J.C.J., Matter of

• Decision Date: 28 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 12-94-00129-CV,12-94-00129-CV
• Parties: In the Matter of J.C.J., a Juvenile.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 753

900 S.W.2d 753

In the Matter of J.C.J., a Juvenile.

No. 12-94-00129-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Tyler.

Feb. 28, 1995.

Rehearing Overruled May 31, 1995.

Paul Tatum, Nacogdoches, for appellant.

Greta E. Haidinyak, Nacogdoches, for appellee.

RAMEY, Chief Justice.

The sixteen year old minor, J.C.J., appeals from the order of the juvenile court certifying him for trial as an adult for the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity, a series of burglaries of buildings. The court waived the juvenile court's original exclusive jurisdiction over J.C.J. and transferred the cause to the district court for trial in the criminal law system. Appellant assigns three points of error. We will affirm.

The first point of error asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of psychiatrist Nancy Stebbins, M.D. ("Dr. Stebbins") and the written report of her court-ordered examination of J.C.J., because the child was not properly admonished of his rights against self-incrimination preceding his examination. Dr. Stebbins performed the psychiatric assessment as part of an overall evaluation of J.C.J., as directed by TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 54.02(d) (Vernon 1986).

Dr. Stebbins testified that she did not remember precisely the admonishments given the child before commencing her examination. She did recall that she told him that the results of the testing could be used in court and that her purpose was not to treat him; she procured no waiver from him or his parents. Citing Estelle v. Smith, J.C.J. argues that a juvenile must be warned that he may remain silent during the court-ordered examination. 451 U.S. 454, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); also Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.1981). The record reflects that, in fact, the minor did refuse to answer any questions concerning his alleged offenses, on the advice of his counsel.

Juvenile transfer hearings are dramatically different from criminal proceedings, the context of both Smith and Battie. A.D.P. v. State, 646 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.); Mena v. State, 633 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, n.w.h.); K.W.M. v. State, 598 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, n.w.h.). Judge Baird in his dissent in a recent Court of Criminal Appeals opinion develops this recognized distinction. Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 152-153 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). Because juvenile certification hearings are pre-trial proceedings and do not involve adjudication of the minor's guilt or innocence, no Federal or State constitutional rights against self-incrimination are presented, and Smith and Battie are not controlling. J.C.J.'s first point of error is overruled.

In his second point, the minor asserts that the juvenile court failed to require a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation and full investigation, because the diagnostic report to the court recited that it was conducted for the purpose of determining mental retardation. Section 54.02(f) of the FAMILY CODE directs that the studies relate to the child generally, his circumstances and the circumstances of the alleged offense. J.C.J.'s complaint is directed only to the study performed by the Deep East Texas Regional Mental Health Mental Retardation Services ("MHMR").

MHMR's report on this minor, dated March 23, 1994, reflects that it focused upon a "Determination of Mental Retardation" and presents as its conclusion that J.C.J. "is not found to have a diagnosis of Mental Retardation". On several occasions during the certification hearing, the juvenile court itself expressed concern about the stated emphasis of MHMR's diagnostic study.

In the waiver and transfer order, the court specifically stated that in making the transfer certification it considered each of the six statutory factors required by Section 54.02(f) of the FAMILY CODE. The order then recited that the court made findings of five specific "reasons" for its order, including the following:

(4) That the sophistication and maturity of the child, as is shown by the evidence in this case, is such that the child should be tried as an adult in the Criminal Court rather than the Juvenile Court.

Here, with no qualification, the court allowed the filing of the subject diagnostic report, received it into evidence, and affirmatively stated that he considered it. The completeness of such a diagnostic report is to be determined by the juvenile court itself. In the Matter of J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d 325, 329 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd by agr.); Turner v. State, 796 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1990, n.w.h.). The juvenile court's ruling on the report will not be overturned absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. In the Matter of C.M., a Juvenile, 884 S.W.2d 562, 563 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1994). This court furthermore held...