Isaacs v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., Civil No. 12-cv-040-LM
| Decision Date | 18 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 12-cv-040-LM,Opinion No. 2014 DNH 070 |
| Parties | Dr. J.D. Isaacs v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, Dr. Christine T. Finn, and the Trustees of Dartmouth College |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Dr. J.D. Isaacs
v.
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center,
Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital,
Dr. Christine T. Finn,
and the Trustees of Dartmouth College
Civil No. 12-cv-040-LM
Opinion No. 2014 DNH 070
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
April 18, 2014
Dr. J.D. Isaacs, a former resident in psychiatry in the Graduate Medical Education ("GME") program at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center ("Dartmouth-Hitchcock"), has sued four defendants and asserts ten claims, arising from either the treatment he received during his Dartmouth-Hitchcock residency or his dismissal from it. Before the court are two motions for summary judgment. One of them was filed by Dartmouth-Hitchcock and Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital ("Mary Hitchcock"). Those two defendants shall be referred to, collectively, as the "Hitchcock defendants." The other summary-judgment motion was filed by Dr. Christine Finn, director of the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Psychiatry Residency Program, and the Trustees of Dartmouth College ("Trustees"). Those two defendants shall be referred to, collectively, as the "Dartmouth defendants." Dr. Isaacs,
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currently proceeding pro se, has not objected to either motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, both motions for summary judgment are granted in full.
While Dr. Isaacs has not objected to either of the pending summary-judgment motions, he has filed a motion for a scheduling conference in which he: (1) asks the court to appoint counsel to review forty hours of videotaped depositions he has conducted, to search for irregularities; and (2) states that he "is . . . of the belief that it is wholly inappropriate for opposing counsel to have filed a motion for summary judgment, when discovery is not yet complete," doc. no. 140, at 2. But, he has identified no authority that would support his request for appointment of counsel, nor has he sought relief under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules"). Accordingly, his motion for a scheduling conference, document no. 140, is denied.
"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ponte v. Steelcase Inc., 741 F.3d 310, 319 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Cortés-Rivera v. Dept. of Corr., 626 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2010)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
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court must "view[] the entire record 'in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'" Winslow v. Aroostook Cty., 736 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)).
"The object of summary judgment is to 'pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.'" Dávila v. Corp. de P.R. para la Diffusión Púb., 498 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Acosta v. Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2004)). "[T]he court's task is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
"The nonmovant may defeat a summary judgment motion by demonstrating, through submissions of evidentiary quality, that a trialworthy issue persists." Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006)). In other words, "the party seeking to avoid summary judgment must be able to point to specific, competent evidence to support his [or her] claim." Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 9 (quoting
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Soto-Ocasio v. Fed. Ex. Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
As noted, Dr. Isaacs has not filed an objection to either of the two pending summary-judgment motions. Necessarily, he has presented the court with no "short and concise statement of material facts, supported by appropriate record citations, as to which [he] contends a genuine dispute exists so as to require a trial." LR 56.1(b). Accordingly, all the properly supported material facts in the moving parties' factual statements are deemed admitted. See id. Those facts, along with others gleaned by the court from the summary-judgment record, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), serve as the basis for the following recitation of the relevant factual background.
In 2005 and 2006, Dr. Isaacs attended medical school at the University of Southern California ("USC"). During his first year, he was suspended and ultimately dismissed for harassing a classmate. From August of 2006 through April of 2010, Dr. Isaacs attended the American University of the Caribbean, Netherlands Antilles, and was awarded an M.D. degree in 2010.
In an Electronic Residency Application Service ("ERAS") application that Dr. Isaacs submitted in September of 2009 to the University of Arizona ("UA") Department of Surgery, he
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omitted his attendance at USC from a listing of his medical education.1 Based upon the 2009 ERAS application, Dr. Isaacs was offered a residency in general surgery at UA. He began his UA residency in July of 2010. Approximately three weeks later, he was issued a Notice of Deficiency that cited, among other things, his "[d]emonstrated incompetence in professional activities related to the fulfillment of assigned duties and responsibilities associated with [his] position." Defs.' Mem. of Law, Ex. 11 (doc. no. 144-12), at 1.2 About three weeks later, Dr. Isaacs was notified that he was going to be put on probation, "based upon his performance and his poor evaluations." Id., Ex. 7 (doc. no. 144-8), at 8. In response, he resigned.
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In September of 2010, Dr. Isaacs submitted an ERAS application to Dartmouth-Hitchcock. In that application, he omitted both his attendance at USC and his aborted residency at UA. Based upon his application, Dr. Isaacs was offered admission to the Dartmouth-Hitchcock residency program in psychiatry, which entailed employment as a resident at Mary Hitchcock. In connection with accepting Dartmouth-Hitchcock's offer, Dr. Isaacs stated, among other things, that he had never "voluntarily resigned or withdrawn from any hospital or licensed facility due to professional misconduct, incompetence or negligence." Defs.' Mem. of Law, Ex. 15 (doc. no. 144-16), at 1. He also agreed to the following condition of employment:
Misrepresentation or omission of material information from my employment application, my C.V., or other documents related to my application, may result in rejection of my application or, if I am hired, termination of my employment.
Id. at 2.
Also in conjunction with his acceptance of Dartmouth-Hitchcock's offer of admission, Dr. Isaacs completed a data form that included information necessary for Mary Hitchcock to fulfill its reporting obligations to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On that form, Dr. Isaacs indicated that he did not "have a handicap or disability," Defs.' Mem. of Law, Ex. 16 (doc. no. 144-17), and when asked to "describe any reasonable accommodation that the Hospital could
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consider enabling [him] to perform [his] job in a safer or better manner," id., Dr. Isaacs responded: "NA," id.
After accepting his offer of admission from Dartmouth-Hitchcock, Dr. Isaacs signed a Resident Agreement of Appointment covering his employment by Mary Hitchcock. That agreement specified that Dr. Isaacs' appointment at Mary Hitchcock was for one year, and also provided as follows:
Continued participation in an academic program at [Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center] is required for this agreement to remain in force. Termination from your academic program will terminate this agreement.
Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital may terminate this agreement and any obligations it may have there under at any time upon any reasonable basis which shall be deemed to include failure to satisfy the academic requirements of the program; failure to progress in knowledge or performance at a satisfactory rate; failure to attain or demonstrate competence in any of the core competencies; or conduct unbecoming a physician.
Defs.' Mem. of Law, Ex. 18 (doc. no. 144-19), at 3.
The same day he signed the appointment agreement, Dr. Isaacs also signed an application for a training license from the State of New Hampshire Board of Medicine. In a supplement to that application, Dr. Isaacs indicated that he had resigned from a medical education program, but also indicated that he had never "been reprimanded, sanctioned, restricted or disciplined in any activities involving medical education or practice." Defs.' Mem. of Law, Ex. 19 (doc. no. 144-20), at 3. By way of
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explanation for his resignation from the UA residency program, Dr. Isaacs wrote:
I was employed as a preliminary surgery resident at the University of Arizona for approximately six weeks, between July - August 2010. I resigned, in good standing, from the program, and with permission from the program director. At the time, the program was under . . ....
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