Jackson v. Boise Cascade Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 July 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-0761-AH-S.
• Citation: 941 F.Supp. 1122
• Parties: Earl JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

Page 1122

941 F.Supp. 1122

Earl JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 95-0761-AH-S.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

July 2, 1996.

Ronald A. Herrington, Jr., Mobile, AL, for plaintiff.

Sandy G. Robinson, Mobile, AL, for defendant.

ORDER

HOWARD, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. # 8]. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion. [Doc. # 16]. Upon review and careful consideration of Defendant's Motion and the evidence in support of such Motion, Plaintiff's Response and the evidence in support of such Response, the Briefs of the parties and the pleadings in this action, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be GRANTED. The Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff, Earl Jackson, worked in the wood yard at Defendant Boise Cascade Corporation's Jackson, Alabama wood yard. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that he was discharged by Boise Cascade because of his disabilities (sleep apnea and narcolepsy). Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").

2. Jackson began working for Boise Cascade on July 21, 1976. (Depo. of Plaintiff at 39.) At all times pertinent to Jackson's Complaint, Jackson worked in the wood yard. (Depo. of Plaintiff at 45-46.) As a part of his job in the wood yard, Jackson performed various functions. His primary duty was to help unload log trucks in the wood yard. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 58.) Jackson also did cleanup work in the wood yard area, using a "Bobcat" front-end loader. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 59, 119, 136-37, 140.) Additionally, Jackson worked in the reclaimer and drove chip trucks. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 92-98.)

3. In 1991, Jackson first noticed that he became sleepy during the day. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 90, 104.) He began to fall asleep at work. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 91.) Jackson stated that he would get sleepy even when he was standing up or working. (Plaintiff's Dep. at 104). On frequent occasions, Jackson admitted that he would sleep in the break room, reclaimer, and chip dump at times when he should have been working. (Id.)

4. In 1992, Jackson was caught sleeping in the chip dump. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 113-14.) Coleman Chastain, a supervisor, "chewed out" Jackson for such incident. (Id.) At the time that he was caught by Chastain, Jackson admits that he was falling asleep on the job every day, wherever he happened to be when he became sleepy. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 115-17.) Sometime after being caught by Chastain, Bill Lewis, the safety supervisor of the wood yard, saw Jackson asleep on the Bobcat front-end loader while the loader was still in gear. (Plaintiff's Depo. 118-19.)

5. In early 1993, Joe Baggett, another Boise Cascade employee, found Jackson asleep on the job. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 117, 125.) Baggett reported the incident to the mill's human resources department. Jackson attended a meeting along with union representatives. At such meeting, the human resources department determined that Jackson should be "laid off" until such time as he could get his sleeping problem resolved. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 126-30.) Jackson remained "laid off" for over three months, returning for work on April 30, 1993. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 132.)

6. On September 22, 1993, Jackson was using the Bobcat front-end loader to clean up. (Jackson's Depo. at 140.) Jackson developed a headache from the heat, so he pulled the Bobcat in the shade to relieve his headache. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 137-42.) Ken Stuart and William Walker, two supervisors, noticed Plaintiff on the Bobcat front-end loader and determined that he was asleep. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 138-42.) Jackson states that Walker shook him and that Stuart had noticed him asleep before Walker shook Jackson. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 138.) Jackson does not admit that he was asleep, but he concedes that his eyes were closed and that he did not notice either Stuart or Walker until Walker shook Jackson. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 138-42.)

7. On September 23, 1993, Jackson attended a meeting that was also attended by union representatives on his behalf. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 143.) Bill Hearn of the Human Resources Department informed Jackson that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss Jackson's sleeping and asked Jackson what made him go to sleep. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 144.) Jackson replied that he thought that his heat-induced headache had caused him to go to sleep. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 168, 144-146.) Jackson did not mention his sleep apnea or narcolepsy. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 168.) On September 24, 1993, Boise Cascade terminated Jackson's employment.

8. The reason given for Jackson's termination was "unacceptable job behavior/performance, namely repetitive sleeping on the job." (See Plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination attached to his Complaint.) Jackson alleges that Mr. Stuart stated in a letter to Jackson, that Jackson "continued to be a direct safety threat to [him]self and other employees, despite repeated efforts to help [him] through multiple sleep studies, EAP counseling, and disciplinary supervision." (Id.)

9. Jackson claims to have incurable narcolepsy and sleep apnea. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 151.) Jackson states that he falls asleep "wherever the problem hits [him]" and admits that he often falls asleep at least twice a day during his day shift work hours at Boise Cascade. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 151-52, 158-59.) Jackson usually falls asleep at about 10:00 a.m. and usually sleeps for about an hour. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 172-73.) Jackson again falls asleep in the afternoon, usually about 2:00 p.m., and often sleeps for as much as two hours each afternoon. (Id.) However, Jackson testified that he falls asleep whenever he gets sleepy and he is as likely to fall asleep if he is standing or sitting and no matter whether he is hot or cold. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 159.)

10. Jackson testified that his problem is incurable and will never be corrected. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 131, 151.) Jackson has not applied for a job since September of 1993, because of his medical condition. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 89-90.) However, Jackson claims that he can perform the essential functions of his job with Boise Cascade as it was structured before he was discharged. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 155.) Jackson further admits that he never asked Boise Cascade to change his job in any way to accommodate his alleged medical problems. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 156-57.)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted:

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). "A factual dispute is `genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is `material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law." Beck v. Somerset Technologies, Inc., 882 F.2d 993 996 (5th Cir.1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)); accord Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir.1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 911, 113 S.Ct. 1259, 122 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993).

The basic issue before the Court on a motion for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden the Court must view the movant's evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993). "If reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment." Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir.1985)).

Once the movant, here the Defendant, satisfies its initial burden under Rule 56(c) of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)) (emphasis omitted). Otherwise stated, the nonmovant must "demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991).<sup>1</sup> "A mere `scintilla' of evidence supporting the [nonmoving] party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party". Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). "[T]he nonmoving party may avail itself of all facts and justifiable inferences in the record taken as a whole." Tipton, 965 F.2d at 998 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)). "`The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Tipton, 965 F.2d at 999 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513) (citing Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158-159, 90 S.Ct. at 1608-09)). "Where the record taken as a...