J.A. v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 17 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | WD 82606 |
| Citation | 590 S.W.3d 894 |
| Parties | J.A., Appellant, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Missouri State Highway Patrol and Pettis County Prosecutor, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Daniel Baker, Sedalia, MO, for appellant.
Ross A. Kaplan, Jefferson City, MO, for respondents.
Before Special Division: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Thomas H. Newton, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge
J.A. ("Appellant")1 appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Pettis County dismissing his petition for expungement. J.A. raises two points of error contending that the circuit court erred in its application of section 610.140.5.2 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions.
On July 25, 2018, J.A. filed a Petition for Expungement in the circuit court ("Petition"). J.A. sought expungement of his 1970 conviction for felony possession of a stimulant drug in violation of section 195.240,3 specifically amphetamine. The Petition named as defendants multiple Pettis County entities, the Missouri State Highway Patrol ("Highway Patrol"), and the Sedalia Police Department. The Highway Patrol was the only entity that filed an Answer; it also filed a Motion to Dismiss.
The circuit court held a hearing on February 1, 2019. J.A. admitted that he was convicted of felony possession of a stimulant drug on May 6, 1970. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, he served 11 months, and was completely released on May 7, 1973. In 1976, he was convicted of the sale of amphetamines in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. With the exception of one traffic ticket, J.A. had not been found guilty of any misdemeanor or felony offense in the past 40 years.
In arguing both against expungement and in support of its Motion to Dismiss, the Highway Patrol contended that J.A. was ineligible for expungement of his 1970 conviction because he was found guilty of an additional felony in less than seven years after the completed authorized disposition of the conviction.
The circuit court entered its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 26, 2019 ("Judgment").4 The court found that the calculation of the seven-year period was from the date of completed disposition and found J.A. ineligible for expungement due to his 1976 conviction. As such, the Judgment dismissed J.A.'s Petition.
This appeal followed.
As a court-tried case, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court unless there is no evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares the law. Murphy v. Carron , 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976) ; S.Y. v. Askren , 581 S.W.3d 721, 722 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). The circuit court's statutory interpretations are a question of law to be reviewed de novo. S.Y. , 581 S.W.3d at 722.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. J.A. was convicted of a felony in 1970 and was not completely released from his disposition until May 7, 1973. Within three years of that final disposition, he was found guilty of an additional felony offense in federal court. The circuit court determined the proper interpretation of subsections 610.140.5(1) and (2) was that, to be entitled to expungement of a felony, a petitioner must show that he or she did not commit another felony or misdemeanor for at least seven years from the date of completion of final disposition of the felony sought to be expunged. In his first point on appeal, J.A. argues that the circuit court erred in its interpretation. J.A. argues that subsections (1) and (2) only require a showing that he had not committed another felony or misdemeanor within the seven years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for expungement.
The relevant portion of section 610.140.5 reads:
This Court directly addressed the proper interpretation of section 610.150.5(1) and (2) in R.G. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol , 580 S.W.3d 38 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019), which was handed down after the Judgment was entered but during the pendency of this appeal. In R.G. , petitioner sought the expungement of two misdemeanor convictions for disturbing the peace that occurred within three years of each other but more than three years prior to the filing of the petition for expungement. Id. at 39-40. The circuit court granted expungement and the Highway Patrol appealed, arguing the proper timeframe considered is not from the date of the petition looking back but rather from the date of the completion of the final disposition looking forward. Id. at 40-41. This Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, noting that:
While it is not clear from the language in the statute when the time period was to begin, the only interpretation that would be consistent with the legislative intent would be for the time period to begin at the time the petition was filed and extend backwards for three years for the expungement of this misdemeanor offense.
Id. at 41. This Court further explained, "[t]he purpose of expungement is to provide a second chance to persons who have had prior criminal offenses but have shown by their more recent conduct that they have rehabilitated themselves and deserve the second chance provided for in the statute." Id. at 42. "The legislature was focused on the time immediately prior to the filing of the petition for expungement because that is the period of time that would determine if the petitioner had changed their behavior so as to meet the statutory qualifications for expungement and deserve[s] the second chance provided by the statute." Id. This interpretation was affirmed again by this Court in S.Y. v. Askren , 581 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019), deciding the same issue.
The circuit court and the parties did not have the benefit of R.G. and S.Y. when this case was presented and when ...
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G.E.D. v. Mo. State Highway Patrol
...Patrol Criminal Justice Info. Services , 592 S.W.3d 74, 76 n.2, 80 n.4, (Mo. App. W.D. Nov. 12, 2019) ; J.A. v. Dep't of Corr. , 590 S.W.3d 894, 896–97, (Mo. App. W.D. Dec. 17, 2019).MSHP fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in granting G.E.D.’s petition for expungement. MSHP’s p......