Ithaca City Sch. Dist. v. City of Ithaca

• Decision Date: 03 March 2011
• Citation: 918 N.Y.S.2d 232,82 A.D.3d 1316
• Parties: In the Matter of ITHACA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent, v. CITY OF ITHACA et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

918 N.Y.S.2d 232

82 A.D.3d 1316

In the Matter of ITHACA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent,

v.CITY OF ITHACA et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

March 3, 2011.

Daniel L. Hoffman, Ithaca, for appellants.

Bond, Schoeneck & King, P.L.L.C., Syracuse (Jonathan B. Fellows of counsel), for respondent.

Before: MERCURE, J.P., ROSE, LAHTINEN, MALONE JR. and STEIN, JJ.

STEIN, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Mulvey, J.), entered April 2, 2010 in Tompkins County, which granted petitioner's application, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to, among other things, annul a determination of respondent Ithaca Landmarks Preservation Commissiondenying petitioner's request for permission to demolish a certain structure.

Petitioner owns a four-acre parcel of property in the City of Ithaca, Tompkins County. Located on the property is a building formerly known as the Ithaca Gas Works, but now commonly referred to as the Markles Flats Building. The building housed a coal gas manufacturing plant until 1932. In 1978, the building was designated a historical landmark by respondent Ithaca Landmarks Preservation Commission (hereinafter ILPC). The property is contaminated due to its prior use and was listed by the Department of Environmental Conservation as a class 2 site on the Registry of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites. ¹ In December 2008, petitioner applied to the ILPC for permission to demolish the building. Public hearings were thereafter held before the ILPC at which neighborhood residents testified both in support of and in opposition to demolition. Upon the ILPC's denial of petitioner's request, petitioner commenced this combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the ILPC lacked jurisdiction over petitioner and annulment of the ILPC's determination. Supreme Court determined that the ILPC did not have jurisdiction to make the decision and granted the petition. Respondents now appeal and we affirm.

We have held that a local government's authority to regulate landmarks "does not include the power to regulate the activity of a[s]tate agency which might affect historical or cultural property under the control and jurisdiction of the [s]tate agency" ( Matter of Ebert v. New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preserv., 119 A.D.2d 62, 65-66, 505 N.Y.S.2d 470 [1986], lv. denied 68 N.Y.2d 612, 510 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 503 N.E.2d 123 [1986] [State University Fund not required to comply with local historical preservation ordinance before demolishing existing structure; state level review sufficient] ). Thus, the question here distills to whether a public school district, like petitioner herein, is akin to a state agency in this context and is, therefore, encompassed within the same precepts. While we have not previously addressed this precise question, the very nature of school districts, together with related precedent, convinces us that such question should be answered in the affirmative.

The Court of Appeals has long held that a board of education is a "governmental agency of the state" ( Herman v. Board of Educ. of Union School Dist. No. 8, Town of Arcadia, Wayne County, 234 N.Y. 196, 201, 137 N.E. 24 [1922]; accord Town of Poughkeepsie v. Hopper Plumbing & Heating Corp., 23 A.D.2d 884, 885, 259 N.Y.S.2d 992 [1965, Hill and Hopkins, JJ., dissenting] ) and that "public education shall be beyond control by municipalities and politics" ( Matter of Divisich v. Marshall, 281 N.Y. 170, 173, 22 N.E.2d 327 [1939] ). It has also been recognized that "[a] school district and its [b]oard of [e]ducation is more than a mere agent of the [s]tate. It is an entity performing a [s]tate purpose pursuant to the mandate of the People as directed by their Constitution" ( Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1, Towns of E. Greenbush v. Allen, 51 Misc.2d 297, 299, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 [1966], revd. 27 A.D.2d 69, 276 N.Y.S.2d 234 [1966], affd. 20 N.Y.2d 109, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799, 228 N.E.2d 791 [1967]; ²see Matter of Divisich v. Marshall, 281 N.Y. 170, 22 N.E.2d 327 [1939]; see generally N.Y. Const., art. XI, § 1; Education Law § 2[14]; accord City of New York v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 286, 298, 631 N.Y.S.2d 553, 655 N.E.2d 649 [1995, Ciparick, J., dissenting] ).³ We have previously referred to a school district as "a creature and subdivision of the [s]tate" ( Matter of Board of Educ. of Roosevelt Union Free School Dist. v. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y., 282 A.D.2d 166, 172, 723 N.Y.S.2d 262 [2001] ).

Inasmuch as school districts are "created by the [s]tate for the...