Morrow v. Redd

• Citation: 257 Iowa 151,131 N.W.2d 761
• Decision Date: 15 December 1964
• Docket Number: No. 51056,51056
• Parties: Clarence MORROW, Appellant, v. Robert REDD, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 761

131 N.W.2d 761

257 Iowa 151

Clarence MORROW, Appellant, v. Robert REDD, Appellee.

No. 51056.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 15, 1964.

Joseph L. Phelan, Fort Madison, for appellant.

Johnson & Phelan, Fort Madison, for appellee.

LARSON, Justice.

The sole issue raised in this appeal is quite familiar. Was the evidence sufficient to generate a jury question on the status of plaintiff as a passenger for hire? We shall refer only to such evidence as may be germane to that issue. Of course, under the rule this evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.

Plaintiff, a 40-year-old laborer residing in Fort Madison, Iowa, met defendant, 29, also a resident of Fort Madison, at a tavern in that city on the afternoon of September 2, 1961. Plaintiff asked defendant to take him to Burlington some 15 miles away. He testified defendant told him 'If you will pay for the trip and buy the gasoline', he would do so. (Emphasis supplied.) Plaintiff also testified that as they were leaving Fort Madison for Burlington 'We stopped at a gas station on the corner of 6th right across from the Fort Lot, a Mr. Carroll's Station, and I bought $2.00 worth of gas. I gave him (defendant) $2.00 for the trip and bought us a package of cigarettes apiece.'

As they left Fort Madison on Highway 61 and approached a curve known as the Country Club Curve, defendant lost control of his car, which skidded about 216 feet before hitting a highline pole. The car was demolished and plaintiff was seriously injured. Plaintiff testified he had complained of excessive speed, in a 45-mile-an-hour zone, which he said reached 85 miles per hour just before the accident. The details of the accident need not be related in view of the fact that the only evidentiary question present in this appeal is the application of the Iowa guest statute. Section 321.494, Code of Iowa 1962, I.C.A. which provides: 'The owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for any damages to any passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not for hire unless damage is caused as a result of the driver of said motor vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or because of the reckless operation by him of such motor vehicle.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Plaintiff's petition was in several counts, but our concern here is only Counts I and II. The court found substantial evidence of reckless operation by defendant and submitted Count I alleging plaintiff was a guest. The court did not submit the question of plaintiff's status to the jury, but in effect held the evidence as to his status as a passenger for hire was insufficient to submit by dismissing Count II alleging defendant's negligent operation of his vehicle.

It is plaintiff's contention that the evidence was sufficient to require submission of Count II to the jury, and that it at least generated a jury question as to plaintiff's status which required the court to submit the issue to the jury.

In overruling plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground that the evidence showed he contracted and paid defendant for a ride to Burlington, the court considered the circumstances showed no more than a share-the-gasoline-expense arrangement and said this would 'not take a person out from under the Guest Statute', citing Haas v. Owens, 248 Iowa 781, 81 N.W.2d 654. In other words, the trial court held as a matter of law that plaintiff had failed to carry his burden to produce sufficient evidence to overcome his presumed status as a guest. We cannot agree.

I. As we have said many times, the dispute in such matters is not over the principles of law, but as to their application to the facts. It is well settled that one who rides in an automobile for the definite and tangible benefit of the owner or operator or for the mutual, definite and tangible benefit of the owner or operator on one hand and of himself on the other, is not a guest within the meaning of the guest statute, Section 321.494, and he may recover for negligence of the driver. Livingston v. Schreckengost, Iowa, 125 N.W.2d 126; Reeves v. Beekman, Iowa, 127 N.W.2d 95, 97; Nielsen v. Kohlstedt, 254 Iowa 470, 474, 117 N.W.2d 900, and citations; Knutson v. Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 195, 251 N.W. 147, 149.

II. It is, of course, true that each case must be decided in the light of its own facts. Among the items to be ascertained, if possible, is what primarily motivated the undertaking. Nielsen v. Kohlstedt, supra. To make that determination, evidence of the intention of the parties, their relationship, as well as the circumstances surrounding the transaction, is material. Livingston v. Schreckengost, supra; Ritter v. Dexter, 250 Iowa 830, 95 N.W.2d 280; Knutson v. Lurie, supra, 217 Iowa 192, 198, 251 N.W. 147; Bilbro v. Bilbro, Iowa, 128 N.W.2d 282, 283. Other important items to consider are as to who instigated the trip, its extent and who was to pay the expense thereof.

III. It is also true that we have in effect created a presumption, rebuttable, that an occupant riding in a car operated by another is a guest within the meaning of our guest statute, and placed upon the one contending otherwise the burden of proving same. Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 266, 267, 106 N.W.2d 643, 647. Furthermore, we have said: 'Such benefits to the operator or owner as are incidental to hospitality, social relations, companionship or the like are not definite and tangible benefits as are contemplated by the statute.' Reeves v. Beekman, Iowa, 127 N.W.2d 95, 98, and citations.

IV. Plaintiff was the instigator of this trip. He asked defendant to take him to Burlington. We take judicial notice of the fact that this distance does not exceed 15 or 20 miles. Although plaintiff did not disclose his purpose in making such a trip, defendant said: 'We had no real purpose--maybe to get some women.' It is clear however, that defendant agreed to take plaintiff to Burlington if he would 'pay for the trip and buy the gasoline.' Defendant does not deny that plaintiff paid $2.00 for gasoline placed in his car before the trip was commenced and bought him a package of cigarettes.

Plaintiff contends the evidence reveals that he paid defendant an additional $2.00 for the trip. The record on this point is not clear, but as defendant avoided reference to compensation in his cross-examination, we think the jury might find there was in fact an additional two-dollar payment. If so found, a conclusion would be justified that the compensation was more than nominal and that it sustains plaintiff's claim that he was a passenger for hire.

Defendant contends his benefit, if any, was social, and that plus a nominal rider's contribution was all the benefit he received. True, if that were so, plaintiff would fial to show he was not a guest under our holding in Haas v. Owens, supra, 248 Iowa 781, 784, 81 N.W. 654. However, we are satisfied there was substantial evidence tending to show more than a mere social benefit to the defendant. While we are not to be understood as saying that by furnishing $2.00 worth of gasoline a substantial showing of a passenger-for-hire arrangement is made, we believe other elements, such as the shortness of the trip, the original request of the plaintiff, the question of additional compensation, as well as the other circumstances surrounding the arrangement, could be considered by the jury in resolving the issue of hire or sufficiency of tangible benefits to the operator. Since the jury could find plaintiff was a passenger for hire, the issue of negligence raised in plaintiff's Count II should have been submitted to it.

V. We have considered the problem in several recent cases, the latest being Bilbro v. Bilbro, Iowa, 128 N.W.2d 282, where w...