Jackson v. Cintas Corp.

• Citation: 391 F.Supp.2d 1075
• Decision Date: 30 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2:03CV1170-D.,2:03CV1170-D.
• Parties: Jennifer JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. CINTAS CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

391 F.Supp.2d 1075

Jennifer JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. CINTAS CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 2:03CV1170-D.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

September 30, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Britt Searcy Booth, Booth Law Offices, PA, Priscilla Black Duncan, P.B. Duncan & Associates, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Abdul K. Kallon, Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is Defendant Cintas Corporation's ("Cintas") motion for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 14.) A brief and an evidentiary submission accompany the motion.¹ (Doc. Nos. 16, 47.) Plaintiff Jennifer Jackson ("Jackson") submitted a response and an evidentiary submission. (Doc. No. 27.) Thereafter, Cintas filed a reply and a supplemental brief. (Doc. No. 48-49.) Jackson also filed a supplemental brief. (Doc. No. 52.)

Subsequently, the court entered an order, directing a limited reopening of the summary judgment record. (Doc. No. 60.) Cintas filed a response to the court's order (Doc. No. 62), to which Jackson submitted a reply. (Doc. No. 63; see also Doc. No. 64.)

Cintas moves for summary judgment on Jackson's claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 ("Title VII"), and state law. Her claims are premised on allegations that, during her employment with Cintas, commencing somewhere in the time frame between February 1998 and June 1998, and continuing intermittently until approximately March 2002, Jackson's supervisor, Chris Angell ("Angell"), sexually harassed her. The alleged sexual abuse took a variety of forms: Angell implied that performing oral sex on him would result in advancement at Cintas; he engaged Jackson in lewd propositions for sex on a daily basis for at least a year; he boasted of his sexual agility; twice, he grabbed his loins as an illustration of how Jackson aroused him; and, on two different occasions, he touched her breast.

The court carefully has examined the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole. For the reasons stated herein, as to the Title VII claim, the court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether there is actionable harassment under Title VII, and whether Cintas avoids liability based on the affirmative defense enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). The court, however, finds that summary judgment is due to be granted on the state law claims.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate allegations of both.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court considering a motion for summary judgment must construe the evidence and make factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment is entered only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). At this juncture, the court does not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but solely "determine[s] whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). This determination involves applying substantive law to the substantive facts that have been developed. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, based on the applicable law in relation to the evidence developed. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11^th Cir.1989).

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, which "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Summary judgment will not be entered unless the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. See id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS²

A. Cintas' Operations and Hierarchy

Jackson's employer, Cintas, provides multiple business services, including uniform rentals and sales. (John Laurenzi Aff. ¶ 2 (Ex. to Doc. No. 22).)³ On February 18, 1998, Jackson began working for Cintas in its Montgomery distribution center as an hourly employee in a position called "special operations" and remains employed in this position.⁴ (Pl. Dep. at 11-12 (Pl. Ex. 1 to Doc. No. 27)); (see also Pl. "Employment Status" form (Ex. to Pl. Dep.)); (Pl. E.E.O.C. Aff. ¶ 1 Ex. to Compl. (Doc. No. 1).) Cintas refers to its hourly employees, such as Jackson, as "partners." (Douglas Dep. at 132 (Def. Ex. 3 to Doc. No. 16)); (Holloman Dep. at 13-14 (Def. Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 16).)

The Montgomery distribution center is part of Cintas' distribution division. (Laurenzi Aff. ¶ 2.) The distribution center "warehouses, customizes and distributes products to Cintas' rental locations and also directly to Cintas' customers." (Id.)

The highest ranking official at the Montgomery distribution center is the general manager. (Id. ¶ 4.) The general manager reports to the vice president of the distribution and production planning division. This vice president works in Cintas' headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio. (Id.)

The distribution center operates twenty-four hours per day, with three shifts. (Id. ¶ 5.) There are three production supervisors, one for each shift, who directly supervise the hourly employees. (Id.) The three production supervisors report to the production manager,⁵ who in turn reports to the on-site general manager.⁶ (Id.)

