Rochester City Sch. Dist. v. City of Rochester

• Decision Date: 02 August 2019
• Docket Number: E2019007046
• Citation: 65 Misc.3d 1093,108 N.Y.S.3d 739
• Parties: ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, and the Board of Education of the Rochester City School District, Petitioners, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, Lovely A. Warren as Mayor of the City of Rochester, Council of the City of Rochester, and the Monroe County Board of Elections, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

65 Misc.3d 1093
108 N.Y.S.3d 739

ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, and the Board of Education of the Rochester City School District, Petitioners,
v.
CITY OF ROCHESTER, Lovely A. Warren as Mayor of the City of Rochester, Council of the City of Rochester, and the Monroe County Board of Elections, Respondents.

E2019007046

Supreme Court, Monroe County, New York.

Decided on August 2, 2019

108 N.Y.S.3d 740

Alison K.L. Moyer, Esq., Rochester, Attorney for Petitioners

Patrick Beath, Esq. and Timothy R. Curtin, Esq., Attorneys for the City Respondents

J. Scott Odorisi, J.

108 N.Y.S.3d 741

Pending before this Court is a hybrid Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") Article 78 and declaratory judgment special proceeding, accompanied by a permanent injunction request.

Based upon a review of: the Verified Petition [NYSCEF Docket # 1], the Attorney Affirmation of Alison K.L. Moyer, Esq., with exhibits [Docket # 4-11], and the Order to Show Cause [Docket # 27/28] - all submitted in support of the proceeding; the City Respondents' Answer [Docket # 19]; the Attorney Affirmation of Patrick Beath, Esq., with exhibits [Docket # 20-25] - both submitted in opposition; the Notice of Appearance for Respondent Monroe County Board of Elections [Docket # 33] - which took no position as to the merits; the Amended Petition [Docket # 30], and Ms. Moyer's Reply Attorney Affirmation, with an exhibit [Docket #'s 34-35] - submitted in further support of the application; and, the City Respondents' Answer to the Amended Petition with Counterclaim [Docket # 38] - submitted in further opposition; Petitioners' Reply [Docket # 39] - submitted in further support; as well as upon oral argument, this Court hereby GRANTS the Verified Petition and DENIES the City Respondents' counterclaim - both for the reasons set forth hereinafter.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

The Court is compelled to begin by acknowledging the great challenges facing the Rochester City School District, and the utmost importance a sound education is in the lives of our children. The City Respondents' proactive proposals for remedying the situation are admirable, but not legally permissible, as will be explained hereinafter.

Petitioners' Legitimate Standing

A threshold matter to tackle is the City Respondents' standing defense, which falters. See e.g. Elefante v. Hanna , 54 A.D.2d 822, 823, 389 N.Y.S.2d 501 (4th Dept. 1976) (the petitioner had standing to attack, by means of Article 78, administrative action done pursuant to an invalid law, and was entitled to seek declaratory relief with respect to the impending submission of the proposed new city charter to the Utica electorate), mod on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 908, 389 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 N.E.2d 1011 (1976) (dismissed due to laches, not lack of standing). As in Elefante , the present Petitioners also have standing to assail the impending Referendum seeking to negate the Board of Education positions and those members' salaries.

The City Respondents' interpretation of the standing principle is too narrow. As the appellate courts have articulated:

In [a] matter of significant municipal concern to the citizens ... involving the actions of municipal officials ... [a] petitioner has standing to bring [an] article 78 proceeding even though he does not show a personal grievance or a personal interest in the outcome ...

Andrews v. Nagourney , 41 A.D.2d 778, 342 N.Y.S.2d 79 (2d Dept. 1973), aff'd , 32 N.Y.2d 784, 345 N.Y.S.2d 542, 298 N.E.2d 680. See also Julian v. LaSalle , 22 A.D.3d 1033, 1034, 804 N.Y.S.2d 522 (4th Dept. 2005) (a petitioner's standing is afforded where "the case involves a ‘matter of significant municipal concern’ " citing Andrews ).

This broad standing rule has been applied in the education context to permit Boards of Education to sue under Article 78 "as part of the school board's duty and responsibility to provide a system of public

108 N.Y.S.3d 742

education." Bd. of Educ. of Roosevelt Union Free School Dist. v. Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York , 282 A.D.2d 166, 171, 723 N.Y.S.2d 262 (3d Dept. 2001) ; Bd. of Ed. of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. v. Ambach , 108 Misc. 2d 632, 633-634, 438 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Albany Co. Sup. Ct. 1981) (rejecting the respondent's standing objection).

