Ivey v. Audrain Cnty.

• Decision Date: 04 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-2507,19-2507
• Citation: 968 F.3d 845
• Parties: David IVEY, Plaintiff - Appellee v. AUDRAIN COUNTY, MISSOURI, Defendant - Appellant Stephanie Hildebrand, individually and in her official capacity as a nurse for the Audrain County Jail; John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as a guard for the Audrain County Jail, Defendants Richard White, individually and in official capacity as guard - Audrain County Jail; Nathanael Atkinson, individually and in official capacity as guard - Audrain County Jail; Nicholas Jensen, individually and in official capacity as guard - Audrain County Jail, Defendants - Appellants Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc.; M.D. Shawndra Brown-Foote, Defendants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

968 F.3d 845

David IVEY, Plaintiff - Appellee

v.AUDRAIN COUNTY, MISSOURI, Defendant - Appellant

Stephanie Hildebrand, individually and in her official capacity as a nurse for the Audrain County Jail; John Doe, individually and in his official capacity as a guard for the Audrain County Jail, Defendants

Richard White, individually and in official capacity as guard - Audrain County Jail; Nathanael Atkinson, individually and in official capacity as guard - Audrain County Jail; Nicholas Jensen, individually and in official capacity as guard - Audrain County Jail, Defendants - Appellants

Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc.; M.D. Shawndra Brown-Foote, Defendants

No. 19-2507

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 16, 2020

Filed: August 4, 2020

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 8, 2020^*

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellants and appeared on the brief was Rachel Bates, of Kirkwood, MO. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellants brief; Robert John Krehbiel, of Kirkwood, MO., Jason Scott Retter, of Kirkwood, MO., Blake Hill, of Kirkwood, MO.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee and appeared on the brief was Patrick R. McPhail, of Saint Louis, MO. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; John G. Simon, of Saint Louis, MO., Kevin M. Carnie, Jr., of Saint Louis, MO.

Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

After Mark Ivey tragically died while jailed in Audrain County, Missouri, his father, a proper plaintiff under Missouri's wrongful death statute, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.080.1(1), sued, as relevant, three jail employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming they were deliberately indifferent to Ivey's serious medical needs. He also sued their employer—the county—on the ground that its failure to train the officers caused Ivey's death. The district court denied summary judgment to the employees on the issue of qualified immunity—a decision they now challenge on interlocutory appeal. The district court denied summary judgment to the county as well, and it also appeals. We conclude the jail employees are entitled to qualified immunity but that we lack jurisdiction to resolve the county's appeal. So we reverse and remand.

A police officer arrested Ivey one evening at a convenience store for driving under the influence of drugs and for possessing drugs and drug paraphernalia. As the district court explained, at the time of his arrest Ivey "was acting strangely, had defecated on himself, and was under the influence of heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl

and methadone." He was transported to an emergency room, diagnosed with asthma and drug intoxication, and released that night with a letter from the hospital saying that he was fit for confinement.

Ivey was booked into the jail shortly after midnight. Working the jail's night shift were guards Richard White, Nathanael Atkinson, and Nicholas Jensen. About three hours after being booked, Ivey vomited in his cell. Atkinson and Jensen cleaned Ivey's cell and took him to the shower so he could wash himself, and Ivey told Jensen that he was "doing all right, just needed some water." About two hours later Ivey vomited in his cell again and defecated on himself. From a video monitor White observed what he described as "seizure-like symptoms" in that Ivey appeared "stiff" and "slid off the bench onto the floor." White instructed Atkinson and Jensen to check on Ivey, and again they cleaned Ivey's cell and took him to the shower. When Jensen asked Ivey if he needed medical attention, he declined. White notified his supervisor, who instructed White to monitor Ivey and ensure that the nurse who would be arriving later that morning examine him.

The nurse examined Ivey that morning, and she knew that Ivey had been diagnosed with asthma

and was experiencing drug withdrawal. Her notes report that Ivey complained, as relevant, of vomiting twice and having a loose stool, but she disputes that she knew Ivey had had a seizure-like movement or that he had defecated on himself. White maintains that he told the nurse about these things, but, in any case, Ivey remained in the jail after the nurse's evaluation and was not transported to a hospital.

