J. T. v. Dist. of Columbia

Citation983 F.3d 516
Decision Date29 December 2020
Docket NumberNo. 19-7136,19-7136
Parties J. T., Appellant v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Douglas Tyrka, Washington, DC, was on the briefs for appellant.

Karl A. Racine, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. Alikhan, Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, and Sonya L. Lebsack, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief for appellee.

Before: Henderson and Garland* , Circuit Judges, and Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge:

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires that the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) provide its students with disabilities a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Plaintiff J.T. asserts that DCPS failed to provide her son, V.T., with a FAPE based on his 2017 individualized education program (IEP). After the IDEA administrative hearing officer ruled against her, J.T. filed this suit in federal court. The district court dismissed J.T.’s claim as moot because the 2017 IEP no longer governed V.T.’s education and J.T. did not seek retrospective relief.

J.T. v. District of Columbia , No. 17-cv-1319, 2019 WL 3501667 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2019). Because the case presents a fact-specific challenge to particular provisions in an inoperative IEP, the parties agreed to a subsequent IEP and J.T. does not seek retrospective relief, we affirm the district court.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Statutes and Regulations

The IDEA seeks to provide to children with disabilities a FAPE that "emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The IEP is "the centerpiece of the [IDEA]’s education delivery system for disabled children." Honig v. Doe , 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988).

At the beginning of each school year, a participating educational agency must have an IEP "in effect ... for each child with a disability in the agency's jurisdiction." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). The IDEA requires that every IEP include "a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance," describe "how the child's disability affects the child's involvement and progress in the general education curriculum," and set out "measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals," along with a "description of how the child's progress toward meeting" those goals will be gauged. Id. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(III). The IEP is prepared by a child's IEP Team, which includes teachers, school officials and the child's parents. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). The IEP Team must review and revise the child's IEP "not less frequently than annually, to determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved." Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A).

The IDEA provides a dispute resolution procedure in the event a child's parents and school officials disagree over what a child's IEP includes. Either party may file a "due process complaint" to challenge the IEP or its implementation. Id. §§ 1415(b)(6), (c)(2). Filing a complaint triggers a "[p]reliminary meeting" between the parties to attempt to resolve their differences and provides the option to pursue resolution through mediation. Id. §§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i), (e). If these measures fail to produce accord, the parties may proceed to what the IDEA calls a "due process hearing" before a state or local educational agency. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A). The administrative hearing process requires that the hearing officer's decision "be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a [FAPE]." Id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i).

If the hearing officer finds a violation, the hearing officer can grant relief including (i) retroactive reimbursement for private school tuition, (ii) an order that the school district provide a FAPE or (iii) compensatory education to make up for educational services that the child should have received. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass. , 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985) (prospective relief and retroactive reimbursement); Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia , 401 F.3d 516, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (compensatory education). At the conclusion of the administrative process, "any party aggrieved" may seek redress in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(1), (i)(2)(A).

B. Facts and Procedure

V.T. is a fifth-grade student who has been diagnosed with Autism

Spectrum Disorder. V.T. attended Kingsbury, a nonpublic day school in the District, for the 2016–17 and 2017–18 school years. The IEP at issue was drafted in April and May 2017 (2017 IEP) when V.T. was completing the first grade.

The 2017 IEP was drafted after the resolution of a due process complaint brought by V.T.’s parents. This earlier complaint, filed on October 31, 2016, challenged an IEP drafted in August 2016 (2016 IEP), at the start of V.T.’s first-grade school year. On April 3, 2017, a hearing officer determined that the 2016 IEP denied V.T. a FAPE. J.A. 228 (April 3, 2017 Hearing Officer Determination (HOD)). The hearing officer instructed that:

Within 15 school days, DCPS shall convene an IEP meeting (including Parents) and review and revise [V.T.’s] IEP, by (a) increasing [his] O[ccupational] T[herapy] and Speech Language services, (b) providing a specified minimum amount of 1:1 instruction, (c) providing a maximum student-teacher ratio, (d) defining a quiet instructional environment, and (e) providing a maximum class size and other necessary aspects of a school environment.

