9-10]. Mr. Irizarry and the three other individuals began using cameras and cell phones to record the traffic stop "for later broadcast, live-streaming, premier[e]s, and archiving for their respective social media channel[s]." [Id. at ¶ 11]. Lakewood Police officers on the scene advised Defendant Ahmed Yehia ("Officer Yehia") that "four males had arrived on the scene and were video recording their D.U.I traffic stop." [Id. at ¶ 12]. Officer Yehia then arrived at the scene "in full regalia in a Marked cruiser, with every single light available on the cruiser turned on." [Id. at ¶ 13]. Officer Yehia exited his vehicle and positioned himself directly in front of Mr. Irizarry to obstruct Mr. Irizarry's camera's view of the field sobriety test that was occurring as part of the traffic stop. [Id. at ¶ 14].
Mr. Irizarry and Mr. Brandt began to "loudly criticize" Officer Yehia and voiced their disapproval of Officer Yehia's actions. [Id. at ¶ 16]. Officer Yehia then began to shine his flashlight into Mr. Irizarry's and Mr. Brandt's cameras, which "saturat[ed] the camera sensors." [Id. at ¶ 17]. Mr. Irizarry alleges that Officer Yehia continued to harass him and Mr. Brandt until a fellow police officer instructed him to stop. [Id. at ¶ 19]. Officer Yehia returned to his vehicle, "drove right at [Mr. Irizarry] and Mr. Brandt, and sped away" before turning around and "gunn[ing] his cruiser directly at Mr. Brandt, swerv[ing] around him, stopp[ing], [and] then repeatedly . . . blast[ing] his air horn at Mr. Irizarry and Mr. Brandt." [Id. at ¶¶ 20-21]. OfficerYehia was then instructed to depart the scene. [Id. at ¶ 22].2
On September 23, 2020, Mr. Irizarry filed this lawsuit against Officer Yehia, raising one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a First Amendment violation. [Id. at 4]. Mr. Irizarry asserts that Officer Yehia's actions "deprived [Plaintiff of] his right[] to freedom of the press secured by the [F]irst [A]mendment of the United States Constitution" and that Officer Yehia's conduct "constituted a blatant prior restraint on [Plaintiff's] right to free speech and free press." [Id. at ¶¶ 27-28]. On December 9, 2020, Officer Yehia filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Mr. Irizarry fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Officer Yehia is entitled to qualified immunity. [#14 at 4]. Mr. Irizarry has responded in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and Defendant has since replied. [#29; #30]. Because the Motion is ripe for disposition, I consider the Parties' arguments below.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Walker v. Mohiuddin, 947 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, the "court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in [the] complaint and views those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co., 909 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018).
In applying these legal principles, this court is mindful that Mr. Irizarry proceeds pro se and is entitled to a liberal construction of his papers. Smith v. Allbaugh, 921 F.3d 1261, 1268 (10th Cir. 2019). But the court cannot and does not act as an advocate for a pro se party. United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019). Nor does a party's pro se status exempt him from complying with the procedural rules that govern all civil actions filed in this District, namely, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice for the District of Colorado. See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018); Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008).
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from individual liability for actions carried out while performing their duties so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights. Washington v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Cty., 847 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2017). To facilitate the efficient administration of public services, the doctrine functions to protect government officials performing discretionary actions and acts as a "shield from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Once a defendant has asserted a defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff who must establish that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's action. Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190, 1196 (10th Cir. 2015).
A right is clearly established if there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Tenth Circuit") decision on point or if the weight of authority in other courts provides that the right is clearly established. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)); DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 979 (10th Cir. 2001). The purpose of the clearly established prong is to establish that an officer had sufficient notice such that he knows, or should know, what conduct will violate a constitutional right. See Allstate Sweeping, LLC v. Black, 706 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2012). This is a particularized, fact-specific analysis as it presents an inquiry into whether a reasonable officer would have known, under the then-prevailing conditions, that his conduct violated Plaintiff's rights, and thus a court must take care not to define the right in too general of terms. Leiser v. Moore, 903 F.3d 1137, 1140 (10th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff's Complaint need not contain all the necessary factual allegations to sustain a conclusion that Officer Yehia violated clearly established law. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) (). The Complaint needs to satisfy only the minimum pleading requirements articulated in Twombly and discussed above. Id.
Officer Yehia argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from Mr. Irizarry's lawsuit because (1) he did not violate Mr. Irizarry's First Amendment rights as a matter of law, [#14 at 5]; and (2) even if he did violate Mr. Irizarry's constitutional rights, those rights were not clearly established at the time of the traffic stop incident. [Id. at 8]. I consider these arguments below.
To start, Officer Yehia states that Mr. Irizarry improperly introduces new factual allegations in his Response that were not included in his Complaint. [#30 at 1]. The court agrees. In his Response, Mr. Irizarry cites to trial testimony of Officer Yehia in which he discusses the traffic stop incident and the related events. See [#29 at 2].3 However, when ruling on a motion todismiss, the court may consider only "the four corners of the complaint and . . . any attached exhibits or documents referenced therein whose accuracy is not disputed." Sanchez v. Bauer, No. 14-cv-02804-MSK-KLM, 2015 WL 5026195, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 26, 2015); see also Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) () (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Thus, the court cannot consider any factual allegations not made or exhibits not referenced in or incorporated by the Complaint. And Mr. Irizarry may not amend his pleading by adding new factual allegations in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss. See Abdulina v. Eberl's Temp. Servs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1206 (D. Colo. Feb. 3, 2015). For these reasons, this court's analysis focuses solely on the allegations contained in the Complaint.
The First Amendment provides that "Congre...
To continue reading
Request your trial