Isaac v. State
Decision Date | 22 April 1999 |
Docket Number | No. A99A0160.,A99A0160. |
Citation | 237 Ga. App. 723,516 S.E.2d 575 |
Parties | ISAAC v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alexander & Vann, Marcus R. Todd, Thomasville, L. Warren Turner, Jr. & Associates, Jody D. Peterman, Valdosta, for appellant.
J. David Miller, District Attorney, Mark E. Mitchell, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Aundray Radell Isaac pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, interfering with government property, making terroristic threats, and obstruction of an officer. The trial court orally pronounced sentence on April 22, 1998, and entered a written sentence on April 23, 1998. Among other things, the sentence required Isaac to pay restitution in the amount of $2,310.02. Although he was represented by counsel, Isaac filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea on April 27, 1998, stating that he was "ill advised" when he entered the plea and that he "entered the plea due to threats and coercion." On May 20, 1998, Isaac's appointed attorney filed a notice of direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. Subsequently, on June 17, 1998, the trial court denied Isaac's motion to withdraw his plea. On appeal, Isaac contends that (1) the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution, (2) the trial court failed to properly determine whether his plea was freely and voluntarily entered or whether there was a factual basis for the plea, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the plea.
A criminal defendant does not have an unqualified right to file a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on a guilty plea. A direct appeal will lie from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered on a guilty plea only if the issue on appeal can be resolved by facts appearing in the record. Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 470 S.E.2d 436 (1996). Thus, the merits of Isaac's appeal can be addressed only if the issues he seeks to raise can be resolved by facts appearing in the record, including the transcript of the guilty plea hearing. Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 467 S.E.2d 570 (1996).
(Punctuation omitted.) Id.
2. Isaac contends that, in accepting his guilty plea, the trial court failed to properly determine whether the plea was freely and voluntarily given or whether there was a factual basis for the plea. To the extent that this contention can be resolved by reference to the facts in the record, it is without merit.
The transcript of the guilty plea hearing reflects that Isaac was one of fourteen defendants who pled guilty to various crimes at the hearing. Isaac's court-appointed attorney, Marcus Todd, was at his side during the hearing. In conducting the hearing, the trial court first addressed certain questions to the defendants as a group, and the defendants' answers to these questions were individually recorded by the court reporter. In response to these questions, Isaac indicated, among other things, that he was not under the influence of any substance; that he could read, write, and understand the English language; that he had read and understood the indictment; and that he was completely satisfied with his attorney's representation. The judge then advised the defendants as a group of their constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial; the right to subpoena and confront witnesses; the right to testify on their own behalf and offer other evidence; and the right to have the assistance of a lawyer. Isaac indicated that he understood these rights. The court then informed the defendants that they waived these rights, including the presumption of innocence, by entering a guilty plea; that they could withdraw their plea at any time before sentence was imposed; and that they had the right to appeal their conviction and sentence. Isaac indicated that he understood these facts, and that he had no questions about his rights or any other issues.
The court then discussed the specific charges with each of the defendants individually. With respect to Isaac, the court informed him of the nature of his plea agreement, the charges he faced under the plea agreement, and the possible sentence on each charge. Isaac confirmed that the court's discussion of these facts conformed with his own understanding.
In response to questions posed to the group as a whole, Isaac stated that he understood his rights and the charges against him; that his plea of guilty was freely and voluntarily made; that no threats, promises, or agreements were made to induce his plea; that the plea was his own voluntary act; that he was guilty of the charges against him; and that he understood the court was not bound by any agreement or recommendation as to sentencing, but could impose a sentence within the limits previously explained.
The district attorney then related the factual basis for the various pleas. He explained that, on January 1, 1998, Isaac was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive and was stopped at a police roadblock. Isaac broke the window of a police vehicle and threatened to kill an officer and his family and burn down their house. Isaac obstructed the officer by resisting arrest and fighting with the officer. In response to the court's questions, Isaac indicated that the district attorney's recitation of the facts was correct.1 The trial court found that there was a factual basis for the pleas and that each of the defendants, including Isaac, "entered the pleas of guilty freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently after fully understanding all of his or her constitutional and statutory rights appertaining thereto."
(Emphasis omitted.) King v. State, 226 Ga. App. 576, 584(4), 486 S.E.2d 904 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 270 Ga. 367, 509 S.E.2d 32 (1998). Here, Isaac was represented by an attorney, who was at his side during the plea hearing. The court personally advised the defendants, including Isaac, of their constitutional rights and discussed with Isaac individually the charges against him and possible sentences. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to conclude that Isaac's guilty plea was freely and voluntarily made and supported by a factual basis.
3. Isaac contends that the trial court erred in denying his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As noted above, however, the trial court did not rule on the motion until after Isaac's attorney filed the notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence. In criminal cases as well as civil cases, the filing of a notice of appeal "has the effect of depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to modify or alter its judgment." Bryson v. State, 228 Ga.App. 84, 85(1), 491 S.E.2d 184 (1997); Holt v. State, 205 Ga.App. 40(1), 421 S.E.2d 131 (1992); D.P. v. State of Ga., 129 Ga.App. 680, 681(1), 200 S.E.2d 499 (1973). Since the grant of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after sentence has been imposed is, in effect, a modification of the judgment of conviction and sentence, the filing of the notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to grant Isaac's motion to withdraw his plea.2
Moreover, even if we were to consider the merits of Isaac's claim, it is clear that the trial court did not err in denying the motion. A defendant has an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea and plead not guilty at any time before sentence is orally pronounced by the trial court. OCGA § 17-7-93(b); Anderson v. State, 194 Ga.App. 395, 390 S.E.2d 637 (1990). In his brief, Isaac suggests that OCGA § 17-7-93(b) should apply because the signature line of the motion to...
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