J.A. 238.

On April 27, 2017, an IEP meeting was held to amend the 2016 IEP consistent with the HOD's requirements. Although DCPS attempted to observe V.T. at Kingsbury before the IEP amendment meeting to "ascertain the level of restriction [he] actually needed in light of the directives in the [April] HOD[,] DCPS was not permitted to observe" him. J.A. 323–24 (November 27, 2017 HOD, at 5 ¶ 5). At the April 27, 2017 IEP meeting, the parties agreed to increase V.T.’s occupational therapy and speech-language services and include two hours per day of one-on-one instruction.

But the parties disagreed on the maximum class size, ratio of students-to-adults and the definition of a quiet instructional environment. For example, DCPS proposed a maximum class size of eight students and a student-to-adult ratio of four-to-one. On the other hand, J.T. requested, based on consultation with personnel at Kingsbury, a class size of four students and a student-to-adult ratio of two-to-one. The April 2017 IEP meeting concluded with DCPS disagreeing with J.T.’s proposals but stating it was open to making further changes when the IEP was reviewed in August 2017 and after DCPS observed V.T.

The 2017 IEP set a maximum class size of eight students and a four-to-one ratio of students-to-adults. It also required V.T.’s instruction and independent work time to be in "a quiet area of the classroom" with "minimal risk of noise and distraction from outside of the classroom" and adults "speak[ing] in low, calm tones." J.A. 244 (2017 IEP).

On July 6, 2017, J.T. filed a due process complaint alleging that the 2017 IEP was "inappropriate" because it lacked the provisions she had requested, thus denying V.T. a FAPE. See J.A. 131–35. J.T. requested (i) that DCPS "be found to have denied [V.T.] a FAPE by developing an inappropriate IEP," (ii) that DCPS place and fund V.T. at Kingsbury and (iii) that DCPS be ordered to "convene an IEP meeting with the parents, and at that meeting to review and revise the IEP to include the parents’ requested changes." J.A. 134.

An administrative hearing was held on October 13, 2017 and November 6, 2017. By that time, DCPS had agreed to fund V.T. at Kingsbury for the 2017–18 school year and therefore J.T. no longer sought tuition reimbursement. On November 27, 2017, the hearing officer determined that the 2017 IEP provided V.T. with a FAPE.

In July 2018, the IEP Team met and developed a new IEP (2018 IEP). The 2018 IEP set the maximum class size at six and removed the student-to-adult ratio. The 2018 IEP made these changes because "[V.T.] was able to tolerate more from a sensory perspective this [past] year" and his teacher reported that V.T. had been successful in a group of five. J.A. 24. The 2018 IEP also provided V.T. with a dedicated aide for six hours a day.

Five months before the parties reached agreement on the 2018 IEP, on February 23, 2018, J.T. filed suit challenging the hearing officer's November 27, 2017 determination that the 2017 IEP provided V.T. with a FAPE. The complaint sought a declaration that DCPS "violated the IDEA and denied her son V.T. a [FAPE] ... by failing to develop an appropriate [IEP]" and an order requiring DCPS to "make the specific changes to V.T.’s IEP requested by J.T." J.A. 13. The complaint did not seek retrospective relief—neither tuition reimbursement nor compensatory education.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which were referred to a magistrate judge. On June 11, 2019, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (R&R) that, in relevant part, recommended J.T.’s challenge to the 2017 IEP was moot. The magistrate judge also recommended that in the event J.T.’s challenge to the 2017 IEP was not moot, it failed on the merits. J.T. objected to the R&R on both mootness and the merits.

On August 1, 2019, the district court concluded that "J.T.’s claim regarding the November 2017 HOD is moot because the challenged 2017 IEP already has been modified and no claim for compensatory education has been made." J.T. v. District of Columbia , 2019 WL 3501667, at *2. First, the district court found that neither of the two forms of relief J.T. sought "would be effectual as the ...

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