The next evening Ivey vomited in his cell again, and officers again cleaned his cell and took him to the shower. He ate dinner, and later that evening a qualified mental health professional assessed his condition and noted that he was responsive, had no complaints, and was likely withdrawing from drugs. White, Atkinson, and Jensen later took up their posts on the night shift. At one point Ivey was moved to a different cell without incident, and officers checked on him every hour from around nine o'clock that night until three o'clock the next morning, at which time White noticed that Ivey looked pale and that his chest was not rising and falling. White therefore entered the cell to get a closer look at Ivey, saw that something was wrong, and immediately called for assistance. Officers performed CPR on Ivey but to no avail; he was pronounced dead at the hospital a short time later. The coroner ruled that Ivey died of "acute asthma

exacerbation," though the court pointed out that Ivey's cause of death was disputed because his father had produced evidence suggesting that Ivey's withdrawal from drugs contributed to his death.

Ivey's father maintains that White, Atkinson, and Jensen violated Ivey's constitutional rights because they were deliberately indifferent to Ivey's serious medical needs. He maintains that the officers failed to do "what any reasonable person would have done—call 911." Or, he goes on to say, the officers could have called the nurse, a doctor, or at least spoken to medical personnel at the jail about Ivey's condition, and since they didn't, "medical personnel never knew how desperately ill [Ivey] was." Had the officers informed medical personnel of Ivey's condition on or soon after Ivey exhibited symptoms that first night in jail, the argument goes, Ivey could have been transported to a hospital and treated, in which case he would not have died.

The officers moved for summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity—a legal doctrine that "shields government officials from liability when their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." See Thiel v. Korte , 954 F.3d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 2020). The district court denied their motion on the ground that genuine issues of material fact remained for a jury to settle. We have jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment that was based on qualified immunity. See Krout v. Goemmer , 583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009).

Prison officials violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they show deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee's objectively serious medical needs. See Morris v. Cradduck , 954 F.3d 1055, 1058 (8th Cir. 2020). To succeed on this kind of claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a pretrial detainee had an objectively serious medical need that the defendants knew of and yet deliberately disregarded. Id.

In denying qualified immunity, the district court found that Ivey's asthma

and drug withdrawal could constitute objectively serious medical needs. It also found that the officers knew that Ivey had asthma

because the hospital's letter said Ivey needed an inhaler and because a jail intake questionnaire reported Ivey's asthma. The court noted, moreover, that Ivey's seizure-like movements could have been a severe consequence of drug withdrawal and a serious medical need that should have been addressed. Finally, after noting that a factfinder could find deliberate indifference from the fact that a medical need was obvious, the court determined that a jury here could conclude the officers were deliberately indifferent to Ivey's objectively serious medical needs. The officers challenge these determinations, and for purposes of this appeal we will accept as true the facts that the district court found or likely assumed.

We have said that qualified immunity involves the resolution of two questions—whether a defendant has violated a constitutional or statutory right and, if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's conduct. See, e.g. , Santiago v. Blair , 707 F.3d 984, 989 (8th Cir. 2013). We have the discretion to decide either question first, see id. , and we think this case can be resolved on the second question, namely, whether the officers violated clearly established law. To prevail, Ivey's father has the burden to show that legal authorities establish beyond debate that a constitutional violation has occurred, so that, in responding to Ivey, the officers were plainly incompetent or knowingly violated the law. See Estate of Walker v. Wallace , 881 F.3d 1056, 1060–61 (8th Cir. 2018).

The Supreme Court has cautioned courts not to define clearly established law at too high a level of generality. See, e.g. , Kisela v. Hughes , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152, 200 L.Ed.2d 449 (2018) (per curiam). We have recognized this principle in cases involving deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee's objectively serious medical needs. See, e.g. , Ryan v. Armstrong , 850 F.3d 419, 426–27 (8th Cir. 2017) ; Barton v. Taber , 820 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 2016). The district court here defined the right at issue quite broadly when it said that "it is unlawful to delay medical treatment for a detainee exhibiting obvious signs of medical distress." Assuming the court's statement is true as a general matter, its application to the situation that the officers faced here is unclear because they encountered a detainee who declined medical assistance, and Ivey's father has not shown that the law clearly establishes what officers must do in that situation.

At oral argument Ivey's father identified McRaven v....