As framed by the City Respondents, the present issue is of paramount public concern, and that is precisely why they seek the public's input to chart a course of action. That proffered course is the temporary removal of the Board of Education and the elimination or reduction of those members' salaries. With that overtly articulated objective in mind, saying that the Board of Education, and the directly impacted School District, have no voice to complain is simply untenable. Further, the City Respondents' conceded salary removal/reduction effort, all on its own, serves as an adequate injury to the Board of Education members to afford standing to contest the Referendum as that is a concrete financial harm. Contrary to the City Respondents' suggestion, Petitioners' standing does not rise and fall on the ultimate success of their advisory referendum contention, but rather the real effects should they lose. Stated differently, a party need not be right on the law to gain access to the courthouse. See Colella v. Bd. of Assessors of County of Nassau , 95 N.Y.2d 401, 410, 718 N.Y.S.2d 268, 741 N.E.2d 113 (2000) ("the failure to accord such standing would be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny ...").

In all, Petitioners have the right to prosecute this proceeding.¹

Article 78 and Declaratory Judgment Standards

To begin, Article 78 "is an appropriate method of collaterally attacking an administrative action threatened or taken pursuant to an allegedly invalid law." Belle v. Town Bd. of Town of Onondaga , 61 A.D.2d 352, 355, 402 N.Y.S.2d 677 (4th Dept. 1978). As clarified at oral argument, Petitioners seek varied forms of Article 78 relief - two of which this Court deems meritorious.

First, a writ of prohibition restrains an official who acts without, or in excess of, his or her jurisdiction. See CPLR 7803 (2) ; Van Wie v. Kirk , 244 A.D.2d 13, 24, 675 N.Y.S.2d 469 (4th Dept. 1998). The granting of prohibition relief is appropriate when a petitioner shows a clear legal right thereto. See Town of Huntington v. New York State Div. of Human Rights , 82 N.Y.2d 783, 786, 604 N.Y.S.2d 541, 624 N.E.2d 678 (1993) ; Rush v. Mordue , 68 N.Y.2d 348, 352, 509 N.Y.S.2d 493, 502 N.E.2d 170 (1986) ; Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. v. Nevins , 295 A.D.2d 887, 743 N.Y.S.2d 754 (4th Dept. 2002). A writ of prohibition may be issued "in the sound discretion of the court." Soares v. Herrick , 20 N.Y.3d 139, 145, 957 N.Y.S.2d 664, 981 N.E.2d 260 (2012).

Second, mandamus to review relief is set forth in CPLR 7803 (3) which permits determinations to be set aside if "made in violation of lawful procedure [or] was affected by an error of law ...." See also

108 N.Y.S.3d 743

New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. v. McBarnette , 84 N.Y.2d 194, 205, 616 N.Y.S.2d 1, 639 N.E.2d 740 (1994) (an alleged error of law most often involves an allegation that the agency improperly interpreted or applied a statute or regulation).

Besides Article 78 relief, and separate and distinct therefrom, Petitioners - and also the City Respondents - seek the issuance of a favorable declaratory judgment. Declaratory judgment relief is set forth in CPLR 3001, which provides that:

The supreme court may render a declaratory judgment having the effect of a final judgment as to the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.

CPLR 3001 (emphasis added). See also CPLR 3017 (b).

"[A] declaratory judgment is a remedy sui generis and escapes both the substantive objections and procedural limitations of special writs and extraordinary remedies." Morgenthau v. Erlbaum , 59 N.Y.2d 143, 147, 464 N.Y.S.2d 392, 451 N.E.2d 150 (1983). It is available in a wider range of circumstances than CPLR Article 78 relief. See Morgenthau v. Roberts , 65 N.Y.2d 749, 492 N.Y.S.2d 21, 481 N.E.2d 561 (1985). As the Court of Appeals has decreed about declaratory judgments:

The use of a declaratory judgment, while discretionary with the court, is nevertheless dependent upon facts and circumstances rendering it useful and necessary. The discretion must be exercised judicially and with care ... It is usually unnecessary where a full and adequate remedy is already provided by another well-known form of action. The general purpose of the declaratory judgment is to serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation either as to present or prospective obligations.

James v. Alderton Dock Yards , 256 N.Y. 298, 305, 176 N.E. 401 (1931) (emphasis added and internal citation omitted).

The foregoing legal standards will next be applied to each side's claims before this Court.

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