State v. Womble

• Decision Date: 31 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 126A94,126A94
• Citation: 473 S.E.2d 291,343 N.C. 667
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Curtis Ray WOMBLE.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 291

473 S.E.2d 291

343 N.C. 667

STATE of North Carolina v. Curtis Ray WOMBLE.

No. 126A94.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 31, 1996.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Ralf F. Haskell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Janine M. Crawley, Assistant Appellate Defender, Durham, for defendant-appellant.

LAKE, Justice.

The defendant was indicted on 22 March 1993 for first-degree burglary and for the first-degree murder of Palmer Ray Brown. On 13 September 1993, the defendant pled guilty to the first-degree murder charge. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the first-degree burglary charge was dismissed. Following a capital sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended that the defendant be sentenced to death. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the jury selection and the defendant's capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error, and that the sentence of death is not disproportionate.

At the capital sentencing proceeding, the State presented evidence tending to show that Palmer Ray Brown, the sixty-year-old victim, was murdered on the night of 16 March 1993, and that the defendant confessed to the murder. The defendant, in his confession, stated that he, Jamieka Oliver and Tony Oliver had discussed "messing with" the victim and taking the victim's money. On the night of the murder, the defendant and Jamieka went to the victim's residence. The defendant entered the residence while Jamieka waited outside. Brown was asleep when the defendant found him. Defendant jumped on top of Brown and began beating him, first with his fist and then with a glass object that was sitting on a shelf behind the bed. The glass object shattered into pieces, so the defendant grabbed the base of a telephone and used it to hit Brown several more times in the head. After the phone slipped out of his hand, the defendant grabbed a frying pan from the shelf and began hitting the victim in the head with the pan. Grease flew out of the pan as the defendant beat the victim.

The defendant stated that throughout the assault, the victim was yelling, "You're going to kill me," but that he did not stop the assault until the victim stopped yelling. After the assault, the defendant searched the victim's pockets and the residence for money but did not find any. As the defendant searched the premises, the victim made "gargling" sounds. Later that evening, defendant told Tony Oliver that he thought he had killed Ray Brown. Defendant also asked Jamieka to go back to the victim's residence to get the frying pan and the telephone because defendant thought that they might have his fingerprints on them. Defendant also stated that he was not intoxicated, and that he had not used any drugs prior to murdering Brown. Defendant stated that he was aware of what he was doing and knew that killing Brown was wrong. Finally, defendant stated that he freely and voluntarily committed the murder.

Dr. Brent Hall, an expert in the field of forensic pathology, performed an autopsy on the victim. The autopsy revealed that the victim suffered numerous external lacerations, bruises and contusions, multiple skull fractures, bruises to the brain and other

internal brain injuries. Dr. Hall was able to form the opinion that the victim died as a result of head trauma inflicted by a blunt object. Dr. Hall was also of the opinion that the victim suffered moderate to severe pain as a result of his injuries, and that the victim could have lived for several minutes after receiving the blows to the head.

JURY SELECTION

In his first assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by permitting the State to reexamine a prospective juror whom the State had previously passed. We disagree.

During jury selection, the trial court asked prospective juror James Grange a series of death-qualifying questions. Mr. Grange indicated to the trial court that he would be able to vote for a recommendation of either death or life, that he would base his recommendation on the law and the evidence presented and that he had no prior opinion as to the appropriate punishment in this case. Mr. Grange responded in similar fashion to questions posed by the prosecution. However, when asked by the defendant to describe his general feelings regarding the death penalty, Mr. Grange stated that he believed in life in prison with hard labor. Following examination and acceptance of this juror by the defendant, the prosecution moved to reexamine prospective juror Grange pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(g). The trial court allowed the prosecution's motion, and this prospective juror was thereafter peremptorily excused by the prosecution.

Section 15A-1214(g) of the North Carolina General Statutes permits the trial court to reopen the examination of a prospective juror if, at any time before the jury has been impaneled, it is discovered that the juror has made an incorrect statement or that some other good reason exists. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(g) (1988). The decision whether to reopen the examination of a passed juror is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 216, 341 S.E.2d 713, 721 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988). Moreover, once the trial court reopens the examination of a juror, each party has the absolute right to exercise any remaining peremptory challenges to excuse such a juror. Id.

After a thorough review of the record, we find that a "good reason" existed for reopening the examination of prospective juror Grange. Mr. Grange's answer to defense counsel's question regarding his feelings about the death penalty was inconsistent with the earlier answers he gave to both the trial court and the prosecution. The only means to assure that Mr. Grange had been forthright in his answers to the trial court and to the prosecution regarding the death penalty was for the trial court to allow further inquiry into Mr. Grange's beliefs regarding capital punishment. The trial court, having "good reason," therefore did not abuse its discretion by reopening Mr. Grange's examination. This assignment of error is overruled.

In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends that under Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), it was error for the trial court to dismiss prospective juror Paula Dew for cause based upon her opposition to capital punishment.

In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court held that a prospective juror may not be excused for cause simply because he "voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." 391 U.S. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d at 785. However, a juror may be excused for cause if his views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52. Further, jurors may be properly excused if they are unable to " 'state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.' " State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430 S.E.2d 905, 907-08 (1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149-50 (1986)).

When initially questioned by the trial court in the case sub judice, Ms. Dew stated that, although she believed in capital punishment, she did not know whether she could vote for a recommendation of death. When asked if she could recommend a sentence of death if the State were to convince her personally of all the things the law requires, Ms. Dew responded, "I couldn't do it." During examination by defense counsel, Ms. Dew first indicated that she "couldn't personally hand down the death penalty" and that she "couldn't handle it." However, Ms. Dew later stated that although she did not wish to vote for the death penalty, she would if she had to. Ms. Dew also stated that she would listen to the trial court's instructions and keep an open mind about what her decision would be until she heard all of the evidence and the trial court's instructions. Following a reexplanation of the sentencing process by the prosecutor, Ms. Dew stated that she did not know whether her feelings regarding the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair her ability to sit as a juror in this case. When asked why she could not return a recommendation of death, Ms. Dew responded, "I don't think I could live with myself." Finally, when asked by the trial court if her feelings about the death penalty would interfere with her ability to be a juror, Ms. Dew responded, "Yes." Prospective juror Dew was then excused for cause.

Notwithstanding Ms. Dew's statement that she believed in the death penalty, her responses strongly indicated that she personally could not return a recommendation of death. Ms. Dew was never able to state clearly her willingness to temporarily set aside her own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. This Court has recognized "that a prospective juror's bias may not always be 'provable with unmistakable clarity,' " and in such instances, " 'reviewing courts must defer to the trial court's judgment concerning whether the prospective juror would be able to follow the law impartially.' " Brogden, 334 N.C. at 43, 430 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 624, 386 S.E.2d 418, 426 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 2587, 110 L.Ed.2d 268 (1990)). After a thorough review of the exchanges between the trial court, the prosecutor, counsel for the defendant and prospective juror Dew, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the views of prospective juror Dew would...