J.R.R., Matter of
| Decision Date | 18 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. C-4338,C-4338 |
| Citation | 696 S.W.2d 382 |
| Parties | In the Matter of J.R.R. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Gossom & Cotton, Thomas C. Cotton, Wichita Falls, for petitioner.
James A. Rasmussen, Co. Atty., Jeanmarie Baer, Asst. Co. Atty., Wichita Falls, for respondent.
J.R.R. and two other youths were arrested early one morning riding stolen bicycles. J.R.R. was adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent conduct on the basis of the testimony of T.S., age fifteen, an accomplice. The court of appeals, 689 S.W.2d 516, found that the testimony of T.S. was not corroborated as required by the Texas Family Code § 54.03(e), and since this resulted in insufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court, remanded it to that court for another trial.
In Walker v. State, 615 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), this problem was addressed in a case involving an adult. The accused had been convicted of capital murder after his accomplice had testified. The court, however, found that the testimony was not corroborated and therefore, there was insufficient evidence to convict. The court then had to follow the constitutional mandate of Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978):
... the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the only "just" remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 18, 98 S.Ct. at 2050-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 14.
Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), applied Burks to the states. The Greene court recognized, as the court had earlier stated in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), that the guarantee against double jeopardy is a part of fundamental fairness. As such it comes within the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of due process of law.
The question before this court is whether this due process protection applies to juveniles. Although juvenile delinquency procedures are civil in nature, because they may result in the child being deprived of liberty there are certain constitutional protections to which the juvenile is entitled as in a criminal trial. The question of due process was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark decision of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1969) In Kent v. United States, [383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) ], we stated ... while "We do not mean ... to...
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