J.A. Croson Co. v. J.A. Guy, Inc.
Decision Date | 04 October 1996 |
Docket Number | 96-LW-3380,95 CA 10 |
Parties | J.A. CROSON COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant v. J.A. GUY, INC., Defendant-Appellee CASE |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Ronald L. Mason, Thomas M.L. Metzger & Timothy T. Tullis, Emens, Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, L.P.A., 65 East State Street, Suite 1800, Columbus, Ohio 43215.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE J.A. GUY, INC.: Felix C. Wade & Edwin L. Skeens Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, L.P.A., 41 South High Street Columbus, Ohio 43215.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE LOCAL 189:[1] N. Victor Goodman, Orla E. Collier Mark D. Tucker & Rex A. Littrell, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, 88 East Broad Street, Suite 900, Columbus, Ohio 43215-3506.
DECISION
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court denying the motion for summary judgment filed by J.A. Croson Company, plaintiff below and appellant here in, and granting the motions for summary judgment filed by J.A. Guy, Inc. and the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local No. 189, defendants below and appellees herein.
Appellant assigns the following errors:
On June 15, 1993, appellant filed the instant complaint against Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4115, Ohio's prevailing wage law. In the complaint, appellant alleged that it unsuccessfully bid on two contracts that Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. won. The contracts were for the construction of the new Pickaway County Jail and for the installation of a water softening system for the jail. Appellant further alleged in pertinent part as follows that relative to those contracts, Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. entered into an agreement with Appellee Local 189 whereby Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. would deduct two percent from the workers' wages, pay that two percent to Appellee Local No. 189, and then Appellee Local 189 would return that two percent to Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. in violation of Ohio's prevailing wage law:
On July 21, 1993, Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. filed an answer and third-party complaint against Appellee Local 189. In the answer, Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. alleged, inter alia, that appellant's claims are preempted by federal law. In the third-party complaint, Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. alleged that if any violations of R.C. Chapter 4115 occurred, those violations were caused by acts or omissions of Appellee Local 189, including the use it made of union dues remitted by Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc.
On August 10, 1993, Appellee Local 189 answered the third-party complaint. Appellee Local 189 asserted various defenses to the third-party complaint, including the defenses that: (1) the claims in appellant's complaint are preempted by federal law; and (2) Ohio Adm. Code 4101:0-4-07,[3] to the extent that it is construed as prohibiting deductions of union dues or assessments, is inconsistent with R.C. Chapter 4115.[4]
On October 19, 1993, Appellee Local 189 filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, Appellee Local 189 argued that: (1) because R.C. 4115.10(D) expressly permits the deduction of union dues from employee wages, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) even if appellant has stated a claim upon R.C. 4115.16(A) and (B), appellant's claims are preempted by federal law as explained in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon (1959), 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 [hereinafter Garmon]; and (3) even if appellant's claims are not preempted by federal law, the deduction of dues from employee wages is expressly authorized by the collective bargaining agreement between the parties and by R.C. Chapter 4115 and accompanying regulations.
In a memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment and in an accompanying affidavit, Appellee Local 189 explained as follows that its "Industry Advancement Program" results in money withheld from employees' paychecks going to the union and then back to the contractor:
Appellee Local 189 argued that the money deducted from the employees' paychecks was for union dues, not for a special assessment. Appellee Local 189 cited Garmon for the proposition that states may not regulate activities which federal labor law either permits or prohibits, and cited Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc. (1986), 475 U.S. 282, 106 S.Ct. 1057, 89 L.Ed.2d 223, for the proposition that it is now firmly established that federal labor law has largely displaced state regulation of labor relations. Appellee Local 189 noted that in the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Region 9 Director's July 21, 1993 joint decision in International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC (Wagner-Smith Company), Case No. 9-CB-8493, The Fred DeBra Co., (Case No. 9-CA-30588), and International Bhd. of Workers, Local 82, AFL-CIO (The Fred B. DeBra Co., Case No. 9-CB-8511), the NLRB Regional Director approved the allocation of union dues to a job-targeting program. Appellee Local 189 quoted from the Region 9 director's July 21, 1993 decision as follows:
"Inasmuch as the job targeting program `deductions' are not an additional assessment, but are merely a reallocation of periodic dues which are uniformly required of members, Local 82 did not violate the Act by securing them through checkoff authorization and the Employer did not engage in any unlawful conduct by effectuating the checkoff."
Appellee Local 189 noted that in International Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 48, Case No. 36-CB-1299, decided April 22, 1987, Local 48, IBEW (Midway Electric, Bonneville Power), Case No. 36-CB-1302, decided April 28, 1987, the NLRB Region 19 Director reached a similar conclusion with regard to union dues collected for a "Market Recovery Program."
On November 1, 1993, Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment. In a memorandum in support of the motion Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. argued, inter alia, that it lawfully deducted union dues from the wages it paid to employees. Appellee J.A. Guy, Inc. cited United States Department of Justice opinion 22 LRRM (BNA) 4...
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