Irwin, In re

Decision Date21 March 1995
Docket NumberNo. C0-94-2082,C0-94-2082
Citation529 N.W.2d 366
PartiesIn re Raymond David IRWIN, a/k/a Raymond E. Platt, a/k/a Raymond E. Frisbee.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. The procedures followed by the trial court in the commitment hearings provided adequate safeguards to protect appellant's rights.

2. The trial court rulings at the hearings on evidentiary and procedural issues were proper.

3. Lack of recent overt acts while confined in a prison does not preclude commitment as mentally ill and dangerous, where clear and convincing evidence supported the commitment.

4. Clear and convincing evidence supported the commitment of appellant for an indeterminate period as a psychopathic personality.

5. Application of the psychopathic personality statute did not violate appellant's constitutional rights.

Ronald L. Greenley, Nicol & Greenley, Ltd., Anoka, for appellant Irwin.

Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Atty., Janice Allen Wheat, Asst. County Atty., Anoka, for respondent County.

Considered and decided by HARTEN, P.J., and PARKER and MANSUR, * JJ.

OPINION

MARTIN J. MANSUR, Judge.

After a hearing, the trial court committed appellant to the Minnesota Security Hospital as a psychopathic personality and as mentally ill and dangerous. Appellant then moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied. The security hospital filed a report, and a review hearing was held. After the hearing, the trial court committed appellant for an indeterminate period to the security hospital as a psychopathic personality and as mentally ill and dangerous. Raymond David Irwin appeals.

FACTS

On August 3, 1993, a petition was filed to commit appellant as a psychopathic personality. Pursuant to respondent's motion, the court amended the petition in an August 17, 1993 order to include an allegation that appellant was mentally ill and dangerous. A hearing was held.

At the time of the hearing, appellant was 52 years old. The court found that throughout his life, no matter what his age or where he was living, he was the target of many accusations, some of which resulted in arrests and criminal convictions. Appellant denied, minimized or tried to justify these incidents.

From 1956 to 1958, appellant was sent to Manteno State Hospital in Illinois because of admitted threats to kill his stepfather. Appellant also admitted that he whipped his half-sister in 1958 because she refused to wash the dishes.

In 1960, appellant was convicted of automobile theft. He explained at the commitment hearing that he only borrowed the car because he did not want to walk through a picket line. In 1965, while at Moose Lake Hospital, he was accused of writing love letters to student nurses. He admitted writing love letters to one student nurse whom he claimed to have been dating. In 1965, appellant was committed to the Minnesota Security Hospital. Also in 1965, appellant fondled his 15-year-old half-sister in bed. She testified that appellant thought it was acceptable for him to have sex with her because she was only his half-sister, rather than his full sister. Appellant admitted that he fondled her, but claimed he mistakenly thought she was his brother-in-law's sister.

In 1966, there were allegations that appellant raped his teenage niece. Appellant denied the rape and was never charged with the offense. The trial court found there was no evidence upon which it could base a finding that the rape actually occurred.

In 1967, appellant was convicted of forced sexual contact with a 17-year-old girl in Los Angeles. Contrary to the records, appellant asserted that the conviction was for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and claimed this incident involved consensual sex with a prostitute. In 1969, also in Los Angeles, appellant was convicted of trespassing. Appellant was charged in 1972 with indecent exposure to three female juveniles in Bremerton, Washington, but these charges were dismissed.

Appellant's brother-in-law testified he saw appellant hanging a teenage girl in a barn in Wisconsin in 1973. The girl had a rope around her neck and was beginning to turn blue. Appellant was 32 years old at the time. The court described this hanging incident as being "incredibly impulsive" and an obviously very dangerous prank on appellant's part.

Appellant was married in 1971. He admitted that between 1980 and 1981 he beat his children with a belt until they were black and blue. Appellant also admitted to seven to eight separate criminal sexual incidents with his stepdaughter, F.I., and also admitted that sometimes she submitted to sex with him to avoid being beaten.

F.I.'s whereabouts were unknown and she did not testify at the commitment hearings. F.I.'s cousin testified as to F.I.'s confidences to her about appellant's sexual contacts with F.I. when they were young. Based upon this testimony, the court found appellant had sexual contact with F.I. several times per week over a period of at least three years, and that on at least one occasion, he held a gun to F.I.'s head while raping her. The court described this criminal sexual activity as "particularly vicious."

