J. Douglas Beckler v. Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 96-LW-2460
| Decision Date | 03 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | 95CA006049,96-LW-2460 |
| Parties | J. DOUGLAS BECKLER, Appellant v. LORAIN CITY SCHOOL DIST. BD. OF EDN., Appellee C.A. NO.95CA006049 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE NO. 94 CV 112266
DECISION
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
Appellant, J. Douglas Beckler, appeals from the entry of summary judgment by the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas in favor of Appellee, the Lorain City School District. We reverse and enter judgment in favor of Beckler.
In March of 1994, Beckler, who was employed by the Lorain City School Board of Education (the "Board") as a business manager, received a notice from the Board that his contract would be suspended effective July 1, 1993, because of a decline in school enrollment. In June, Beckler filed an action challenging the suspension. On July 1, 1993, he filed a claim for unemployment compensation, which was tentatively granted on July 6, 1993. The parties then negotiated a settlement agreement in the pending action whereby Beckler agreed to dismiss the lawsuit in exchange for the Board's extension of his employment contract to November 1, 1993. The Board agreed to place Beckler on personal leave and vacation through October 31, 1993, and also to continue to pay him a set salary and to provide customary benefits.
On July 22, 1993, the administrator of the Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation issued a ruling that Beckler was entitled to receive unemployment compensation. The Board requested reconsideration of the decision. The request was denied because the Board had not filed it within the time limit prescribed by law; as a consequence, Beckler received unemployment benefits while also collecting his salary from the Board. Beckler did attempt to return his first two checks; however, the bureau, stating that Beckler was entitled to the benefits, would not accept their return. Beckler continued to receive the benefits throughout his extended employment.
The Board paid Beckler's salary in full until October of 1993. At that time, the Board docked Beckler's pay a total of $4,743, the amount that Beckler had received to date in unemployment benefits. Beckler then initiated this lawsuit for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Board upon the grounds that Beckler had breached the settlement agreement by accepting unemployment benefits during the period that he remained employed by the Board. The court further found that the Board had been entitled to deduct the amount of benefits from Beckler's paychecks because the Board was required to reimburse the bureau on a dollar for dollar basis pursuant to R.C 4141.242.
Beckler assigns three errors in this appeal. We address the first two together.
In reviewing a trial court's entry of summary judgment, an appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court. McConville v. Jackson Comfort Sys., Inc. (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 297, 301. In order to grant summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), a trial court must first determine that:
(1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.
State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 587, 589. The moving party has the burden of showing that summary judgment is appropriate. Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115.
In the instant action, the Board argued in its motion for summary judgment that Beckler's application for and receipt of unemployment benefits was a breach of the contract to remain in the Board's employ; further, that it did not breach the contract because Beckler received all of the compensation to which he was entitled under the contract. Beckler responded that he was entitled to both the salary payments under the agreement as well as to the unemployment benefits. Although he did not style his response as a motion for summary judgment, he requested judgment in his favor. His response, therefore, was the equivalent of a motion for summary judgment.
Although both parties dispute Beckler's entitlement to unemployment compensation, that issue is not properly before this court. Instead, we must focus on the lower court's construction of the contract and its conclusion that Beckler, and not the Board, breached the agreement. If the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, then their interpretation is a question of law. State ex. rel Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511. Questions of law are reviewed de novo by this court; accordingly, we need not give deference to the trial court's conclusions. Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v. Safety-Kleen Oil Serv., Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 591, 602; Tamarkin Co. v. Wheeler (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 232, 234.
The contract between Beckler and the Board provided:
During th[e] period of personal leave and vacation, [Beckler] shall receive salary payments by the Treasurer at [a specified rate] *** [and] all fringe benefits, which he customarily receives ***.
In consideration of the continued employment, Beckler was required to dismiss his action against the Board and to agree not to bring suit based upon his employment or suspension. The agreement specifically provided that Beckler would have "no commitment or responsibility to the Board" during the extended...
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