During the time frame of the events at issue in this lawsuit, Carmen Douglas ("Douglas") worked as the human resources manager at the Montgomery distribution center. (Douglas Aff. ¶ 3 (Ex. B to Doc. No. 62).) Also, during the relevant time period, Kristi Clement-Williams ("Clement-Williams") held the position of director of human resources for Cintas' distribution and production planning division in Cincinnati, Ohio. (Clement-Williams Aff. ¶¶ 1, 7 (Ex. A to Doc. No. 62).) In that position, Clement-Williams "had oversight" over the Montgomery distribution center where Jackson works. (Id.)

Jackson complains that her superior, Angell, sexually harassed her. (Pl. Dep. at 28.) Angell began employment with Cintas in August 1996. When Jackson was hired, Angell was the production supervisor for the second shift. He directly supervised approximately thirty-five employees, including Jackson. (Pl. Dep. at 24); (Angell Dep. at 5 (Def. Ex. 4 to Doc. No. 16 & Pl.Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 27)); (Def. Resp. to Pl. 1^st Interrogs., No. 1 (Pl.Ex. A. to Doc. No. 27)); (Def. Resp. to Pl. E.E.O.C. charge at 2 (Pl.Ex. F attached to Holloman Dep. & Doc. No. 27).)

In June 1998, Angell relocated to Cintas' distribution center in Chicago, Illinois. The harassment ceased during this period when Angell was in Chicago. (Angell Dep. at 5 (Def. Ex. 2 to Doc. No. 16 and Pl.Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 27)); (Def. Resp. to Pl. 1^st Interrogs., No. 1.) Angell, however, returned to the Montgomery distribution center in June 1999 as operations manager. (Def. Resp. to Pl. 1^st Interrogs., No. 1.) In this position, Angell did not directly supervise the hourly employees; instead, the production supervisors reported to him. (Douglas Dep. at 46 (Def. Ex. 3 to Doc. No. 16).)

In March 2001, Angell was promoted to general manager at the Montgomery distribution center. (Def. Resp. to Pl. 1^st Interrogs., No. 1 (Pl.Ex. A to Doc. No. 27).) As general manager, he reported to Phillip Holloman ("Holloman"), vice president of the distribution and production planning division in Cincinnati, and later to Holloman's successor, Greg Emrick. (Def. Resp. to Pl. 1^st Interrogs., No. 1.) Angell served in this position until June 7, 2004. Although the parties dispute whether Cintas demoted Angell or whether Angell voluntarily stepped down, it is undisputed that, on June 7, Angell returned to the position of second-shift production supervisor and suffered a 38 percent salary reduction. (Def. Resp. to Pl. 1^st Interrogs., No. 1); (see also Angell "Employee Status Notification" form (Pl.Ex. to Holloman Dep. & Doc. No. 27)) (Def. Br. at 2 (Doc. No. 47)); (Pl. Resp. at 9 (Doc. No. 27)); (Angell Dep. at 5-6.)

B. The Sexual Harassment and Cintas' Investigation after Jackson's Complaint

From day one of Jackson's employment, Jackson was wary of Angell. His sexual prowess was a topic of conversation in the Montgomery distribution center. There were many discussions among hourly employees about his alleged sexual affair with a subordinate employee, and rumors abounded that he had impregnated her. (Pl. Dep. at 215-220); (Michelle Harris Aff. ¶¶ 4-5 (part of Pl. Ex. 4 to Doc. No. 27)); (Douglas Dep. at 71-73, 79-80); (Pl.E.E.O.C.Aff.¶ 4.)

Jackson's intuition proved correct, as Angell wasted no time honing in on Jackson. At the outset of Jackson's employment, Angell, who at the time was her direct supervisor, began harassing her. Angell told Jackson that "doing special things gets you high places" at Cintas, and he defined "special things" as ...