Irvine v. I.C. Sys., Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 July 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14-cv-01329-PAB-KMT
• Citation: 198 F.Supp.3d 1232
• Parties: Leona IRVINE, Plaintiff, v. I.C. SYSTEM, INC., a Minnesota corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

198 F.Supp.3d 1232

Leona IRVINE, Plaintiff,

v.I.C. SYSTEM, INC., a Minnesota corporation, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14-cv-01329-PAB-KMT

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed July 29, 2016

David Michael Larson, David M. Larson, Attorney at Law, Englewood, CO, for Plaintiff.

Jamie N. Cotter, Philip Michael Quatrochi, Spencer Fane Britt & Browne, LLP, Denver, CO, Joshua Caine Dickinson, Spencer Fane Britt & Browne, LLP, Omaha, NE, for Defendant.

ORDER

PHILIP A. BRIMMER, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Reconsideration [Docket No. 77] and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction [Docket No. 85] filed by defendant I.C. System, Inc. and the Motion to Enter Judgment in Favor of the Plaintiff and Against the Defendant and to Enter an Order that the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, CM/ECF # 77 is Moot [Docket No. 81] filed by plaintiff Leona Irvine.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts underlying this dispute are set forth in detail in the Court's March 31, 2016 order. See Docket No. 76. Only the facts relevant to resolving the instant motions will be restated herein.

On May 12, 2014, plaintiff Leona Irvine filed this case. Docket No. 1. She asserts a single claim for relief against defendant for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq ., in connection with defendant's efforts to collect a debt (the "debt") allegedly owed by plaintiff.¹ Id. at 9-10.

On June 29, 2015, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim. Docket No. 36. On November 9, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment and defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim. Docket No. 59, 60.

On March 31, 2016, the Court issued an order on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Docket No. 76. The Court determined that, during the March 13, 2014 phone call with defendant, plaintiff disputed the debt and that defendant violated the FDCPA by telling plaintiff that the debt would remain on her credit report until paid, and that defendant violated the FDCPA by its March 16 and 23, 2014 communications to Experian and Transunion, and its April 1, 2014 communication to the creditor, by not reporting the debt as disputed. Id . at 14-19. Regarding plaintiff's contention that defendant violated the FDCPA by its May 18, 2014 communication to Experian and Transunion to delete the account, the Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate on this issue because plaintiff did not establish that deleting an account from a credit report violated the FDCPA. Id . at 20.

On April 28, 2016, defendant filed a motion requesting the Court to reconsider its March 31, 2016 order. Docket No. 77. Defendant asks the Court to "issue judgment as a matter of law holding that ICS did not violate the FDCPA" by its May 18, 2014 communication to Experian and Transunion requesting deletion of plaintiff's debt from her credit report. Id. at 2.

On May 20, 2016, defendant filed a Stipulation as to Statutory Damages, Docket No. 79, in which defendant "stipulates to the maximum statutory damages pursuant to the FDCPA in the amount of $1,000." Id . at 1, ¶ 3. Defendant also states that it "recognizes that under the [FDCPA], Plaintiff is entitled to make an application for costs and reasonable attorney fees." Id . at 2, ¶ 3.

On May 20, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion requesting the Court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and to deny defendant's motion for reconsideration as moot. Docket No. 81.

On July 1, 2016, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute because plaintiff has not established that she has standing to bring her claim. Docket No. 85 at 1.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Whether Plaintiff has Standing

Defendant's argument that plaintiff lacks standing to assert her FDCPA claim is properly determined pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because such argument attacks the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Colo. Envtl. Coalition v. Wenker , 353 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir.2004) (standing is jurisdictional). Rule 12(b)(1) challenges are generally presented in one of two forms: "[t]he moving party may (1) facially attack the complaint's allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) go beyond allegations contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to challenge the factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests." Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell , 363 F.3d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir.2004) (quoting Maestas v. Lujan , 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir.2003) ). Ultimately, plaintiff has "[t]he burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction" because it is "the party asserting jurisdiction." Port City Props. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. , 518 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir.2008).

"The standing inquiry ensures that a plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in a dispute to ensure the existence of a live case or controversy which renders judicial resolution appropriate." Tandy v. City of Wichita , 380 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir.2004). To establish Article III standing, plaintiff must meet three elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ " Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations omitted).

"Injury in fact is a constitutional requirement, and ‘[i]t is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.’ " Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547–48, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (citations omitted). "To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ " Id . at 1548 (citing Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ). An injury is particularized if it affects "the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Spokeo , 136 S.Ct. at 1548. "A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto ’; that is, it must actually exist;" it must be "real," not "abstract." Id .

Defendant contends that "Plaintiff has suffered no ‘concrete’ injury and therefore cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the Supreme Court's test for Article III standing." Docket No. 85 at 6. Defendant argues that "a bare procedural violation is all Plaintiff asserts in this suit," which is insufficient to confer standing. Id . at 5; see Summers v. Earth Island Inst. , 555 U.S. 488, 496, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) ("[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo —is insufficient to create Article III standing.").

Plaintiff responds that she "suffered an invasion of a ‘legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and actual" when the defendant falsely represented to her "that the account would stay on the credit report until it is paid and by communicating information to the credit bureaus and the creditor regarding the Plaintiff's account without reporting the account as disputed." Docket No. 95 at 6. Plaintiff relies on two post-Spokeo cases for her argument that defendant's conduct caused her concrete and particularized harm—Church v. Accretive Health, Inc. , 654 Fed.Appx. 990, 2016 WL 3611543 (11th Cir. July 6, 2016), and Dickens v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship , 2016 WL 3917530 (M.D.Fla. July 20, 2016). In both Church and Dickens , the defendant challenged plaintiff's standing to bring an FDCPA violation claim based on Spokeo . See Church, 654 Fed.Appx. at 992, 2016 WL 3611543, at *1 ("[defendant] argues that Church's injury is not sufficiently concrete to support Article III standing because Church incurred no actual damages from [defendant's] violation of the FDCPA"); Dickens , 2016 WL 3917530, at *1 ("[defendant] argues that its alleged statutory violation caused Dickens only a hypothetical injury, not any actual harm, and thus Dickens did not suffer ‘an injury in fact’ "). Church and Dickens noted that the Supreme Court in Spokeo reversed the Ninth Circuit for failing to perform a complete standing analysis and did not reach the issue of whether the alleged injury was concrete. See Church, 654 Fed.Appx. at 992, 2016 WL 3611543, at *1 ; Dickens , 2016 WL 3917530, at *1. Church and Dickens found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged a concrete injury in fact due to defendants' FDCPA violations. See Church, 654 Fed.Appx. at 995, 2016 WL 3611543, at *3 ("Church has sufficiently alleged that she has sustained a concrete—i.e., "real"—injury because she did not receive allegedly required disclosures .... Church did not receive information to which she was entitled .... [T]his injury is one that Congress has elevated to the status of a legally cognizable injury through the FDCPA."; Dickens , 2016 WL 3917530, at *2.

The Court agrees with plaintiff that the harms from defendant's actions are sufficient to establish standing to assert an FDCPA claim. Through the FDCPA, Congress created statutory legal rights to be free from certain abusive debt collection practices, Johnson v. Riddle , 305 F.3d 1107, 1117 (10th Cir.2002), and a debt collector's violation of those rights may constitute a concrete and particularized injury. See Brown v. Transurban...