Irwin v. Irwin

Decision Date11 June 1962
Docket NumberNo. 19986,19986
Citation372 P.2d 440,150 Colo. 261
PartiesAnna Mary IRWIN, Plaintiff in Error, v. Everett IRWIN, Defendant in Error.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Robert A. Lehman, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Alex Stephen Keller, Denver, for defendant in error.

HALL, Justice.

We refer to the plaintiff in error as the wife and to the defendant in error as the husband.

On October 3, 1957, the husband was awarded a final decree of divorce from the wife. The matter of custody and support of three minor children, of permanent alimony for the wife, and division of property was reserved for future consideration.

On December 3, 1957, judgment was entered resolving these matters and the wife, being dissatisfied with the award, filed her motion requesting modifications thereof favorable to herself. This motion was denied and she brought the matter to this court by writ of error, seeking to have the award or judgment modified as per her request.

Sometime prior to February 27, 1959, the wife had commenced Civil Action No. 8b-24828 in the District Court of the City and County of Denver, wherein the husband was the party defendant. The record before us does not disclose the nature of that action, the relief sought or the status of it on the last mentioned date, except that it was then pending.

On February 27, 1959, the husband and wife (then no longer husband and wife) entered into and executed a written agreement:

'* * * effecting a property settlement agreement between themselves.' (Emphasis supplied.)

At the outset this agreement provided for (1) dismissal, with prejudice of the above mentioned writ of error and the case pending in the Supreme Court; (2) dismissal with prejudice of the above mentioned case then pending in the District Court.

The agreement dealt with all matters that had been resolved by the trial court and granted to the wife most of the benefits which she had requested in her motion for modification.

The agreement contains the following provisions with reference to matters pertinent to the questions now before this court:

1. 'Defendant [husband] shall pay to Anna Mary Irwin [wife] the sum of $75.00 per month for the support of Stanley Ross Irwin; * * * $75.00 per month for * * * Pamela Arlene Irwin; * * * $75.00 per month for * * * Steven Wade Irwin; * * * alimony in the amount of $100.00 per month commencing December 1, 1958, and the sum of $135.00 per month commencing June 1, 1959 * * *.

2. 'Title to the home was to be placed in the names of the wife and children as joint tenants, the wife owning one-half and the children the other one-half. All of the furniture and furnishings therein and rentals therefrom to be the sole property of the wife. The husband agreed to make all monthly payments due or to become due on the home.

3. 'The following life insurance policies [eight in number providing for coverage totalling $31,634.00] shall be kept in full force and effect by defendant, and the beneficiaries shall remain as indicated, provided, however, that if the plaintiff should remarry, then the defendant may change the policies in which she is beneficiary to only the children of the parties as beneficiaries therein; * * *.'

This agreement is signed by the husband and wife and thereon appears the following: 'APPROVED BY:' counsel for the wife; 'APPROVED BY:' counsel for the husband; and 'Approved by the Court,' all of whom signed. (The decree of divorce and property settlement order of December 3, 1957, is signed by Joseph E. Cook, Judge, whereas the court approval to this agreement is signed by Neil Horan, Judge).

On February 14, 1961, the husband, by his present counsel, filed his 'MOTION FOR ELIMINATION OF ALIMONY, REDUCTION OF SUPPORT MONEY AND FOR CHANGE OF INSURANCE AND HOUSE PAYMENTS.' In this motion it is alleged that conditions have changed in that: (1) the wife is now employed and receiving a substantial salary; (2) the oldest child, now nineteen and one-half years of age, is self supporting; (3) the insurance provisions now in effect are detrimental to the interest of all parties, and the defendant (husband) should be permitted to change said policies.

The husband requested an order (a) ending alimony payments; (b) reducing the payments for support of the children; (c) ending the house payments, and changing the insurance provisions now in effect.

The wife filed no responsive pleading.

Hearing was had on the motion and testimony taken. From the record it is apparent that counsel and the court all proceeded on the theory that the rights and duties of the parties were as defined in the property settlement order entered on December 3, 1957. Wholly overlooked and ignored was the agreement of the parties entered into on February 27,...

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16 cases
  • Marriage of Manzo, In re
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • February 28, 1983
    ...the contract was fair and free from fraud, collusion or compulsion. Newey v. Newey, 161 Colo. 395, 421 P.2d 464 (1966). Irwin v. Irwin, 150 Colo. 261, 372 P.2d 440 (1962); In re Marriage of Hines, 525 P.2d 517 (Colo.App.1974); McMillion v. McMillion, 522 P.2d 125 (Colo.App.1974); compare Ho......
  • Lindsley v. Lindsley
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • June 6, 1977
    ...cannot in the first instance divest the judiciary of power to superintend payment of alimony and child support. Irwin v. Irwin, 150 Colo. 261, 372 P.2d 440, 442 (1962); Richey v. Richey, Ky., 389 S.W.2d 914, 919 Having determined the power of the Florida court, we proceed to assess the exte......
  • Marriage of Franks, In re
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • November 17, 1975
    ...of any such policy. Quite to the contrary, such contracts are generally enforceable. We agree with the statement in Irwin v. Irwin, 150 Colo. 261, 372 P.2d 440: 'Constitutional provisions inhibit the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts. A fortiorari the judiciary cannot......
  • Marriage of Ingels, In re
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • March 8, 1979
    ...antenuptial agreements are generally valid and enforceable if the parties' marriage is terminated by death. See, e. g., Irwin v. Irwin, 150 Colo. 261, 372 P.2d 440 (1962); In re Estate of Abbott, 39 Colo.App. 536, 571 P.2d 311 (1977). The question of whether they are also generally enforcea......
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