Jackson v. Brown
Decision Date | 11 February 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 53263,53263 |
Citation | 164 N.W.2d 824,39 A.L.R.3d 1075 |
Parties | Janice JACKSON, Appellee, v. James BROWN, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John J. Respeliers, Omaha, Neb., and Dan J. Buckley, Harlan, for appellant.
Fred Louis, Jr., Harlan, for appellee.
The primary question for determination is plaintiff Janice Jackson's status while riding in an automobile owned and being operated by defendant James Brown.
Plaintiff brought a law action seeking recovery for injuries sustained March 21, 1967, when Brown's automobile overturned on a trip to Harlan. She alleged in one division of her petition that defendant's reckless operation of his vehicle was the proximate cause of her injuries and in the other she was a passenger, not a guest, and defendant's negligent operation had caused her damage.
At the close of plaintiff's evidence after dismissing the division based on recklessness the trial court overruled defendant's motion for directed verdict in all other respects. His motion renewed at the close of all evidence was overruled and the case submitted to the jury on the necessary elements of a negligence case, instructing on the passenger or guest issue. After overruling ruling motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for new trial, judgment was entered against defendant on the verdict. He appeals.
The issues on appeal relate to plaintiff's status as an occupant in the automobile when the accident occurred and the court's instructions on that issue.
Ling v. Hosts, Inc., Iowa, 164 N.W.2d 123 filed January 14, 1969.
The afternoon of the accident Sandra Barnett, George Weston, plaintiff and defendant met by chance at the Oasis tavern in Glenwood. All had been previously acquainted and fell into conversation concerning some chain saws owned by plaintiff's former husband which Weston understood were being offered for sale. Plaintiff told Weston and defendant she though the saws might be stored in Glenwood although Mr. Jackson was then living in Harlan. Weston persuaded defendant to take him to Harlan so he could inquire about the tools. Defendant reluctantly agreed. Plaintiff did not know Jackson's Harlan address but could locate the house. Both Weston and defendant asked plaintiff to go along and give directions. Plaintiff said she would but preferred not to go alone and asked Sandra Barnett to go along.
Mrs. Barnett and plaintiff were in the back seat as defendant drove with Weston in the front seat with him. As the parties approached an S-curve south of Harlan, defendant lost control of his vehicle which slid into the guard posts, jumped the ditch and rolled over, resulting in plaintiff's injuries.
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in (1) overruling his motion for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and (2) refusing to give his requested instructions 1 and 2 and overruling objections to court's instructions 2 and 4.
I. Under his first assigned error defendant contends plaintiff's failure to establish she was other than a guest while riding in defendant's automobile barred recovery for ordinary negligence under the guest statute. Section 321.494, Code, 1966, provides:
Of course, one who claims the guest statute is not applicable has the burden to prove his status was other than a guest. Livingston v. Schreckengost, 255 Iowa 1102, 1104, 125 N.W.2d 126, 127; Vipond v. Jergensen, 260 Iowa 646, 148 N.W.2d 598, 660; and Sieren v. Stoutner, Iowa, 162 N.E.2d 396, 401. Not only does plaintiff have the burden to establish her status, the action being predicated upon negligence of the operator or owner, but there is a presumption, rebuttable, that she was a guest within the meaning of section 321.494. Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 266-267, 106 N.W.2d 643, 647; Delay v. Kudart, 256 Iowa 523, 525, 128 N.W.2d 201, 202--203. In re Estate of Ronfeldt, 261 Iowa 12, 152 N.W.2d 837, 841--842.
We quote from Ronfeldt:
'That case recognizes a fourth category, i.e., where the relationship between operator and passenger is that of co-employees in furtherance of their employment in transportation as directed by their employer, they are not guest and host.
For plaintiff to recover under the circumstances here there must be substantive evidence that at the time of the accident she was riding in the vehicle 'for the definite and tangible benefit of the owner or operator'--the second category announced in Knutson v. Lurie, supra.
It is true the benefit to be received by the owner or operator need not be the only purpose or sole motivating factor in furnishing transportation, it need only be a substantial factor. Delay v. Kudart, supra, 256 Iowa at 528, 128 N.W.2d at 204. In re Estate of Ronfeldt, supra, 261 Iowa at 19, 152 N.W.2d at 842.
When benefits are to be considered, we have said such benefits to the operator or owner as are incidental to hospitality, social relations, companionship or the like are not definite and tangible benefits as are contemplated by the rule. Nielsen v. Kohlstedt, supra, 254 Iowa at 474, 117 N.W.2d at 903; Powers v. Hatcher, supra, 257 Iowa at 837, 135 N.W.2d at 114; In re Estate of Ronfeldt, supra, 261 Iowa at 19, 152 N.W.2d at 842.
We have announced these rules several times and the law is clear. Our problem arises when we are called upon to determine whether given facts constitute such definite and tangible benefit to the owner or operator that a jury question is created. Badger v. Groszbach, 259 Iowa 644, 145 N.W.2d 588, 589.
In Bodaken v. Logan, 254 Iowa 230, 233, 117 N.W.2d 470, 472, we quoted with approval the following from 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Perm. Ed., section 2292 (Now 5 Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, Third Ed., sections 212.8--212.15):
'In determining who are 'guests' within the meaning of automobile guest statutes, the enactments should not be extended beyond the correction of the evils which induced their enactment.
'They were designed to relieve the harshness of the common-law rule which requires the exercise of ordinary care even to a recipient of the driver's kindness and hospitality. In construing such statutes their terms are not always to be taken in their literal sense, and the court will consider not only the ordinarily accepted meaning of the words used, but also such interpretation as may have been applied to them under common law or similar statutes. * * * ...
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