Jackson v. AR Dept. of Edu.
| Decision Date | 11 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-1789,00-1789 |
| Citation | 272 F.3d 1020 |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 2001) OLA JACKSON, APPELLANT, v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION DIVISION; LONNIE MCNATT, DIRECTOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; ROY WOOD, DR., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, APPELLEES. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before McMILLIAN, Richard S. Arnold, and Loken, Circuit Judges.
Ola Jackson appeals from a final order entered in the District Court1 for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the Arkansas Department of Education, Vocational and Technical Education Division ("the Department") and her supervisors in their official and individual capacities. The district court dismissed Jackson's claims of sexual harassment, race discrimination and constructive discharge brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Jackson v. Arkansas Department of Education, No. LR-C-97-422 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 6, 2000) (memorandum and order). For reversal, Jackson argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because there were outstanding issues of material fact regarding: (1) whether the Department was entitled to the affirmative defense against vicarious employer liability for sexual harassment claims and (2) whether Jackson was constructively discharged. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Jurisdiction was proper in the district court based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).
The following facts are based upon the district court order.2 Jackson was employed by the Department as a Secretary II from November 23, 1993 until September 12, 1995. From the first day of her employment, Jackson's supervisor, Robert Gwatney, made unwelcome and unsolicited remarks to her about sexual favors and hugged and touched her inappropriately. On August 31, 1994, Jackson's fiance phoned one of Jackson's supervisors, Ruth Deaton, to inform her of the sexual harassment. Deaton immediately informed her supervisor, Roy Wood, who began an investigation of the allegations.
During the investigation, Wood and the personnel director, Dianne Farquhar, met with Jackson to hear her complaints. Wood and Farquhar agreed to change Jackson's working hours so that she would not be alone in the office with Gwatney. They also assured Jackson that Gwatney's offensive behavior would stop immediately and asked her to inform them if it continued. Wood and Farquhar then met with Gwatney, who admitted hugging Jackson but denied the rest of the allegations. Gwatney agreed to avoid any further contact with Jackson that might be interpreted as improper. Although the investigation was considered inconclusive, Wood and Farquhar assured Jackson that Gwatney would not hug or touch her in any manner, nor would he discuss sexual matters with her again.
Pursuant to the Department's formal anti-harassment grievance process, Wood and Farquhar attempted to schedule a meeting with both Jackson and Gwatney. Jackson declined the Department's offer and instead stated her intent to file a grievance with the EEOC. Jackson informed Wood and Farquhar that her new working hours conflicted with her child care arrangement, so they arranged for Gwatney to leave the office at 4:30 p.m. every day, to avoid the possibility of being alone with Jackson during the time in which the harassment had occurred. For two weeks afterwards, Wood stopped by Jackson's office daily to ask how she was doing and to ensure that Gwatney had left the office by 4:30. Jackson did not complain again about Gwatney's conduct.
On June 23, 1995, the Department learned that Gwatney had lied during the investigation about his conduct toward Jackson. Gwatney was immediately terminated.
On June 27, 1995, Jackson complained to Wood that she had been asked to perform data entry, which she claimed was not included in her job responsibilities. Wood arranged for Jackson to meet with Farquhar on June 29, 1995, to discuss her job duties. However, Jackson left work on June 27 for a doctor's appointment and remained on leave for "job-related stress" until July 26, 1995.
On July 5, 1995, Lonnie McNatt, a Department director, sent Jackson a letter reinstating all of the sick leave time she had used during the period of time following her complaints of Gwatney's harassment until his termination. The letter also invited her to submit for payment any medical bills that she believed had resulted from the harassment.
Jackson returned to work on July 26, 1995. Wood temporarily reassigned her data entry duties to other employees. Three days later, Jackson took another extended leave. On August 24, 1995, Jackson was notified that she had exhausted all of her paid leave time on August 7, 1995, but that she was entitled to 196 hours of unpaid leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. On August 29, 1995, Jackson received a summary of her remaining leave time. On September 12, 1995, Jackson was terminated because she had exhausted all of her leave time and had failed to return to work.
On May 22, 1997, Jackson sued the Department and her supervisors in their individual and official capacities for sexual discrimination and constructive discharge in violation of her rights under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that the Department (1) was vicariously liable for Gwatney's sexual harassment of her and (2) had constructively discharged her by firing her after Gwatney's hostile work environment sexual harassment prevented her from returning to work. On May 13, 1998, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gwatney and dismissed him in his individual capacity from the lawsuit. On May 27, 1998, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, including Gwatney in his official capacity, and dismissed them in their official and individual capacities from the lawsuit, thus terminating the action.
Jackson timely appealed the district court's order and judgment pro se. On December 11, 1998, this court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (Ellerth), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (Faragher). On March 6, 2000, after re-briefing by the parties, the district court again granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district court assumed for purposes of analysis that Gwatney's conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter Jackson's working conditions and thus created a hostile work environment. Nonetheless, the district court found that, in the absence of a tangible employment action, the Department was entitled to the affirmative defense provided by Faragher and Ellerth because the Department had demonstrated effectively that: (1) it had exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior and (2) Jackson had unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the Department or to otherwise avoid harm. Jackson timely appealed, and this court appointed counsel to represent her on appeal.
Jackson's new counsel unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a copy of Jackson's original deposition in this case from opposing counsel, the district court, and this court. On June 5, 2001, Jackson moved to strike from the record on appeal excerpts of her deposition included in the Department's appendix on the grounds that the complete deposition was unavailable. On June 12, 2001, the Department opposed the motion to strike. On June 8, 2001, this court entered an order taking the motion with the case, which was argued and submitted on June 11, 2001.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Randolph v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 1999). As the nonmoving party, Jackson bears the burden "of presenting evidence sufficiently supporting disputed material facts that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in [her] favor." Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992). However, summary judgment will be improper only if the factual dispute in question affects the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Faragher and Ellerth provide an affirmative defense to an employer's vicarious liability under Title VII for an employee's hostile work environment claim based on a supervisor's harassment:
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages... [which] comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 1999) (Todd).
Jackson contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Department was entitled to the affirmative defense articulated in Faragher. Specifically,...
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