Tamarkin Co. v. Wheeler
Citation | 81 Ohio App.3d 232,610 N.E.2d 1042 |
Decision Date | 02 January 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 15179,15179 |
Parties | TAMARKIN COMPANY, Appellant, v. WHEELER et al., Appellees. |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
David R. Cook, Cleveland, for appellant.
Thomas E. Davis, Akron, for appellees Wheeler et al.
Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and William O'Neill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cleveland, for appellee Indus. Com'n.
This appeal of a final judgment rendered May 31, 1991 by the Summit County Court of Common Pleas arises from the claim of Eric S. Wheeler, employee-appellee, for workers' compensation benefits. Wheeler's original application was disallowed by a district hearing officer in Akron on the grounds that the injury was not sustained during the course of employment. The Canton Regional Board of Review reached a contrary conclusion. This latter decision was affirmed by the Industrial Commission.
Wheeler's employer, Tamarkin Company, appealed to the court of common pleas on May 25, 1990. R.C. 4123.519. The judge determined that Wheeler had stated a valid claim for benefits. Further review is now sought in this court.
The parties have stipulated to the following statement of facts:
Tamarkin raises a single assignment of error.
A compensable "injury" must be "received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C. 4123.01(C). The Supreme Court explained in Bralley v. Daugherty (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 302, 303, 15 O.O.3d 359, 360, 401 N.E.2d 448, 449, that:
"The test of the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund is not whether there was any fault or neglect on the part of the employer or his employees, but whether a 'causal connection' existed between an employee's injury and his employment either through the activities, the conditions or the environment of the employment. * * *" (Citations omitted.)
In an appeal of an Industrial Commission ruling pursuant to R.C. 4123.519, the court of common pleas conducts a trial de novo in which the burden of proof remains with the claimant. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Mayfield (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 70, 71, 11 OBR 315, 316, 464 N.E.2d 133, 134; Swift & Co. v. Wreede (1959), 110 Ohio App. 252, 254-255, 12 O.O.2d 240, 241-242, 168 N.E.2d 757, 759-760. Due to the parties' stipulation of fact, the only issue before the trial court was whether Wheeler's injury was sustained in the course of employment. An appellate court need not afford any special deference on such purely legal questions.
"The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is not to make an employer an absolute insurer of the employee's safety, but only to protect the employee against risks and hazards incident to the performance of his work." Phelps v. Positive Action Tool Co. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 26 OBR 122, 123, 497 N.E.2d 969, 970. The dual requirements that a compensable injury be "received in" and "arising out of" the course of employment have been combined into a "causal connection" test. Fisher v. Mayfield (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 275, 276-278, 551 N.E.2d 1271, 1273-1275. In Lord v. Daugherty (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 441, 20 O.O.3d 376, 423 N.E.2d 96, syllabus, the court held that:
"Whether there is a sufficient 'causal connection' between an employee's injury and his employment to justify the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, including, (1) the proximity of the scene of the accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer had over the scene of the accident, and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured employee's presence at the scene of the accident." See, also, MTD Products, Inc. v. Robatin (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 66, 70, 572 N.E.2d 661, 665.
Addressing the first prong, Wheeler's accident occurred, technically, at his place of employment. This circumstance must be tempered by the fact, however, that...
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