Jackson v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 28 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. B159850.,B159850.
• Citation: 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 325,111 Cal.App.4th 899
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Johnny JACKSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

4 Cal.Rptr.3d 325

111 Cal.App.4th 899

Johnny JACKSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B159850.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3.

August 28, 2003.

Review Denied November 25, 2003.

Mounger, Gonda & Seki and Darryl Mounger, Burbank, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Mark Burton, Senior Assistant City Attorney, and Matthew C. St. George, Jr., Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

KITCHING, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal presents the issue whether Government Code section 3304, subdivision (d)¹ in the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (§ 3300 et seq., the Bill of Rights Act) establishes the statute of limitations in a charter city's action to discharge a police officer, or whether, under home rule provisions applicable to charter cities in article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution, the city charter establishes the statute of limitations. We conclude that because section 3304, subdivision (d) addresses a matter of statewide interest, it prevails over the city charter's limitations provision. We hold that section 3304, subdivision (d), as implemented by the police department's own administrative order, establishes the statute of limitations. Because the facts show that section 3304, subdivision (d) barred the city's administrative complaint, we reverse a judgment denying appellant's petition for writ of mandate.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Discipline imposed on city employees affects their fundamental vested right in employment. (McMillen v. Civil Service Com. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 125, 129, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 548; Schmitt v. City of Rialto (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 494, 500, 210 Cal.Rptr. 788.) When an administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court uses an independent judgment standard of review, examines the administrative record for errors of law, and exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence. The appellate court must sustain the trial court's factual findings if substantial evidence supports them. (Evans v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 958, 967, fn. 1, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 460.) This court's review must resolve all conflicts in the evidence and must draw inferences in support of the judgment. This court, however, independently determines questions of law. (Oldham v. Kizer (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1057, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 195.)

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Johnny Jackson worked as a Los Angeles Police Department police officer with his partner, Officer Christian Shaw. Jackson made statements to Shaw which threatened injury to other police officers and harm to the West Valley police station. Shaw also witnessed an argument between Jackson and another officer at the West Valley station.

On March 25, 1999, Shaw told a supervisor, Sergeant Carl Widman, that Jackson might have problems of which Widman and other officers were not aware. Widman responded that he knew Jackson was having problems, that Jackson would be off work for a couple of days, and that Widman would assess Jackson when he returned to work.

No later than March 26, 1999, Shaw told fellow police officer Richard Bengtson that Jackson plotted to kill police officers if they came to his house or stopped him on the street, had a list of 10 officers he would "take out," and had a plan to use an assault rifle in his locker to kill police officers at the station. On March 26 or 27, 1999, Bengtson notified a supervisor, Sergeant II Paul Sciarrillo, of Shaw's statements about Jackson's misconduct.

On April 12, 1999, Sergeant Sciarrillo advised Sergeant II Thomas Wunsch, of the police department's Internal Affairs Group, that on April 2, 1999, Officer Shaw had told Sciarrillo that Jackson said he was going to shoot police officers at the West Valley Station. Acting on behalf of the Internal Affairs Group, Sergeant Wunsch prepared a written report of these allegations dated April 12, 1999.

On March 31, 2000, the chief of police issued an administrative complaint against Jackson, alleging the three counts involved in this appeal. Counts 1 and 2 alleged that between February 1 and March 31, 1999, Jackson made improper remarks to Shaw. Count 3 alleged that on March 21, 1999, Jackson made a threatening remark to another police officer.

In a hearing conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department Board of Rights, Jackson argued that as to counts 1, 2, and 3, the one-year statute of limitations of section 3304, subdivision (d) barred the Department from filing the March 31, 2000, administrative complaint. The Board rejected this argument.

On October 26, 2000, the Board found Jackson guilty of counts 1, 2, and 3, and recommended termination. The chief of police terminated Jackson on November 14, 2000.

