J.M. Davidson Inc. v. Webster

• Decision Date: 31 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 13-00-626-CV,13-00-626-CV
• Citation: 49 S.W.3d 507
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001) J. M. DAVIDSON, INC., Appellant, v. CHELSEY J. WEBSTER, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 507

49 S.W.3d 507 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001)

J. M. DAVIDSON, INC., Appellant, v. CHELSEY J. WEBSTER, Appellee.

No. 13-00-626-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.

May 31, 2001.

Rehearing Overruled July 5, 2001.

On appeal from the 343rd District Court of San Patricio County, Texas and On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Justices Hinojosa, Yanez, and Castillo

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Hinojosa

This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. In the alternative, appellant, J. M. Davidson, Inc. ("Davidson"), asks this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to grant the motion to compel arbitration. We affirm the trial court's order, and deny appellant's request for a writ of mandamus.

A. Background and Procedural History

At the hearing on the motion to compel, the trial court heard only argument from the parties' counsel. Neither party presented evidence. No affidavits, discovery, or stipulations were offered into evidence. Based on the pleadings,¹ the following are the undisputed facts. On December 1, 1997, Davidson hired appellee, Chelsey Webster, as a mechanic. On December 15, 1997, Davidson required that appellee sign an "Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy," which states, in relevant part, as follows:

                                        J. M. Davidson, Inc. 
                                        ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
                                             RESOLUTION 
                                               POLICY 
                                       EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION 
                                              LANGUAGE
                

I, the applicant whose signature is affixed hereto, and the above listed Company, (hereinafter referred to as the "Company"), for itself and all of its officers, directors, agents and employees, all of which mutually agree and contract that any and all claims, disputes or controversies, whether based on the Construction [sic], Statutes, Code(s), Ordinances, Rules, Orders, Regulations, and/or common law of he [sic] United States and/or of all subdivisions, of either, and/or asserted on the basis of contract, quasi-contract, personal injury, tort, offenses, quasi-offenses or otherwise, or arising out of, or in any way relating to this application for employment, or any other application for employment that I may have previously submitted, or may submit in the future, or the Company's decision to hire or not to hire me; including the arbitrability of any claim, dispute, or controversy shall be exclusively and finally settled by binding arbitration administered by, Conducted [sic] under the Arbitration Rules of, and before the Arbitrator(s) of an Arbitration Tribunal of the National Association for Dispute Resolution, Inc., pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act and/or any applicable Alternative Dispute Resolutions Act, whichever shall have the broadest effect, all claims of any rights to the contrary, including any right to trail [sic] by jury, being hereby expressly waived.

* * * * *

If employed, I agree to abide by and comply with all of the rules, policies and procedures of the "Company." I understand that if I am employed by the "Company," such employment will be "at-will" and that the "Company" may terminate my employment at any time and for any reason.

* * * * *

No supervisor or person other than the President of the "Company" can change or otherwise modify any employment agreement. The "Company" reserves the right to unilaterally abolish or modify any personnel policy without prior notice.

* * * * *

                               ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO
                APPLICANT:  [signed]           PRINTED NAME: C. J. Webster 
                DATE:  12-15-97                 S.S. # [social security number]
                

Appellee sustained an on-the-job injury on November 3, 1998, and filed for workers' compensation benefits. He subsequently returned to work. However, appellee's condition deteriorated and his treating physician placed him on "no work" status. Soon thereafter, appellee's employment with Davidson ceased.

Appellee sued Davidson, alleging he had been terminated in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.²Davidson filed a motion to compel arbitration. Davidson asserted that the arbitration policy appellee had signed was a binding arbitration agreement and that appellee's claims fell within the scope of the agreement. The trial court denied the motion without stating a reason. Davidson then filed this interlocutory appeal and mandamus action. Davidson seeks to compel arbitration under the Texas Arbitration Act³ and the Federal Arbitration Act.⁴

B. Jurisdiction

Under the Texas Arbitration Act, an interlocutory appeal may be taken from a trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.098(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001). Mandamus is the appropriate remedy when the trial court improperly denies a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias, 934 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1996). Mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992). When a party seeks to compel arbitration under both the Texas Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, he must pursue parallel proceedings: an interlocutory appeal of the order denying arbitration under the Texas act, and a request for a writ of mandamus from the denial under the federal act. Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992);Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Mack, 945 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. dism'd w.o.j., mand. denied).

C. Standard of Review

A party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement. In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); In re H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 17 S.W.3d 360, 366-67 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding). When one party denies he is bound by an arbitration agreement, the trial court must summarily determine whether an agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.021 (Vernon Supp. 2001);Southwest Tex. Pathology Assocs., L.L.P. v. Roosth, 27 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, pet. filed);ANCO Ins. Servs. of Houston, Inc. v. Romero, 27 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). A court may summarily decide whether to compel arbitration on the basis of affidavits, pleadings, discovery, and stipulations. Anglin, 842 S.W.2d at 269. However, if material facts necessary to determine the issue are controverted, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the material facts in dispute. Id. Once a party establishes a claim within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the trial court must compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings unless the party opposing arbitration meets its burden of presenting evidence that prevents enforcement. Oakwood, 987 S.W.2d at 573;Cantella & Co., Inc. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).

We review a trial court's determination concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement under an abuse of discretion standard. Roosth, 27 S.W.3d at 207; ANCO Ins. Servs., 27 S.W.3d at 3; Hardin Const. Group, Inc. v. Strictly Painting, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). Under this standard, we must uphold the trial court's decision unless we conclude that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision. Roosth, 27 S.W.3d at 207; Hardin, 945 S.W.2d at 312. Where, as here, the trial court does not enter findings of facts and conclusions of law, we must affirm the trial court's decision if there is sufficient evidence to support it upon any legal theory asserted. Pepe Internat'l Dev. Co. v. Garcia, 915 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). Even if we would have decided the issue differently, we cannot disturb the trial court's finding unless it is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. Id; Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, no writ). Whether an agreement imposes a duty on the parties to arbitrate a dispute is a matter of contract interpretation and a question of law for the court. Tenet Healthcare Ltd. v. Cooper, 960 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Kline v. O'Quinn, 874 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

D. Is There a Binding Arbitration Agreement?

Arbitration is a contractual proceeding by which the parties, in order to obtain a speedy and inexpensive final disposition of disputed matters, consent to submit the controversy to arbitrators for determination. See Porter & Clements, L.L.P. v. Stone, 935 S.W.2d 217, 221 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no pet.). Arbitration is a creature of contract and a clause requiring arbitration is interpreted under contract principles. Tenet Healthcare, 960 S.W.2d at 388; Belmont Constructors, Inc. v. Lyondell Petrochemical Co., 896 S.W.2d 352, 356-57 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ);City of Alamo v. Garcia, 878 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1994, no writ). The Federal Arbitration Act and the Texas Arbitration Act both provide that a contract to submit to arbitration is valid and enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.001 (Vernon Supp. 2001); Tenet Healthcare, 960 S.W.2d at 387-88. Arbitration agreements are subject to...