Jackson v. Carland

• Decision Date: 02 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. COA07-1122.,COA07-1122.
• Citation: 665 S.E.2d 553
• Parties: Reginald Dudley JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. Chance Mitchell CARLAND, Individually, and Carland Ford Tractor, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

665 S.E.2d 553

Reginald Dudley JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. Chance Mitchell CARLAND, Individually, and Carland Ford Tractor, Inc., Defendants.

No. COA07-1122.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

September 2, 2008.

Appeal by defendants from judgment entered 27 April 2007 by Judge James U. Downs in Henderson County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 February 2008.

Pulley, Watson, King & Lischer, P.A., by Richard N. Watson, Durham, for plaintiff-appellee.

Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes & Davis, P.A., by Michelle Rippon, Asheville, for Carland Ford Tractor defendant-appellant.

Young, Morphis, Bach & Taylor, L.L.P., by Paul E. Culpepper, Hickory, for Chance Mitchell Carland defendant-appellant.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Defendants appeal from a jury verdict awarding plaintiff $275,000 in damages. We remand for a new trial.

FACTS

On 26 August 2003, Reginald Jackson ("plaintiff") and Chance Carland ("Chance"), an employee of Carland Ford Tractor, Inc. ("Carland Ford Tractor"), were involved in an automobile collision. In addition to being an employee of Carland Ford Tractor, Chance was also the son of the company's owner, Tony Carland. Chance was driving a company truck at the time he struck plaintiff's vehicle.

After colliding with the rear of plaintiff's truck, Chance left the scene of the accident and drove to an abandoned restaurant nearby. He was followed by Harry Roberts, who observed the accident and reported it to the State Highway Patrol. Shortly after receiving this report, Trooper Chris Goodson arrived at the restaurant to determine if the truck parked near the restaurant was the vehicle that had been involved in the earlier collision. When he arrived, Trooper Goodson found Chance circling the truck, trying to determine the extent of the damage. Trooper Goodson testified that had he not received the tip from Mr. Roberts regarding the vehicle's location, he would not have been able to locate it.

On 28 November 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint against Chance Carland and Carland Ford Tractor, Inc. ("defendants"), alleging that Chance's negligence was the proximate cause of the 26 August 2003 accident, and that Carland Ford Tractor was liable for Chance's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus, plaintiff sought to recover damages for, inter alia, his medical expenses, loss of earnings, decreased earning capacity, mental and/or emotional distress, disability, and pain and suffering.

On 12 April 2007, plaintiff's action was heard before a jury in Henderson County Superior Court. As an initial matter, defendants stipulated (1) that Chance Carland had negligently caused the accident, and (2) that Chance Carland had permission to use the truck owned by Carland Ford Tractor. Following defendants' stipulations, plaintiff put forward evidence to support his remaining claims. According to plaintiff, the collision with Chance's truck caused his head to strike the top of his pickup cab and his body to then hit the back of his seat. Dr. Jonathan Sherman testified that as a result of these injuries, plaintiff began to experience neck pain and was diagnosed with cervical extension syndrome, which he referred to as a "whiplash injury." Although he received several medications, this pain persisted. Plaintiff was later diagnosed with a herniated disc, which, according to testimony provided by Dr. Sherman, was directly correlated to the injuries he sustained from the 26 August 2003 accident.

Plaintiff also presented testimony from several other witnesses. Among these witnesses were Trooper Goodson and Mr. Roberts, who testified about Chance Carland's actions following the accident. Additional testimony, provided by plaintiff's employer, Bradley Snider, indicated that plaintiff's ability to perform his job had been limited since the accident occurred.

On 27 April 2007, the jury found Chance Carland had operated the truck owned by Carland Ford Tractor with the express or implied permission of the owner and determined that plaintiff was entitled to $275,000 in damages as a result of the 26 August 2003 accident. Defendants now appeal.

I.

Defendants first argue the trial court erred in permitting witnesses to testify regarding defendant Chance Carland's conduct at the time of the accident. According to defendants, this evidence lacked relevancy, was highly prejudicial, and was inadmissible under Rule 608 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. We disagree.

"Evidence is relevant if it has `any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'" Dunn v. Custer, 162 N.C.App. 259, 266, 591 S.E.2d 11, 17 (2004) (citation omitted); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2007). On appeal, the trial court's rulings on relevancy are given great deference. Dunn, 162 N.C.App. at 266, 591 S.E.2d at 17. "Moreover, even if the testimony admitted were irrelevant, a new trial would not be granted unless the objecting party was prejudiced thereby." Ferrell v. Frye, 108 N.C.App. 521, 526, 424 S.E.2d 197, 200, disc. review denied, 333 N.C. 537, 429 S.E.2d 557 (1993). For the judgment to be set aside, the defendant must show "that a different result would have ensued in the absence of the evidence." Id.

"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2007). "The exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is a matter generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 237, 461 S.E.2d 687, 708 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 116 S.Ct. 1021, 134 L.Ed.2d 100 (1996). The trial court's decision in this matter "will only be reversed upon a showing that the trial court's ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason or was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 690, 473 S.E.2d 291, 304 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1095, 117 S.Ct. 775, 136 L.Ed.2d 719, reh'g denied, 520 U.S. 1111, 117 S.Ct. 1122, 137 L.Ed.2d 322 (1997).

Here, defendants argue that the testimony provided by Trooper Goodson and Mr. Roberts, regarding Chance Carland's behavior after the accident, was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and inadmissible under Rule 608 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Defendants contend that because they stipulated (1) that Chance Carland was negligent and (2) that Chance Carland had permission to use the truck, the only issue before the court was the proper amount of damages. As evidence of Chance Carland's behavior at the time of the accident bears no relevance as to plaintiff's damages, defendants argue, this testimony was admitted in error and caused defendants to be prejudiced.

On review, we are unpersuaded by defendants' contentions. Although the record indicates defendants stipulated to negligence and permissive use, defendants' stipulation was equivocal as to whether Chance Carland was acting as an agent of Carland Ford Tractor at the time of the accident. As our Supreme Court has previously noted, the fact that an individual operated a vehicle with the owner's knowledge, consent, or authorization is not determinative as to the owner's liability. See Passmore v. Smith, 266 N.C. 717, 719, 147 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1966). Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the owner is liable for the other individual's negligence "only upon allegation and proof" that the individual was an agent of the owner and "that this relationship existed at the time and in respect of the very transaction out of which the injury arose." Id. (citation omitted). Thus, in the instant case, plaintiff still bore the burden of proving Chance Carland was the agent of Carland Ford Tractor. If Chance were acting as an agent of Carland Ford Tractor, it is possible that he desired to conceal this agency by running away from the scene. Therefore, the testimony of Trooper Goodson and Mr. Roberts regarding Chance's actions in fleeing the scene was relevant to show Chance's motivation for leaving the scene as it related to the possibility that he was acting as an agent for Carland Ford Tractor. Even assuming arguendo that the admission of this testimony was error, defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing how the trial result would have differed had the trial court not admitted this evidence. Therefore, we hold the aforementioned testimony was relevant and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing this testimony to be admitted at trial.

Defendants further argue that this testimony, which concerned prior acts of misconduct by Chance Carland, was inadmissible under Rule 608 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 608 of our Rules of Evidence provides:

Specific instances of conduct. — Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (2007). According to defendant, the introduction of testimony concerning Chance Carland's actions was meant to disparage his credibility. Because Chance did not testify, defendants argue, the issue of his credibility was not before the trial court and such testimony was inadmissible.

On review, we find defendants' contention to be without merit. "Rule...