On January 23, 2001, Jackson filed a petition for peremptory writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) and a claim for ancillary damages (Code Civ. Proc., § 1095) against the City of Los Angeles and the Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department. Jackson's petition claimed that the investigation of Counts 1, 2, and 3 was not completed within one year of discovery and thus was barred by Los Angeles City Charter, article XIX, section 202(4) (hereafter Charter section 202(4)) and Government Code section 3304, subdivision (d).

The trial court denied Jackson's petition as to counts 1, 2, and 3, and entered judgment, from which Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal.

IV. CONTENTIONS

Jackson contends that the disciplinary action against him was barred by section 3304, subdivision (d) and City of Los Angeles Administrative Order No. 7 (Administrative Order No. 7), which required the City of Los Angeles to file its administrative complaint against him within one year of discovery of misconduct by a supervisor (Sergeant I or Detective II or higher). Because Officer Bengtson reported Jackson's misconduct to Sergeant Sciarrillo, a Sergeant II, no later than March 27, 1999, Jackson argues that the City of Los Angeles administrative complaint filed on March 31, 2000, was untimely.

The City of Los Angeles contends that its city charter established the limitations period, which required the Los Angeles Police Department to file an administrative complaint against an officer no more than one year after the misconduct was (1) discovered by the Los Angeles Police Department and (2) brought to the attention of the Chief of Police. Thus because Sergeant Sciarrillo brought Jackson's misconduct to the attention of the Chief of Police in his report to the Internal Affairs Group on April 12, 1999, the City of Los Angeles argues that its March 31, 2000, administrative complaint was timely filed.

V. DISCUSSION

We first address whether section 3304, subdivision (d) or the Charter of the City of Los Angeles establishes the limitations period. Having concluded that section 3304, subdivision (d) establishes the limitations period, we further find that the administrative complaint was untimely and therefore the statute barred the City's punitive action against Jackson.

A. The Bill of Rights Act Prevails Over the Los Angeles City Charter, and Section 3304, Subdivision (b) Establishes the Limitations Period

1. The State of California and City of Los Angeles Statutes of Limitation

The limitations statutes relied on by the parties both establish a one-year limitations period. The statutes differ, however, in defining when the limitations period commences.

Section 3304, subdivision (d), part of the Bill of Rights Act, states: "Except as provided in this subdivision and subdivision (g), no punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken for any act, omission, or other allegation of misconduct if the investigation of the allegation is not completed within one year of the public agency's discovery by a person authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct." "Punitive action" includes "any action that may lead to dismissal." (§ 3303.)

On March 22, 1999, the Office of the Chief of Police of the Los Angeles Police Department issued Administrative Order No. 7. It recognized that enactment of section 3304, subdivision (d) might affect Charter section 202(4) (quoted, post) and stated: "Until there is further judicial or legislative clarification, City and State laws should be read in conjunction to the extent possible when considering misconduct investigations and final disciplinary decisions." Specifically regarding the limitations period, Administrative Order No. 7 stated:

"I. COMPLETION OF MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS. [¶] Investigations of misconduct should be completed within one year of the discovery of the misconduct by a supervisor (Sergeant I or Detective II or higher). This time limit includes the filing of the verified written complaint with the Police Commission following service upon the sworn employee."

Jackson argues that Administrative Order No. 7 identifies a supervisor (Sergeant I or Detective II or higher) as the "person" in section 3304, subdivision (d) who is "authorized to initiate an investigation of the allegation of an act, omission, or other misconduct."

The City of Los Angeles argues that the limitations period does not begin to run until the matter is reported to the chief of police. It relies on Charter section 202(4) in effect during 1999 and 2000,² which stated: "No tenured officer of the Department shall be discharged, suspended, demoted in rank, or suspended and demoted in rank for any conduct that (a) was discovered by the Department and brought to the attention of the Chief of Police more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint against the officer[.]"

2. As a Matter of Statewide Concern, Section 3304, Subdivision (d) Applies to the City of Los Angeles

Jackson argues that pursuant to section 3304, subdivision (d), the statute of limitations period...