Jackson v. Attorney Gen.
| Decision Date | 11 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-7847(MCA) |
| Parties | RANDY JACKSON, Petitioner, v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter has been opened to the Court by the pro se Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1 ("Petition")) of Randy Jackson ("Petitioner"). For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny the Petition with prejudice and will deny a certificate of appealability.
This Court, affording the state court's factual determinations the appropriate deference, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1),1 relies upon the fact recitation by the AppellateDivision of the Superior Court of New Jersey ("Appellate Division") in State v. Jackson, Indictment No. 07-06-2174, 2011 WL 691642, at *1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 1, 2011).
During the late evening of December 1, 2006, Petitioner, Petitioner's girlfriend Nyiaka James ("James"), Petitioner's sister Latiesha Lynch ("Lynch"), Lynch's boyfriend Hassan Hutchins ("Hutchins"), James's friend Tianna Barclay ("Barclay"), and Petitioner's step-brother Mario Davis ("Davis") went to a night club in Orange, New Jersey. Jackson, 2011 WL 691642, at *1. When the club closed at 2:00 a.m. on December 2, 2006, the six individuals got into two cars. The first was driven by Petitioner, with James in the passenger seat and Lynch and her boyfriend Hutchins in the back seat. The second car was driven by Barclay, with Davis in the passenger seat. At the time of their departure from the club, Lynch and Hutchins were arguing, and the fight continued after they entered Petitioner's car. Ibid. After the car had proceeded for a short distance, defendant, believing that Hutchins had assaulted Lynch, stopped and ordered Hutchins out of the vehicle. Petitioner followed, and an argument ensued, during which Petitioner shot Hutchins, hitting him twice. Barclaywitnessed at least one of the shots and confirmed that Petitioner -- not Davis -- fired the shots. Ibid.
After the shooting stopped, Lynch went to assist Hutchins, who was lying on the ground. James left Petitioner's car and drove off with Barclay in the second vehicle. However, police -- responding almost immediately to the scene -- quickly intercepted the women. Id. at *2. Similarly, Petitioner sought to depart in the first car, but also was stopped by the police. According to Officer Richard Adrianzan, who was the first officer to respond to the scene, Petitioner appeared unexcited and unimpaired. Officer Fidel Hunter described Petitioner as "nonchalant." Ibid.
Hutchins, who was still alive, was transported to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 3:15 a.m. An autopsy revealed that two bullets had struck him, one in the thigh and the other in the back. The latter bullet had traveled through his chest and larynx, lodging in his neck. Ibid. ()
Upon questioning at the scene, Petitioner asserted that Hutchins had been shot in a drive-by shooting. However, when Petitioner could not support his version of events with any details, the police became suspicious and started searching the scene for a weapon. While searching, Officer Hunter overheard Lynch scream at Petitioner, "she [sic] didn't have to do that, you could have just got back in the car, you didn't have to shoot." Soonthereafter, Officer Hunter located the weapon -- a Charter Arms Undercover 39 Special revolver containing five empty shell casings -- on the sidewalk not far from Hutchins's body. Subsequent forensic testing confirmed that the bullet found in Hutchins's neck had been fired from the revolver found at the scene. Ibid.
Following the gun's discovery, Petitioner was arrested for unlawful possession of a weapon and taken to police headquarters. The others were also taken there for questioning. Ibid.
During the subsequent police investigation, both James and Barclay initially gave false statements, but later implicated Petitioner. Photo identifications were conducted, and both women identified defendant as the shooter. Ibid.
At approximately 8:00 p.m., a warrant was issued for Petitioner's arrest on murder charges. Shortly thereafter, police took him to an interview room. Police administered Miranda warnings to him. Christopher Smith, a detective from the Essex County Prosecutor's Office, interviewed Petitioner in the company of Willie Coley, an Orange police detective. After police confronted Petitioner with the incriminating evidence obtained from the witnesses to the Incident, he confessed. Police next asked him to provide a recorded statement. After agreeing and again waiving his Miranda rights, Petitioner did so, stating in part (Petitioner's "Statement"):
Jackson, 2011 WL 691642, at *2-3; ECF No. 13-2 at 13-34.
In June 2007, a grand jury charged Petitioner with: murder in violation of New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-3A (count one); unlawful possession of a handgun in violation of New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-5B(count two); and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose in violation of New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-4A (count three). (ECF No. 12-8.)
Petitioner was tried before a jury in September - October 2008. (ECF Nos. 11-8 - 12-3.) The jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts. (ECF No. 12-9.)
The Honorable Betty J. Lester, J.S.C. sentenced Petitioner on December 6, 2008 as follows: (1) thirty years without parole eligibility for murder (count one); and (2) five years for third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (count two), to be served concurrently with Petitioner's sentence for murder. (ECF No. 12-4.) The conviction for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose was merged into the murder conviction. The judge found aggravating factor 9 (the need for deterrence) and mitigating factor 3 (that Petitioner acted under strong provocation). Jackson, 2011 WL 691642, at *3 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-1a(9) and -1b(3)). The judge found the aggravating and mitigating factors to be in equipoise. Id. at *3.
On or about March 10, 2010, Petitioner directly appealed his conviction. His public defender filed a brief in support, and Petitioner submitted two pro se letter briefs. (ECF No. 12-11, 12-12, 12-14.) On March 1, 2011, the Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. State v. Jackson, 2011 WL 691642, at *1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 1, 2011). On June 30, 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Jackson, 22 A.3d 973 (N.J. 2013).
On or about August 11, 2011, Petitioner filed petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). (ECF No. 13-1.) On October 25, 2013, the Honorable Alfonse J. Cifelli, J.S.C. held a PCR hearing and denied relief. (ECF Nos. 12-7 and 13-4.)
On or about April 24, 2014, Petitioner appealed denial of PCR. (ECF No. 13-5.) (ECF No. 13-6 and 13-7.) On January 12, 2016, the Appellate Division affirmed the PCR denial. State v. Jackson, No. A-4037-13T2, 2016 WL 9694380, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2016). On May 6, 2016, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Jackson, 137 A.3d 1198 (N.J. 2016).
On October 18, 2016, Petitioner filed his § 2254 Petition. (ECF No. 1 at 19.) The Petition sets forth five claims: (1) the trial court's improper denial of, and the trial attorney's ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") with respect to, Petitioner's motion to suppress his Statement (ECF No. 1 at 7; ECF No. 1 at 27); (2) deprivation of Petitioner's constitutional right to cross-examination (ECF No. 1 at 9; ECF No. 1-1 at 7-8); (3) deprivation of his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf (ECF No 1 at 10; ECF No. 1-1 at 8-9); (4) trial court error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on self-defense (ECF No. 1 at 12; ECF No. 1-1 at 9-10); and (5) the trial court's improper decision regarding, and the trial counsel's IAC concerning, the State's motion to redact portions of Petitioner's Statement. (ECF No. 1 at 14; ECF No. 1-1 at 11-12.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), the district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." A habeas petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to relief for each claim presented in his petition. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011); Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 641 (2003). District courts must afford great deference to the determinations of the state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).
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