Jackson v. City Council of Augusta, Ga.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. CV190-286.
• Citation: 841 F. Supp. 1214
• Parties: Leroy JACKSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA, GEORGIA and City of Augusta, Georgia, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

841 F. Supp. 1214

Leroy JACKSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA, GEORGIA and City of Augusta, Georgia, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. CV190-286.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Augusta Division.

November 30, 1993.

Mark Louis Wilhelmi, Augusta, GA, Charles Leslie Wilkinson, III, Augusta, GA, for plaintiffs.

Ziva Peleg Bruckner, Paul Hammond Dunbar, III, Capers, Dunbar, Sanders, Bruckner & Clarke, Augusta, GA, for defendants.

ORDER

BOWEN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs and Defendants move for summary judgment in the captioned case. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are firemen currently or formerly employed at the Augusta Fire Department by Defendant City of Augusta, Georgia (the City), an incorporated municipality in Richmond County, Georgia. Defendant City Council of Augusta, Georgia, is the City's governing body. Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against Defendants alleging noncompliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the City's hourly wage scheme does not meet the FLSA's overtime requirements. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend their "on-call" time as fire fighters is compensable working time under the FLSA.

The essential facts are not disputed. Prior to July 1, 1985, Plaintiffs received no overtime compensation; they were paid a fixed annual salary in bi-weekly installments, regardless of the actual number of hours worked. Plaintiffs worked (and continue to work) considerable overtime by most standards — approximately 3120 total working hours per year, an average of 60 hours worked per week. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985) on April 15, 1985, making the FLSA applicable to state and local governments, the City implemented a new, hourly-based wage scheme, effective July 1, 1985, designed to comply with the FLSA.¹ The City admits that its new compensation system was designed to accord with the FLSA's overtime requirements without increasing payroll costs. In converting from fixed salaries to an hourly wage system that properly compensates overtime hours under the FLSA, the City determined precisely what hourly wage for each fireman would produce the same annual salary paid him under the former system, with overtime paid at the required overtime rate. Since the FLSA requires that overtime hours (those worked over forty in a workweek) be paid at a rate 50% higher than the non-overtime or "straight time" rate, see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), the City simply increased by 50% (for computation purposes only) the total number of hours worked per annum, then divided each fire fighter's projected annual salary by the artificially inflated hours worked, 3640, to arrive at the desired hourly wage.²

Under the new pay system, the City's "pay schedule" reflects projected annual, monthly, bi-weekly and weekly compensation for all firemen, by title. A fireman's hourly wage rate is established by dividing his projected annual compensation from the pay schedule by 3,640. The City maintains records of the hours worked by each fireman. At the end of each bi-weekly pay period, the number of straight time and overtime hours worked is submitted to a payroll clerk. The payroll clerk enters into a computer the number of hours actually worked, and the payroll computer automatically multiplies the number of straight time hours by the hourly wage rate and the number of overtime hours by the overtime rate. Pay stubs distinguish straight and overtime compensation.

This lawsuit also concerns Plaintiffs' "on-call" time as fire fighters, which the City currently does not compensate. The Augusta Fire Department's employee manual requires that all firemen be available at all times, even when off duty, to respond to a general alarm within thirty to forty minutes of being summoned. The firemen receive no compensation for their time off duty unless they are called and respond to a general alarm. If a fireman fails to timely respond to a general alarm, he loses one day's pay. There are no restrictions on what a fireman can do when off duty. He may, for example, hold a second job, recreate in any manner, cook, entertain, visit friends, or do any thing else he enjoys doing or needs to do. Several of the City's fire fighters reside in locations too far from Augusta to respond to a general alarm within the required time. Most of the City's fire fighters hold a second job, and some have jobs that take them away from the Augusta area on a regular basis, rendering impossible their timely response to a general alarm. Since 1985 there have been two general alarms, both of which occurred in 1987.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on December 11, 1990, seeking to recover, among other things, alleged unpaid overtime and compensation for on-call time.³ Defendants dispute Plaintiffs' allegations of noncompliance with the FLSA. Both sides contend they are entitled to prevail on the undisputed facts as a matter of law.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Requirements for summary judgment

The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The applicable substantive law identifies which facts are material in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

"The movant bears the initial burden to show, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991). When the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must carry its burden at summary judgment by presenting evidence affirmatively showing that, "on all the essential elements of its case ..., no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc). When the non-moving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may carry its burden at summary judgment either by presenting evidence negating an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or by pointing to specific portions of the record which demonstrate that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial, see Clark, 929 F.2d at 606-608 (explaining Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); merely stating that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial is not sufficient, Clark, 929 F.2d at 608. Any evidence presented by the movant must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. at 1608.

If — and only if — the moving party carries the initial burden, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party "to demonstrate that there is indeed a material issue of fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark, 929 F.2d at 608. The non-moving party cannot carry its burden by relying on the pleadings or by repeating conclusory allegations contained in the complaint. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010, 102 S.Ct. 2303, 73 L.Ed.2d 1306 (1982). Rather, the non-moving party must respond by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. A genuine issue of material fact will be said to exist "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

The clerk has given the non-moving party notice of the summary judgment motion, the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and of the consequences of default; thus, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1985), are satisfied. The time for filing materials in opposition has expired, and the motion is ripe for consideration. The Court will proceed to review the applicable substantive law and inquire whether the moving party — and, if necessary, the non-moving party — has carried its burden as set forth above. See Clark, 929 F.2d at 609 n. 9.

B. Summary Judgment in the Present Case

The parties' summary judgment arguments are easily summarized: Defendants contend the City's new hourly wage scheme complies with the FLSA's overtime requirements; Plaintiffs argue that the use of a "deflated" hourly rate to compute overtime compensation is improper under the FLSA because such rate is not based on the actual number of hours worked during the subject pay period. Regarding on-call time, Defendants contend Plaintiffs are not working when on-call and thus are not entitled to compensation for this time under the FLSA. Plaintiffs do not address the issue of on-call compensation in their briefs.

1. Overtime

Under the FLSA, hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek must be compensated at one and one-half times the "regular rate" of pay. 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1).⁴ Plaintiffs contend the "regular rate" from which the City computes their overtime compensation is unlawful under the FLSA because it is derived from an artificially inflated number of hours worked per annum. Although the FLSA does not prescribe a method of calculating the "regular rate,"⁵ the Supreme Court has held that "the regular rate refers to the hourly rate actually paid the employee for the normal, non-overtime workweek for which he is employed." Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424, 65 S.Ct. 1242, 1245, 89 L.Ed. 1705 (1945). See also 29 C.F.R. § 778.108 (adopting the Walling...