Appellant pleaded guilty on November 16, 1981 to first degree criminal sexual conduct with 12-year-old F.I., for an incident which occurred on May 10, 1981. He was admitted to the Minnesota Security Hospital for court-ordered evaluation. The subsequent report indicated that appellant minimized his sexual relationship with his stepdaughter, and concluded there were no realistic prospects for psychological intervention. The report recommended returning appellant to court. On January 29, 1982, appellant was sentenced to 43 months at Stillwater. He attended the transitional sex offender treatment program at Lino Lakes for four to five months in 1983, but did not cooperate with treatment or complete the program.

Appellant was returned to prison. He met M.M., a musician who performed at the prison in 1983, and informed her that he was in prison for writing bad checks. After appellant was released from prison, he contacted her.

M.M. testified by deposition that in February 1984, appellant ripped her clothes off and violently raped her in her automobile. She said appellant choked her so hard she lost her vision, and she thought she was going to die. When she tried to escape, he slammed the car door on her foot. Appellant denied raping her, and no charges were filed, but the court found the incident occurred as M.M. related it did.

M.M. testified at the commitment hearing that on another occasion in 1984, when appellant and M.M. were visiting overnight at appellant's sister's home, appellant went to the bedroom where M.M. was sleeping, put "something cold" on her throat, and said he was going to rape her. M.M. was able to escape. The court again found that this incident occurred as M.M. testified, although no charges were filed.

On July 23, 1984, appellant engaged in sexual contact with 15-year-old T.B., fondling her breasts as she slept. State v. Irwin, 379 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Minn.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1986); see also Irwin v. State, 400 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn.App.1987), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987). Appellant denied this allegation.

On September 23, 1984, appellant raped 14-year-old H.T., who lived in the same apartment building as M.M. His conviction for two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, one count of burglary in the first degree, and one count of assault in the second degree and the resulting sentence were upheld on appeal. Irwin, 379 N.W.2d at 116 (affirming conviction); Irwin, 400 N.W.2d at 787 (upholding denial of petition for postconviction relief). Appellant continues to adamantly deny he committed the rape, claiming he was framed by M.M. and Anoka County authorities.

Three experts provided opinions at appellant's commitment hearing: Dr. Nancy Steele, whose testimony was admitted by deposition over appellant's objections because she moved out of state; Dr. James Gilbertson, the court-appointed examiner; and Dr. Myron Malecha, the second examiner. Based upon this evidence, the court found that appellant met the statutory criteria for commitment as a psychopathic personality. It also found that appellant exhibited a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters and exhibited an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses. The court also found appellant should be committed as mentally ill and dangerous because he suffers from a substantial psychiatric disorder manifested by faulty perceptions. It found he has engaged in many overt acts causing serious physical harm to others, and that as a result of his mental illness, there was a substantial likelihood he would engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on other persons. The trial court committed appellant to the security hospital as a psychopathic personality and as mentally ill and dangerous.

The security hospital began administering neuroleptic medication to appellant pursuant to a May 18, 1994 Jarvis order. The medication appeared to have the effect of reducing his delusions and making him more amenable to treatment.

Appellant made a motion for a new trial or amended findings based primarily on the argument that he obtained new evidence to rebut the testimony of some of the witnesses. The trial court denied the motion in a June 13, 1994 order.

The security hospital filed a treatment report. Appellant requested that the court appoint a different second examiner of his choosing, and Dr. Sharon Satterfield was appointed. The parties agreed that Dr. Satterfield's opinion could be submitted by way of her written report. At the hearing, Dr. Gilbertson testified again, as did Dr. Michael Farnsworth, the clinical director of the security hospital. The trial court committed appellant for an indeterminate period to the Minnesota Security Hospital as a psychopathic personality and as mentally ill...

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59 cases
  • In re G.G.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • February 3, 2017
    ...the court shall appoint counsel for the person," as foreclosing mental health patient from self-representation), and In re Irwin , 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no statutory right to proceed pro se), with In re D.Y. , 218 N.J. 359, 95 A.3d 157, 169–71 (2014) (interpreti......
  • In re G.G.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • February 3, 2017
    ...the court shall appoint counsel for the person," as foreclosing mental health patient from self-representation), and In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (finding no statutory right to proceed pro se), with In re D.Y., 95 A.3d 157, 169-71 (N.J. 2014) (interpreting state st......
  • S.M. v. And
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • October 3, 2017
    ...for representation by counsel in civil commitment proceedings "does not violate a patient's constitutional rights"); In re Irwin , 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn.App. 1995) (stating that the Minnesota statute does not give a person in civil commitment proceedings a right to self-representation);......
  • In re Civil Commitment of Giem
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • December 13, 2007
    ...be an unreasonable result to permit a proposed patient to avoid commitment simply by not appearing in court."); see also In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn.App.1995) (noting that "[a] patient may waive [the] requirements" of section 253B.08), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995); In re Buck......
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